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Abstract 
 
Motivation:  
The IASB and the UK ASB have adopted different financial reporting rules for 
different classes of company. The IASB have IFRS and IFRS for SMEs. In the UK, 
currently companies follow IFRS (for public companies), UK GAAP (for medium-
sized companies) or FRSSE (for small companies). Furthermore, some companies 
are exempt from audit. It is difficult to evaluate the efficacy of this approach to 
regulation since the ASB (and IASB) do not specify what consequences should 
follow. Do they expect public companies have higher accounting quality than 
medium and small companies? Or do they expect accounting quality to be the same 
across different groups of companies? 
 
Objective:  
The main objective of this study is to examine accounting quality in order to inform 
the future policy and discussion about the differential reporting framework. 
We examine the effects of accounting standards across public, medium and small 
companies. However, companies also face reporting discipline from market forces, 
and consequently we also examine the impact of debt-holders on reporting quality 
across and within medium and small companies. 
 
Methodology:  
We measure accounting quality from different aspects. For the assessment of 
differential accounting standards, we use: the level of accruals (ratio of cash flows to 
earnings), earnings smoothing, and target beating. For the assessment of any debt-
holders effect, we use aspects that are suited to their needs, namely: earnings 
conservatism, and earnings persistence. 
 
Main Findings:  
Under the discipline of accounting standards, we find that the financial reporting 
behaviour of medium sized entities is significantly different from public and small 
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companies. This suggests that accounting standards do not equalise accounting 
quality. 
The impacts of debt-holders on accounting quality are generally weak within 
medium and small companies. This implies that accounting standards are the main 
discipline for financial reporting for medium and small companies, which is 
consistent with the suggestions of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). However, we raise a 
few issues concerning the interpretation of the accounting quality measurements 
(earnings conservatism and earnings persistence) and provide theoretical and 
empirical support for the discussion. 
 
Recommendations: 
We suggest the accounting regulations for private companies may need to be further 
strengthened, especially for medium-sized companies. 
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Abbreviation Meaning Page 
ACCA Association of Chartered Certified Accountant 19 
ASB 
Accounting Standards Board in the UK. The role of the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) was to issue 
accounting standards. It was recognised for that purpose under the Companies Act 1985. It took over the 
task of setting accounting standards from the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) in 1990. 
12 
ASC Accounting Standards Committee, first recognizable standard setter. It is replaced by ASB in 1990. 19 
CCAB Consultative Committee of Accounting Bodies 19 
FRC 
Financial Reporting Council, it is the UK's independent regulator responsible for promoting high quality 
corporate governance and reporting to foster investment. 
19 
FRED 
Financial Reporting Exposure Draft, it is issued as part of the process of developing a new Financial 
Reporting Standard. 
12 
FRRP Financial Reporting Review Panel 19 
FRSSE Financial Reporting Standards for Smaller Entities. Sometimes it is referred as small GAAP. 10 
IASC 
International Accounting Standards Committee, it was founded in June 1973 in London and replaced by 
the International Accounting Standards Board on 1 April 2001. It was responsible for developing the 
International Accounting Standards and promoting the use and application of these standards. 
20 
IASB 
International Accounting Standards Board, it is responsible for developing International Financial 
Reporting Standards (the new name for International Accounting Standards issued after 2001), and 
promoting the use and application of these standards. 
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IAS International Accounting Standard 20 
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 17 
ICAS Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland 19 
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IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards, issued by IASB after 2001. 12 
Industrial Classifications 
Companies observations are grouped into 10 major industry sectors, which include Primary, 
Manufacturing, Utility, Construction, Wholesale, Service, Transport, Telecom, Other services, Education 
& Health. 
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Manufacturing 
Manufacturing sector includes food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, leather, wood, cork, 
paper, publishing, printing, chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products, metals & metal products, 
machinery, equipment, furniture, and recycling. 
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Other Service Other services sector includes other services, public administration and defence 63 
Primary Primary sector includes agriculture, mining, and etc.  63 
Service Service sector includes hotels and restaurants 63 
SMEs 
Small and Medium-sized Entities. Based on Companies Act (2006), medium-sized company is the one 
that satisfies at least of the following: (1) a turnover of not more than £25.9 million, (2) a balance sheet 
total of not more than £12.9 million, and (3) not more than 250 employees.  A small company is that 
fulfill at least two of the following: (1) has a turnover of not more than £6.5 million, (2) a balance sheet 
total of not more than £3.26 million, and (3) not more than 50 employees. 
10 
Telecom Telecom sector includes post and telecommunication  
UK GAAP 
UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, is a mixture of Financial Reporting Standards (FRS), 
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) and IFRS-based standards.  
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Utility Utility sector includes gas, water, electricity. 63 
Wholesale Wholesale sector includes wholesale and retail trade. 63 
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General Introduction 
Current Background of Differential Reporting 
Current financial reporting structure in the UK follows a three-tiers system of 
different reporting framework: public listed companies are following full 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to prepare consolidated 
accounts; private medium-sized companies are following the UK Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP); and private small companies are following 
Financial Reporting Standards for Smaller Entities (FRSSE). This underlying 
differential reporting framework is developed based on the public accountability and 
size criteria, which is defined in the Companies Act 2006 (sections 382 and 465)
1
. 
According to this a medium-sized company is the one that satisfies at least of the 
following: (1) a turnover of not more than £25.9 million, (2) a balance sheet total of 
not more than £12.9 million, and (3) not more than 250 employees.  A small 
company is that fulfill at least two of the following: (1) has a turnover of not more 
than £6.5 million, (2) a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million, and (3) 
not more than 50 employees.  
With the development of differential reporting standards for smaller entities, 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued the new sets of 
accounting standards – IFRS for Small and Medium-sized Entities (SMEs) in 2009. 
The IASB suggests that IFRS for SMEs are general-purpose accounting standards 
regardless of size, and leave each jurisdiction to decide the size criteria to follow 
IFRS for SMEs. Beginning of 2012, in line with IASB’s move, the UK Accounting 
Standard Board (ASB) proposed Financial Reporting Exposure Draft (FRED) 48, 
which is about the future of Financial Reporting in the UK and Republic of Ireland. 
The FRED 48 proposes that medium-sized companies should follow Financial 
Reporting Standards 102, which is based on IFRS for SMEs; and public listed and 
small companies should remain the same to follow full IFRS and FRSSE. UK ASB 
(FRED 48) suggests that accounting standards for SMEs should be proportionate to 
the size of entities and companies that will follow IFRS for SMEs will be based on 
existing size criteria.  
                                                        
1
 It defines private companies as SMEs for the purpose of accounting requirements. 
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Unclear incentives and objectives 
However, differential accounting regulations for different classes of companies 
are developed with mixed incentives. Further, there is no clear indication of what 
they expect on companies’ financial reporting quality across different boundaries. 
Studies on accounting quality have increased dramatically ever since the emergence 
of accounting standards. Accountings standards are in the position of disciplining 
companies to report good quality of earnings (Ball, 2001), but what are regulators’ 
expectations of accounting quality? In the process of making accounting regulations, 
regulators do not make clear of what they expect. Do they expect higher accounting 
quality for larger entities and lower accounting quality for smaller entities? Or do 
they expect equalized accounting quality across all tiers of companies? 
Hence, it is difficult to evaluate the efficacy of proposed financial reporting 
framework since the ASB and IASB do not specify what consequences that 
companies should follow. Is differential reporting a response to the differential 
importance of companies and the differential cost of compliance? This approach 
would suggest that variation in financial reporting quality across companies is 
acceptable. Or is differential reporting a response to the differential complexity of 
transactions and the incentive to report truthfully and fairly? This approach would 
suggest that variation in financial reporting quality across companies is not 
acceptable.  
The issues on unclear objectives and expectations of developing accounting 
standards are demonstrated in a few studies. Watts and Zimmerman (1979) argue 
that process of developing new accounting standards is the process of negotiation 
because regulators do not have enough understanding of how companies are going to 
behave. Young (2003) suggests that “the standards are to be seen as emergent from a 
rational process that separates the technical and political rather than as the result of 
the demand of economic reality”. She also indicates standard setters engage 
rhetorical strategies to persuade users that standards are appropriate, correct and 
useful (Young, 2003) 
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Disciplines of Firms’ Accounting Quality 
There are two forces discipline accounting quality of firms, which are legal 
forces and market forces. Legal forces include accounting standards, auditors and tax 
authorities. Market forces include investors, shareholders, and debt-holders.  
Discipline from legal forces 
Accounting standards are firstly emerged in early 1930s in the US 
because companies were trying to manage earnings to report improved 
financial performances. Hence, accounting standards are in the position to 
discipline companies so as to report good quality of earnings that could better 
reflect firms’ financial performance.  
Accounting standards determine how the accounting information on 
earnings should be computed and reported. High quality of standards 
influences the users’ perception of quality of financial information (Wulandari 
and Rahman, 2004 pg.2). High quality accounting standards are perceived to 
provide consistent, comparable, relevant and reliable financial information to 
the investors for decision-making of specific investment (Wulandari and 
Rahman, 2004 pg.2).  
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) indicate that accounting standards limit 
the opportunistic distortions, which will result high accounting quality. 
Further, Givoly et al (2010) suggest that the role of accounting standards is to 
balance the effects from both the demand of reporting high quality of financial 
information from market and the incentives of managing earnings from 
companies. 
Discipline from market forces 
Investors, shareholders, and debt-holders demand good accounting 
quality. Skinner (1997) indicates that companies have stronger incentives to 
improve their accounting information and disclosure, and enhance their 
financial transparency so as to mitigate potential lawsuits and to reduce the 
cost of their equity capital.  
In addition, consistent with Skinner (1997), Givoly et al (2010) suggest 
that investors will demand high quality of accounting from firms because 
accounting information is the main type of information contractually available 
General Introduction 
15 
 
to public equity holders. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) suggest that the reason 
why public companies have higher accounting quality than private companies 
is because public companies have more market demand to report higher 
accounting quality than private firms. 
Ball Robin and Sadka (2008) suggest debt-holders demand higher 
accounting quality from companies, as financial statements are their primary 
information source about the firm.  
 
Main Objective 
The main objective of this PhD thesis is to compare accounting quality across 
existing boundaries, due to the lack of expectations from IASB and UK ASB on 
accounting quality across different tiers of companies and the IFRS for SMEs is not 
yet adopted in the UK. That is we compare the accounting quality across as well as 
within each group of companies, which are subject to IFRS, UK GAAP, and FRSSE. 
The purpose of this is to inform discussion about the suitability of existing 
boundaries between groups (public listed, medium-sized and small companies). We 
propose no formal criteria on the desired differences between each group of 
companies.  
The comparison of accounting quality across different tiers of companies will 
be based on two disciplines – the discipline from accounting standards and discipline 
from debt-holders. The purpose of this is to examine whether there is any variation 
in accounting quality under these two types of discipline for each group of 
companies. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The general structure of this PhD thesis is as follows: followed by this general 
introduction, histories and background of development on accounting standards will 
be provided and current issues will be discussed in chapter 1; the accounting quality 
and different methods of measuring accounting quality will be discussed in chapter 2 
of the thesis. 
In the chapter 3, we examine the effects of accounting regulations on 
accounting quality across different groups of companies. The purpose of this is to 
examine whether accounting standards ensure equalised accounting quality across 
General Introduction 
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different groups of companies. We measure accounting quality by level of accruals 
across companies as well as across and within industries. 
In the chapter 4, we continue to examine accounting quality across each group 
of companies under the effects of accounting regulations. In measuring accounting 
quality, accruals are affected by different factors. Hence, we adjust for different 
factors to measure accounting quality in view of general earnings management 
(earnings smoothing) and specific earnings management (target beating).  
In the chapter 5, we focus on the accounting quality on SMEs only, since 
public companies are disciplined by tougher regulations and well-developed market. 
We examine the impacts of debt-holders on accounting quality for medium and 
small companies. We measure accounting quality by earnings conservatism and 
earnings persistence. 
The general conclusion is provided at the end of thesis.  
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Chapter 1: History and Background 
1.1 Development of Accounting 
Accounting has thousand years’ history. The earliest accounting records were 
found in Mesopotamia (Assyrians), which could be dated back more than 7,000 
years. Initially, people applied primitive accounting methods to record the growth of 
crops and herds. Accounting emerged, improving over the years and developing as 
business developed (Friedlob et al, 1996). 
 
1.1.1 Double-entry bookkeeping 
Early accounts served mainly to assist the memory of the businessperson, and 
the user of the account was the proprietor or record keeper alone (Richardson, 2013). 
Cruder forms of accounting were inadequate for the problems created by a business 
entity involving multiple investors (Richardson, 2013). The very first double-entry 
bookkeeping was introduced in Italy in 1494, where trading ventures began to 
require more capital than a single individual was able to invest (Richardson, 2013). 
The work on double-entry bookkeeping was first printed in English version in the 
UK, in 1553. The increased economic activity and the naval strength had made 
England as global trade centre in 18th century, and the very first accountancy firm 
was established in Bristol in 1780s (ICAEW, 2012).  
 
1.1.2 Company Regulation History 
The UK transformed from an agricultural-based economy towards mercantile 
and manufacturing activities in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, and hence, one of the 
main purposes of accounting was pure recordkeeping in order to monitor the debts or 
check the honesty of employees (Day, 2000). Going into the19th century, the 
industrial revolution started in Britain together with rapid economic growth and 
development, which led to a succession of corporate scandal and insolvencies in the 
1840s, and hence, greater public control in the form of audit and winding up of these 
companies (ICAEW, 2012). Between years of 1831 to 1883, a series of Companies 
Act and bankruptcy acts were published (ICAEW, 2012). Incorporation was only 
possible through Royal Charter or private act before the British Joint Stock 
Companies Act, which was an Act of Parliament (Business Accounting Basics, 
2012). In 1844, the British Joint Stock Companies Act permitted companies to be 
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incorporated, which were owned by one or more individuals (Business Accounting 
Basics, 2012). 
As a consequence, many businesses with thousands of members and 
management were operated as unincorporated associations, and regulations for 
underlying businesses were limited. If customers had a grievance or complaints 
against an unincorporated association, their only way was to file a lawsuit against 
every member individually, which was virtually impossible in most of the cases 
(Business Accounting Basics, 2012). This issue was followed up by the Limited 
Liability Act in 1855, which the individual owners and directors of a business had 
limited liability. In 1856, the Joint Stock Companies Act was introduced, modified 
and updated. Companies were incorporated by registration, and auditors needed to be 
appointed to audit the balance sheet and accounts for public companies. This system 
is still largely in use during the present day (Business Accounting Basics, 2012).  
 
1.1.3 Formation of accountancy profession 
Between years of 1853 to 1880, the emergence of the series of Companies Acts 
and Bankruptcy acts had significantly increased demand for professional services of 
accountants. The accountancy bodies and societies were emerged, and accountancy 
took the form as organised profession. The Queen Victoria granted the Royal Charter 
leading to the creation of the national body for England and Wales, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), and the national body 
(ICAEW) began to set up the standards of professional conducts since 1880.   
 
1.2 Development of Accounting Standards and Legislation in the UK 
During the 1930s and 1940s, the absence of standard framework for financial 
accounting became the major concern. This was aware to be a bigger problem in the 
United States where creative accounting was practiced – making a company look 
more successful than it actually was. There were a number of high profile cases 
where supposedly profitable companies managed their financial accounts to attract 
additional investment, and collapsed a few months later with huge debts (Business 
Accounting Basics, 2012).  
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1.2.1 Development of Accounting Standards in the UK 
In 1942, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) 
began to make recommendations about accounting practices. It issued a series of 29 
Recommendations over time, in order to codify the best practice to be used in 
particular circumstances. Unfortunately, these recommendations did not reduce the 
diversity of accounting methods. In the late 1960s, there was a lot of public criticism 
of financial reporting methods. The UK sets up its individual self-regulatory 
organization – the ASSC (Accounting Standards Steering Committee) in 1970, 
which was known as Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) afterward. ASC was 
the first recognizable standard setter in the modern world (Anton, 2011). The ASC 
consisted of six major accountancy bodies, i.e. the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW), Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
(now ICAS), Chartered Accountants of Ireland, the Association of Certified 
Accountants (now ACCA), the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants (now 
CIMA), and the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA).  
The ASC was set up with the aim of developing specific standards for financial 
reporting. A statement of intent produced by ASC in the 1970s identified the 
following objectives: to narrow the areas of difference in accounting practice; to 
ensure disclosure of information on departures from definitive standards; to provide 
a wide exposure for new accounting standards; and to maintain a continuing program 
for improving accounting standards (History and Development, 2005).  
The ASC was renamed again to the Accounting standards board (ASB) in 
1990. Along with the 7th directive the 8th directive was introduced in 1989, the new 
regulatory body called the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) was formed (Anton, 
2011). The FRC is maintained by the FRRP (Financial Reporting Review Panel) and 
ASB. The role of ASB is to supply the FRC with the financial support and leadership 
on public concerns, also to adjust or withdraw accounting standards (History and 
Development, 2005). Reporting requirements in the UK are governed by the FRS 
(Financial Reporting Standards) issued by the ASB that introduce the basic 
provisions contained in company law in the UK. The Companies Act consists of a 
number of acts, which governs the actions of UK companies. These acts are 
regularly updated and amended, which seems to be increasing further (History and 
Development, 2005). 
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1.2.2 Legislation Development in the UK 
In 1844, the incorporation of businesses by registration had been implemented 
according to the Joint Stock Companies Act. Books of account had to be recorded 
and kept. The “true and fair” balance sheet was to be filed with the Registrar of joint 
stock companies as well as prepared and reported to the shareholders in the annual 
general meeting. However, there was no requirement for the preparation of the profit 
and loss account. Auditors need to be appointed with full access to the financial 
accounts. The audit report was to be prepared for the annual general meeting of 
shareholders (Day, 2000). The following relevant Act of Parliament – the Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1856, abandoned necessary accounting requirements as well as 
the audit, which was not to be reintroduced until the Companies Act of 1900 (Day, 
2000). 
The most important transform in the Companies Act was that small and 
medium sized businesses were required to disclose any material cash flows in their 
accounts in 1989. Companies needed to show a true and fair indicator in their 
financial statements to reflect companies’ true financial performance and position 
(History and Development, 2005).  
Up to 2009, companies’ financial accounts needed to follow the requirement 
under the Companies Act 1985. This Act exhibits the responsibilities and roles of 
companies, directors and companies’ secretaries. The Companies Act only applied to 
companies that are incorporated under the guidelines. Sole proprietorship, 
partnerships, limited liability partnerships and co-operatives are not governed by this 
Act. In 2009, the Companies Act 2006 was implemented to supersede the 
Companies Act 1985. The main differences between the old and new acts are the 
new provisions for companies’ communications to shareholders, the implementation 
of new European Directives and clarifications on areas of common law affecting 
companies (Business Accounting Basics, 2012). 
 
1.3 Development of International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
The growth and globalisation of companies’ operations had led to an increase 
in acquisitions of foreign enterprises in the late 19
th
 century, the idea of global 
corporations and markets without borders has come to the fore, and members of 
accountancy professions began to realise the need for international accounting
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standards to ensure the running of the business. The history of international 
accounting standards began in 1966, with the proposal to establish an International 
Study Group comprising the ICAEW, American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) and Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) 
(LIS, 2012). In 1973, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was 
formed to release international accounting standards. IASC mentioned the standards 
had to be “be capable of rapid acceptance and implementation world-wide" (LIS, 
2012).  
At about the same time, the international professional accountancy bodies from 
different countries organized and cooperated under the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC). The IASC and IFAC operated closely to each other for setting 
international accounting standards and publishing discussion documents relating to 
international accounting issues (Sawani, 2009). Between 1973 and 2000, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) released a series of standards 
called “International Accounting Standards” (IAS) in a numerical sequence that 
began with IAS 1 and ended with IAS 41 Agriculture, which was published in 
December 2000 (LIS, 2012).  
The IASC survived for 27 years, until 2001, when the organisation was 
restructured, and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) replaced the 
IASC (LIS, 2012).  However, the International Accounting Standards (IAS) was not 
widely used by most large corporations and countries whose accounting systems 
were already established. Up to 1990s, Italy, Belgium, France and Germany 
permitted large corporations to use International Accounting Standards (IAS) for 
domestic financial reporting (Sawani, 2009).  
In 2001, the IASC was reorganized as the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) and began developing International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) in addition to the existing IAS (IASB, 2007c). The IASB defined itself as “an 
independent standard-setting board, appointed and overseen by a geographically and 
professionally diverse group of trustees of the IASC Foundation who are accountable 
to the public interest” (Sawani, 2009).  
By 2005, Listed companies in the UK were required to present their financial 
statements using the IAS adopted by the EU for periods commencing on or after 1 
January 2005 (LIS, ICAEW, 2012). This was a great achievement for the IASB and 
influenced U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to converge
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with IFRS (Sawani, 2009). Due to pressure from EU officials and corporations in 
2008, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) eliminated the rule requiring 
European companies to restate their financial statements to U.S. GAAP for listing on 
US exchanges (Sawani, 2009). This provided IFRS a foothold in the US financial 
reporting. With these rapid changes, the SEC began to look at IFRS seriously and the 
benefits it provides (SEC Release 2008). However, the process was backsliding ever 
since. 
 
1.4 Differential Reporting Framework 
The regulatory framework for financial reporting in the UK is known as UK 
GAAP (Collis and Jarvis, 2003). Differential reporting requires that different entities 
should be subject to different accounting standards (Harvey and Walton, 1996). This 
gives rise to a controversial debate between the big GAAP (accounting standards for 
large listed companies) and the little GAAP (accounting standards for SMEs). The 
main focus of this debate is whether there should be different accounting standards 
for large and smaller companies.  
The level of regulation in accounting performance measurement will mainly 
depend the demand and supply of accounting information in the market. If investors 
were far removed from the company, the demand for accounting information would 
be substantial. If the regulator makes accounting standards for quoted companies too 
tough, then although investors will find it attractive to invest, companies will find the 
funding too expensive and seek alternative sources, such as from banks and family 
members. Similarly, if accounting standards for quoted companies are too weak, 
then although companies will find it attractive to fund projects from the issue of 
public shares, investors will find it unattractive to invest because of the risks, and 
will invest in other markets. Therefore, differential reporting standards for small 
companies emerge to solve this issue in order to achieve market equilibrium. That is, 
for small companies, they may not have severe agency problems, and there may be 
non-accounting information about the financial performance of the companies 
available to investors – i.e. this reduces the amount of accounting information that 
small companies need to disclose to the market.  
The issues and factors related to the debate include: the needs of users of 
financial reports; agency issues; complexity, costs and benefits of complying with 
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the accounting standards. Further, the debate was fuelled by the rapid expansion of 
financial regulations in the early 1990s in terms of volume and complexity, which 
lead to a concern that compliance imposes a disproportionate burden on smaller 
entities compared to their larger counterparts (Collis and Jarvis, 2003).  
Today, the financial reporting framework in the UK is under three-tier 
reporting systems based on accountability and size thresholds: public quoted 
companies comply with full IFRS to prepare consolidated accounts; private non-
small companies follow UK GAAP; and smaller and micro-companies comply with 
FRSSE or only file abbreviated accounts. Further, companies qualifying as “small” 
under Companies Act 2006 are exempted from statutory audit. The discussion of 
history and development of differential reporting in the UK, which includes 
abbreviated accounts, FRSSE, and audit exemption is provided in this section. The 
development of IFRS for SMEs is discussed as follows. 
 
 
1.4.1 History and development of Differential Reporting in the UK 
The history of differential reporting began in the early 1980s, prior to the 
Companies Act 1981 in the UK, when companies were governed by identical 
financial reporting and disclosure requirements, regardless of size, industry or public 
interest (Collis and Jarvis, 2003). The issues of accounting standards and small 
companies were considered by the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) in 1983 
and a consultative meeting was held between the ASC and representatives of small 
businesses (Barker and Noonan, 1996).  
Meantime, in 1985, ICAEW sponsored a research project to establish whether 
there was a need for accounting standards for small companies. The researchers 
indicated that exemptions from standards with limited importance to small 
companies should be considered to reduce the burden of complying full accounting 
standards (Greeff, 2008). 
Abbreviated Accounts 
The abbreviated accounts for small companies are less detailed and need less 
information for public record. The abbreviated accounts of small company or limited 
liability partnership (LLP) do not have to report the profit and loss account or 
director's report that are normally required by Companies Act (Collis and Jarvis, 
2003). The Companies Act 1985 permitted small and medium size companies to file 
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abbreviated accounts with the Registrar of Companies, although companies are 
required to furnish shareholders with the full set of accounts. The content of 
abbreviated accounts is relatively less than the full set of financial statements. For 
instance, companies are not required to file a profit and loss account or a directors’ 
report (Collis and Jarvis, 2003). However, directors would incur additional costs to 
produce abbreviated accounts, as it is an additional set of financial statements drawn 
from the full financial statements.  
Financial Reporting Standards for Smaller Entities (FRSSE) 
With the establishment of ASB in 1990, the style and content of accounting 
became longer and more complex. As a result, the relevance of the new standards to 
small companies became questionable, and representations were made to the ASB to 
consider the position of small companies and to make appropriate provision for the 
application of standards to them (Barker & Noonan, 1996).  
In response to the request, the Consultative Committee of Accounting Bodies 
(CCAB) set up a working group in 1993 to investigate how to reduce the 
administrative burden on SMEs through the exemption of certain accounting 
standards (Greeff, 2008). The main conclusion of the document was that Small and 
Medium-sized Entities (SMEs) should not need to comply with all aspects of 
accounting standards, and recommended that all entities which met the Companies 
Act definition of a “small company”, with an annual turnover of up to £2.8 million 
and total assets up to £1.4 million (The Companies Act, 1985), should be exempt 
from compliance with all but five accounting standards (Greeff, 2008).  
In December 1995, the CCAB Working Party published a White Paper entitled 
“Designed to Fit”, while the main argument of this paper was that all accounting 
standards applicable to small companies should be issued in a single document 
(Barker and Noonan, 1996; ASB, 2007; Greeff, 2008). The ASB, accepted the 
CCAB Working Party’s recommendations, and became the second standard setter to 
implement differential reporting when it published an Exposure Draft (ED) of the 
proposed FRSSE in December 1996, which led to the issue of the FRSSE in 
November 1997 (ASB, 2007). FRSSE is applicable to all reporting entities that 
qualify as “small” under the Companies Act and its main aim is to reduce disclosure 
requirements of the full array of accounting standards. The FRSSE is lighter than the 
full set of standards by 50 disclosure requirements (Collis and Jarvis, 2003). 
1.4.1.3 Exemption from Statutory Audits 
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The EU Fourth Directive allowed national governments to exempt the 
requirement of undergoing the statutory audit for small companies (Collis and Jarvis, 
2003). Article 51 of the Fourth Company Law Directive (78/660/EEC) requires all 
non-dormant limited companies to have their annual accounts audited. However, 
using the size criteria in Articles 11 and 27, national jurisdictions can provide the 
exemption for qualifying non-publicly accountable small companies (Collis, 2010). 
In 1994, the UK therefore applied the EU Fourth Directive, which permits Member 
States to exempt small companies from statutory audit, and permitted very small 
private companies to opt out of statutory audit for the first time (Collis et al, 2004). 
However, UK government did not adopt the full definition of a small company as 
defined in the Companies Act, which reflected EC recommendations. Although the 
definition was the same as the Companies Act for the value of assets and number of 
employees, the turnover threshold was substantially less (Collis and Jarvis, 2003). 
Since the 1990s, the debate between big UK GAAP and little GAAP in the UK 
has resulted in a number of financial reporting concessions for qualifying to be 
smaller entities. This led to an amendment of section 249A of the Companies Act 
1985 that permitted audit exemption for most companies with a turnover of up to 
£90,000 and a balance sheet total not more than £1.4m. If the company had a 
turnover of between £90,000 and £350,000, it was able to exempt from the audit, but 
had to have an accountant’s report (Skerratt, 2001). 
In 1997 the turnover threshold was raised from £90,000 to £350,000 (SI 
1997/936), with the balance sheet total remaining at £1.4m. On top of that, the 
company had to qualify as ‘small’ for the purposes of filing abbreviated accounts. 
The next amendment was in the year of 2000 when the turnover threshold for audit 
exemption was raised to £1m (SI 2000/1430). However, this is still considerably 
lower than that the turnover threshold that applies to the other concessions offered by 
little GAAP (Collis et al, 20004).  
Today, the Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2012 (SI 
2012/2301) amend the Companies Act 2006 in order to align the mandatory audit 
thresholds with accounting thresholds. It exempts some subsidiary companies from 
statutory audit and dormant subsidiaries from preparing and filing financial accounts 
(Technical Resource, ICAEW, 2012). Audit thresholds for small companies are 
aligned with accounting thresholds for small companies. In 2008, small companies 
will be entitled to an exemption from statutory audit if they meet two out of the three 
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mandatory criteria:  no more than 50 employees; no more than gross assets of £3.26 
million; and less than £6.5 million in turnover (Technical Resource, ICAEW, 2012). 
 
1.4.2 Development of IFRS for SMEs from IASB 
With the debate on whether SMEs should comply with full sets of accounting 
standards, the official differential reporting initiatives at the IASB started in 1998 
when the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) launched a SME 
project in April 1998 (IASB, 2003a). In December 2000, the IASC noted that there 
was a need for a different version of international accounting standards for SMEs, 
and highlighted this as a critical agenda item for the newly formed IASB. The IASB 
took note and launched a research project for SMEs in 2001 (Greeff, 2008). In 
September 2003, the IASB hosted a meeting of the World Accounting Standard 
Setters in London. In the preparation of this meeting, the IASB surveyed the 
standard setters to ascertain what has been already done in the different countries 
over the world and what the IASB should do with respect to accounting standards for 
SMEs. 28 Countries responded to the survey (IASB, 2003b).  
At the February 2004 meeting, the IASB concluded that IFRS was suitable for 
all entities, irrespective of size or public trading (IASB, 2004a). In line with the 
target set in July 2003, the IASB issued a Discussion Paper: Preliminary Views on 
Accounting Standards for Small and Medium-sized Entities in June 2004 (IASB, 
2004b). The IASB received over 100 responses, which were analysed and discussed 
during December 2004 (IASPlus 2008). The feedbacks indicated that an 
overwhelming majority of respondents concurred that full IFRS was not suitable to 
SMEs, and that separate standards should be developed.  
Following the feedback received on the Discussion Paper in 2004, the IASB 
published a staff questionnaire on potential recognition and measurement 
modifications for SMEs on 11 April 2005 (IASB, 2005b). They further commenced 
with a series of round-table meetings to discuss the possible modifications. The 
board found that there was widespread support for an international SME standard 
with recognition and measurement simplifications (Greeff, 2008).  
In February 2007, the IASB released the final version of the Exposure Draft 
(ED) of a proposed IFRS for SMEs for comment (IASB, 2007a). The proposed 
standard is aimed at the types of transactions usually applicable to SMEs with 
approximately 50 employees and is meant to be a stand-alone document not 
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requiring significant cross-references to full IFRS (Greeff, 2008). Finally, on 9 July 
2009, the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) designed for use by 
small and medium-sized entities (SMEs) was published by IASB and it is a result of 
a five-year development process with extensive consultation of SMEs worldwide. 
IFRS for SMEs is designed for companies that have no public accountability, 
which prepare general-purpose financial statements for external users (IASB, 2009). 
It leaves jurisdictions to define size criteria as it is not feasible for the board to 
develop quantified size tests that would be applicable and long-lasting in all of the 
100 countries (IASB, 2009). IFRS for SMEs is designed for entities, regardless of 
size, which need to provide general-purpose financial statements for external users 
(IASB, 2009). Furthermore, it is independent of what tax authorities require (IASB, 
2009). 
 
 
1.4.3 Proposal of ASB in the UK 
In 2012, in line with IASB’s move, the UK Accounting Standard Board (ASB) 
proposed Financial Reporting Exposure Draft (FRED) 48, which is about the future 
of Financial Reporting in the UK and Republic of Ireland. It indicates that 
companies without public accountability will follow Financial Reporting Standards 
102 (FRS 102), which is based on IFRS for SMEs. The proposed financial reporting 
framework in the UK will be three classes of companies following different sets of 
accounting standards, include public listed companies will still follow full IFRS to 
prepare consolidated accounts; private non-small companies will follow the FRS 102 
(based on IFRS for SMEs); and private small companies will still follow Financial 
Reporting Standards for Smaller Entities (FRSSE). ASB defines each class of 
companies (public quoted, medium-sized and small companies) under size criteria of 
Companies Act 2006. 
 
1.5 Factors driving Differential Reporting Standards 
The development of differential reporting framework is discussed in the 
previous section. There are various issues that affect the financial reporting standards 
between large companies and SMEs, which indicate that large companies and SMEs 
should follow different sets of accounting standards. Various factors will be 
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discussed below in detail.  
 
1.5.1 User’s needs 
Research in the UK and Ireland indicates that there is a difference between the 
main users of the financial statements of large companies and those of SMEs (Collis 
and Jarvis, 2003). Large companies’ financial statements are widely circulated in the 
market and available to a wide range and unlimited number of users. The circulation 
of financial statements of SMEs, on the other hand, is generally restricted to 
shareholders. SMEs do not have a statutory requirement to report full accounts to 
Registrar of Companies if they fulfill certain size criteria, although they still have to 
report full accounts to furnish shareholders with full accounts. Investors, lenders, 
suppliers, customers and the general public market, therefore do no have automatic 
access to the financial statements of the typical SME (Greeff, 2008).  
It is also indicated, in the Statement of Principles (ASB, 1999), that large 
companies have a much broader range of users than small companies (Collis and 
Jarvis, 2003). As mentioned above, the typical users of financial statements prepared 
by private companies are its shareholders and banks, and the taxation authorities. It 
could, therefore be argued that not all accounting standards and reporting 
requirements contained in IFRS should be applicable to SMEs (Greeff, 2008). 
 
1.5.2 Agency Issues 
Ownership and management in large companies are separate, whereas for 
private companies, there is no separation of ownership between shareholders and 
directors. Conflicts of interest between corporate insiders, such as managers and 
controlling shareholders, on one hand, and outside investors, such as minority 
shareholders, on the other hand, are central to the analysis of the modern corporation 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Agency issues are exacerbated in public companies since they have complex 
transactions, which provide the scope for performance management. Generally, 
management of public companies are likely to manage earnings upwards, to show to 
investors that the company is doing well. As for SMEs, they may have agency 
problems within the owner/manager structure, but they likely to be less severe than 
in public companies. Overall, public companies need to be more closely regulated 
compared with private companies based on agency issues.  
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1.5.3 Size and Complexity 
The main argument in differential reporting is that large companies have 
complex transactions, and therefore need more complex regulation to neutralise the 
incentives for performance management. ASB (2012, p9) regards size and 
complexity as a major objective affects the regulation. However, such complexities 
are rarely relevant in small companies. Private companies may have simpler 
transactions, and with less facility for performance management. Therefore, in terms 
of size and complexity, SMEs will demand less complex accounting rules compared 
with large companies.  
 
1.5.4 Costs 
Compliance with IFRS is perceived to be costly. Companies have to either 
appoint additional staff in the finance department or rely on their auditors to 
ascertain compliance with the requirement of IFRS. It is generally acknowledged 
that the work effort and costs of complying with certain accounting standards is 
proportionately more burdensome and may be somewhat overwhelming for SMEs 
(Greeff, 2008). Small companies may not afford to spend the same amount of money 
and report the same quality of reporting as large companies. As well as having an 
influence on financial reporting requirements, this factor is the basis for the 
exemptions from audit given to small companies.  
In addition, fewer users of private companies are likely to reap the benefits of 
the information produced than is the case for publicly accountable enterprises. The 
increased costs as a result of the additional recognition and disclosure requirements, 
often add no value to the users (Greeff, 2008). Therefore, the issue of the cost will 
probably lead to the regulators to consider differential reporting in order to reduce 
the burden for small companies on complying with full IFRS.  
 
1.6 Objectives of Differential Reporting Standards 
With the introduction of differential reporting framework across different 
countries, which the main aim is to reduce the burden for SMEs by complying with 
full sets of accounting standards (ASB, 2007). The IASB, therefore, in the interest of 
public development, has extended its convergence project to meet the needs and 
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demands of SMEs in 2003 (Chand and White, 2007). In 2009, IASB issued the 
separate set of accounting standards for SMEs, which is IFRS for SMEs. After the 
launch of IFRS for SMEs, the UK ASB propose the future structure of financial 
reporting standards in 2013, which is in line with IASB’s move. The objectives of 
both accounting standards boards in developing financial reporting standards for 
SMEs are discussed below.  
 
1.6.1 Discussion of IASB’s objective 
The primary objective of the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) is to “establish a single set of high quality, understandable and enforceable 
global accounting standards that will enable transparent and comparable information 
in general-purpose financial reports across nations” (IASB, 2005a, pg.1). According 
to the IFRS for SMEs, Basis for Conclusion (2009), SMEs could be different from 
larger companies in terms of users’ needs and costs that justify different standards. 
Both sets of IFRS and IFRS for SMEs standards are general-purpose statements.
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IFRS for SMEs is for those companies that do not have public accountability, 
regardless of size. The major concern for this is how to differentiate between large 
and SMEs. The IASB offers no specific direction and criteria on how to distinguish 
between large companies and SMEs (Chand and White, 2007). There is no 
indication of accounting quality that large entities and SMEs are expected to 
produce. The IASB leaves each jurisdiction to decide the approach should be used to 
define SMEs. The implicit assumption in developing a separate set of standards for 
SME is that greater comparability in financial reports of SMEs across countries if 
IFRS for SMEs are adopted (Chand and White, 2007). However, leaving each 
jurisdiction to decide the criteria for SMEs seems inconsistent with the 
comparability.  
 
1.6.2 Discussion of ASB’s objectives 
In 2012, the ASB published three Financial Reporting Exposure Drafts 
(FREDs) setting out revised proposals for the future of financial reporting in the UK 
and Republic of Ireland: FRED 46 “Application of Financial Reporting 
Requirements” (draft FRS 100); FRED 47 “Reduced Disclosure Framework” (draft 
FRS 101); and FRED 48 “The Financial Reporting Standard applicable in the UK 
and Republic of Ireland” (draft FRS 102) (ASB, 2012b). ASB recommends that 
proposed FREDs would replace the current body of Financial Reporting Standards 
(FRS) issued by the ASB (ASB, 2012b). They propose that, entities with public 
accountability, would have applied EU-adopted IFRS to prepare consolidated 
accounts; entities without public accountability (non small entities) would apply FRS 
102 based on the IFRS for SMEs; and entitles qualifying as small based on 
Companies Act (size thresholds), would have applied the FRSSE (ASB, 2012a). 
The main objective of ASB’s move is to enable users of accounts to receive 
high-quality understandable financial reporting proportionate to the size and 
complexity of the entity and the users’ information needs, whilst maintaining the 
quality of financial reporting (ASB, 2012a, pg.16). However, the objective of ASB 
in differential reporting framework is unclear in terms of accounting quality. They 
do not specify what consequences or accounting quality should follow across each 
class of companies. Therefore, it is very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of 
differential reporting framework. 
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1.7 Incentives for the Demand and Supply of Financial Information  
Prior to discussing the issues on differential accounting standards for SMEs, 
the incentives of demand and supply of financial information or regulation will be 
discussed in a broader picture in this section.  
Factors drive differential accounting standards between large and smaller 
entities may influence the accounting quality differently. However, from the 
development of IASB and ASB in differential reporting standards, the issues in 
regards of accounting quality are not addressed clearly. Both IASB and ASB have 
not made clear as to what quality they expect that different classes of companies 
should produce. Do they expect larger companies have better accounting quality than 
smaller entities or do they expect equal accounting quality for all types of 
companies? Without any indication of what consequences should follow, it is very 
difficult to evaluate the efficacy of differential reporting structure. Arguably, some 
prior papers argue that the process of regulation is the process of negotiation (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1979; Joni Young, 2004; Sunder, 2005).  
 
1.7.1 Need of Accounting information and regulations 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out the relationships between shareholders 
and managers are agency relationship. In a broader view, accounting procedures and 
regulations are devised in order to reduce the agency costs of contracts (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1979). Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the concept of agency costs, 
analyze the incentives of principals and agents and derive formal hypothesis about 
the contractual arrangements one would expect to observe in equilibrium. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1979) indicate that if the equity 
market is competitive and makes unbiased estimates of the effects of monitoring and 
bonding expenditures, then the owner-manager bears the total wealth effect of the 
expected agency costs of creating outside equity; hence, managers have an incentive 
to reduce expected agency costs. 
Givoly, Hayn and Katz (2010) raise the demand and incentives effects on 
accounting quality that investors, shareholders, authorities will demand high quality 
accounting information from companies, but in the meantime, companies will have 
incentives to manage earnings so as to lower the quality of accounting information. 
Therefore, the role of regulation is to balance the effects from both the demand of 
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reporting high quality of financial information from the market and the incentives of 
managing earnings from companies. 
 
1.7.2 Argument against Accounting Regulations 
Sunder (2005) argue that heavy reliance on standards-based financial reporting 
may have led accounting to focus narrowly on the objectivity of individual numbers 
and so as to sacrifice the overall fairness. Sunder (2005) suggests that a shift in 
emphasis from standards towards norms may yet help accounting and corporate 
governance recover a sustainable and efficient balance.  
Further, Ball (2001) mentions “you cannot regulate an economy very 
effectively if there are incentives in the economy to act against the way you 
regulate.” Therefore, Ball (2001) suggests that there is no point to have accounting 
standards if they are not properly enforced.  
A study by Joni Young (2003) suggests that accounting standard boards 
regulate without any clear objectives, and therefore are engaged a variety of efforts 
to persuade users that the work of theirs is valuable, appropriate, useful and correct. 
Young (2003, pg.625) indicates that accounting standard boards employ rhetorical 
strategies in its accounting standards attempt to persuade users that a specific 
standard is “good”, that silence alternatives and possible criticisms of the standard 
and that construct the FASB as a “good” standard-setter. These strategies help to 
establish standards as technical products and thus work to maintain the myth of 
accounting objectivity (Young, 2003, pg.637). Further, standards and accounting 
practices are to be seen as emergent from a rational process that separates the 
technical and political rather than as the result of the needs of a particular agent or 
the demand of economic reality (Young, 2003, pg.637).  
Therefore, regulators are basically regulating in the dark. The process of 
developing new accounting standards is the process of negotiation (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1979), because the regulators do not have enough understanding of 
how companies going to behave. 
 
1.8 Issues arising within the differential reporting framework 
1.8.1 Comparison of Objectives of IASB and ASB 
The objective of IASB for developing IFRS for SMEs is based on the nature of
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users’ needs. The purpose is to develop a separate set of standards (general-purpose 
statements) for companies without public accountability, regardless of size, to 
enhance comparability across countries. The main objective of ASB in the UK for 
proposing the FRED 48 (FRS 102) to replace the current UK GAAP, is to enable 
users of accounts to receive high-quality understandable financial reporting 
proportionate to the size and complexity of the entity and the users’ information 
needs (ASB 2012). The ASB’s proposal is generally in line with IASB’s thinking. 
However, this seems conflicting in terms of size criterion – the IASB suggested that 
IFRS for SMEs is for companies without public accountability regardless of size, 
whereas the ASB proposed three-tier system based on the size of companies with 
elimination of public accountability.  
 
1.8.2 What do regulators expect? 
The objectives of having differential reporting standards include: the concern 
of size issues; cost issues; agency issues; and economic importance of companies. 
Further, these concerns are major factors driving accounting quality across different 
groups of companies to be different. However, both the IASB and the UK ASB have 
not made clear of what they expect in terms of accounting quality. They emphasize 
the development of differential reporting standards for SMEs is mainly to reduce the 
reporting burden and cost of SMEs, but it is difficult to predict what regulators 
expect because they do not specify what consequences (accounting quality) that 
different classes of companies should follow. 
Do they expect larger entities have higher accounting quality than smaller 
entities? Do they expect accounting quality to be the same across different classes of 
companies under the differential reporting framework? What if the size criteria are 
not appropriate for companies that will be adopting the new standards (IFRS for 
SMEs), which in turn might result low quality of reporting? What if there are some 
large-private companies need to be regulated like public companies? What if there 
are some small companies need to be regulated like medium companies? What if the 
demand of reporting high quality of financial information does not counteract the 
incentives of managing earnings in public companies and private companies? 
 
1.8.3 Possible outcomes 
Different users’ needs, agency issues, size and complexity, and costs are the 
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factors drive differential reporting standards for SMEs. Possible issues in accounting 
quality may arise under differential reporting framework based on these factors. For 
example, large companies may develop schemes to circumvent the reporting 
requirements if agency issues dominate the needs of their potential users. However, 
smaller companies may have so many exemptions from the regulations, which apply 
to larger companies that the quantity and quality of reporting is insufficient.  
However, regulators do not address these issues and it is very difficult to 
evaluate the effectiveness of differential reporting framework without clear 
consequences to follow. It is consistent with Young (2003) and Watts and 
Zimmerman (1979) that process of regulation is the process of negotiation rather 
than the result of the needs of a particular agent or the demand of economic reality. 
 
1.9 Main objective of the thesis 
The IASB and the UK ASB have adopted different financial reporting rules for 
different classes of companies. The IASB has IFRS and IFRS for SMEs. In the UK, 
currently companies follow IFRS, UK GAAP and FRSSE; furthermore, some 
companies are exempt from audit. The objectives of having differential reporting 
standards include the concern of size issues, cost issues, agency issues, and 
economic importance of companies. However, the both regulation boards (IASB and 
UK ASB) have not made clear of what they expect in terms of accounting quality 
based on these factors.  
It is difficult to evaluate the efficacy of this differential reporting framework to 
regulation since the ASB (and IASB) do not specify what consequences should 
follow. Is differential reporting a response to the differential importance of 
companies and the differential cost of compliance? This approach would suggest that 
variation in accounting quality across companies is acceptable. Or is differential 
reporting a response to the differential complexity of transactions and the incentive 
to report truthfully and fairly? This approach would suggest that variation in 
accounting quality across companies is not acceptable. 
There are two forces discipline accounting quality of firms, which are legal 
forces and market forces. Legal forces include accounting standards, auditors and tax 
authorities. Market forces include investors, shareholders, and debt-holders. 
Accountings standards are in the position of disciplining companies to report good
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quality of earnings (Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003). Further, investors, shareholders, and 
debt-holders demand good accounting quality (Givoly et al, 2010). In the process of 
making accounting standards, regulators do not make clear of what they expect. Do 
they expect higher accounting quality for larger entities and lower accounting quality 
for smaller entities? Or do they expect equalized accounting quality across all tiers of 
companies. Furthermore, in the presence of market discipline, will the market 
discipline accounting quality? Will the market discipline result variations in 
accounting quality? 
Therefore, the analysis of companies’ behavior of reporting their financial 
information under current regulatory structure is needed in order to inform the future 
regulation policy. We cannot examine the post-adoption effects of accounting quality 
because the new accounting standards for SMEs (FRS 102) are not yet adopted in 
the UK, and there are very few studies address these issues for SMEs.  
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the discipline of current 
accounting regulations and discipline of market on accounting quality in order to 
inform the discussion about the suitability of existing boundaries between the 
groups. That is, we compare the quality of financial reporting for public and private 
companies under current reporting framework in the UK. We propose no formal 
criteria for the desired differences between the groups, but merely make 
observations. 
Before conducting the empirical analysis of the issues outlined above, we 
firstly review and summarize the large volume of literature on accounting quality in 
the next chapter.   
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Chapter 2: Accounting Quality 
2.1 Overview  
Accounting standards determine how earnings should be computed and 
reported. High quality of standards influences the users’ perception of quality of 
financial information (Wulandari and Rahman, 2004 pg.2). A better perception of 
the standards would create accounting information that are more readily used by 
users and enhance the value relevance of financial information. High quality 
accounting standards are perceived to provide consistent, comparable, relevant and 
reliable financial information to the investors for decision-making of specific 
investment (Wulandari and Rahman, 2004 pg.2).  
Accounting quality is sometimes referred as the term of earnings quality. 
Accounting quality refers to the extent to which the financial statement information 
reflects the underlying economic situation. In particular, Dechow Ge and Schrand 
(2010 pg.344) define the earnings quality based on Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 1 (SFAC No. 1) as “higher quality earnings provide more 
information about the features of firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a 
specific decision made by specific decision-maker.”  
With the definition of earnings quality, Dechow et al (2010 pg.345) indicate 
that there are three features related to this definition. First, earnings quality is 
conditional on the decision-relevance of the financial information, and it is defined 
only in the context of a specific decision model. Second, the quality of reported 
earnings depends on whether it is informative about the firm’s fundamental financial 
performance. Third, earnings quality is jointly determined by the informativeness of 
reported earnings on firms’ financial performance and by the ability of the 
accounting system to measure financial performance.  
2.2 Measures of Accounting Quality 
Dechow et al (2010 pg.345) summarise three broad categories to measure 
firms’ earnings quality: properties of earnings (e.g. earnings persistence and 
accruals; earnings smoothing; earnings conservatism etc.); investor responsiveness to 
earnings (e.g. earnings response coefficient); and external indicators of earnings 
misstatements (e.g. auditing standards; corporate governance). The properties of
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earnings focus on the companies’ own financial information and accounting 
numbers, whereas other two types of measures are mainly focusing on effects of 
external parties.  
Due to the limitation of gathering data and information on external parties such 
as investors and auditors for private companies, therefore, in this thesis, we measure 
earnings quality based on properties of earnings to examine the quality of earnings 
for different classes of companies under current regulatory framework in the UK.  
Properties of earnings can be operationalized by various proxies, which include 
earnings persistence, accruals, earnings smoothness, target beating (e.g. small profit 
relative to small loss), and timely loss recognition, which have been broadly used in 
accounting research.  
However, among these proxies in measuring accounting quality, there is no 
measure of earnings quality that is superior for all decision models. Each measure is 
based on different assumptions and inferences, and captures different aspects of 
accounting quality. Various measures of accounting quality based on properties of 
earnings are discussed below. 
2.2.1 Earnings persistence 
Under a sustainable economic performance, firms are expected to have a 
sustainable earnings/cash flow stream. It will be more useful inputs into equity 
valuations and will be more predictable and easier to forecast future earnings. 
Basically, if earnings are persistent, the level of earnings will be continually 
recurring from accounting to accounting period. This type of measure are usually 
adopted for the research of usefulness of earnings to equity investors for valuation, 
with the assumption that more persistent earnings will yield better inputs to equity 
valuation measure, and hence more persistent earnings are of higher quality than less 
persistent earnings (Dechow et al, 2010).  
The most common model specification estimates earnings persistence is as 
follows: 
                              
In this model, current earnings are the function of future earnings and earnings are 
usually scaled by total assets. If earnings are more persistent and more informative, β 
will be higher (close to 1). In the view of earnings quality, if firms’ earnings are 
persistent, the current earnings will be useful in measuring the future performance of 
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firms and will have relatively small volatility in earnings and fewer transitory 
component (Dechow et al, 2010 pg.352). 
 
In addition, Sloan (1996) decomposes           into current year’s cash 
flows (   ) and accruals (         ). The model is expressed as follows: 
                                     
The intuition of this model is that    is expected to be larger than   , implying cash 
flows component should be more persistent than accruals component. Accruals are 
used to solve the timing and matching problems of cash flows, so would not expect it 
to have any permanence, whereas cash flows are related to economic activity. 
Therefore, cash flows are expected to be more informative about             than 
accruals. If accruals are more informative, it is probably due to earnings 
management (an overestimate of sales in one period needs to be corrected in the 
next). 
 
Strength of Earnings persistence model 
 Overall, earnings persistence fits well with the view of earnings forecast. It 
helps investors, since they are typically concerned with permanent performance. 
Earnings persistence captures the smoothness of earnings. Economic performance is 
quite persistent, so earnings should be too. If earnings are more persistent, it will be 
easier to forecast firms’ future earnings with less earnings volatility and less 
transitory components.  
Therefore, higher persistence of earnings will produce better inputs to equity 
valuation models and will be able to generate sustainable cash flows in the future 
(cash flows component greater than accruals component), implying high quality of 
earnings. 
Problem of Earnings persistence model 
Earnings persistence is based on the assumption that economic performance is 
sustainable. Earnings persistence may be achieved by earnings management 
(evidence of earnings smoothing) because economic performance may be volatile in 
some situations.  
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Cash flows component is expected to be more persistent than accruals 
component. However, accruals grow with the size company, so accruals may have 
some (or more) information about            . 
Therefore, earnings persistence model is influenced by economic factors and 
related to earnings smoothing. 
 
2.2.2 Accruals 
2.2.2.1 Magnitude of Accruals 
In the light of earnings persistence, accruals are crucial components in earnings 
affecting earnings persistence. Recently, accruals are the most studied determinant of 
earnings quality. Sloan (1996 pg.37) finds that the accruals component is less 
persistent than the cash flows component of earnings, implying that firms with high 
levels of accruals have low quality of earnings. Extreme large level of accruals 
involved in earnings are low quality, because high levels of accruals are positively 
correlated with higher magnitude of estimation errors in accruals, implying all else 
equal, large accruals indicate lower earnings persistence. (Dechow and Dichev, 2002 
pg.54). Therefore, the level of accruals should be appropriate in earnings to adjust 
cash flows. 
According to Dechow et al (2010), who summarize the most commonly used 
metrics to define magnitude of accruals are as follows: 
                       
                                   
                                 
Accruals could be defined in various ways. In early research (e.g. Sloan, 1996; 
Jones, 1991; and Healy, 1985), when statement of cash flows is not mandatory, 
accruals were frequently defined as non-cash working capital and depreciation. Ever 
since the statement of cash flows is emerged, accruals are more often defined as the 
difference between earnings and cash flows where cash flows can be obtained from 
the statement of cash flows. Hribar and Collins (2002), who suggest the latter 
definition of accruals mitigates error induced by mergers and acquisitions, which 
motivate researchers to adopt the new definition of accruals. 
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Strengths of Large Magnitude of Accruals measure 
The measure links directly the role of an accruals-based accounting system 
relative to a cash-flow-based system (Dechow et al, 2010 pg.351). This tries to 
capture whether accruals are performing a useful function in making adjustments to 
cash flows. If accruals are too small then there seems to be little point. If accruals are 
too large, then earnings might appear not to have any economic substance. 
Therefore, if level of accruals is extremely higher, which may result lower 
earnings persistence. This implies that cash flow component should be more 
persistent than accruals component in earnings. 
Problems of Large Magnitude of Accruals measure 
Dechow (1994) finds that accruals solve the timing and matching problems of 
cash flows, which improves the ability of earnings to better measure firms’ financial 
performance. Dechow and Dichev (2002) suggest that large accruals are indication 
of greater improvement over cash flows since accruals are used to compensate 
timing and matching problems of cash flows. 
Different firms’ characteristics may drive the accruals to be different, for 
instance, companies in different industries or different sizes are likely have different 
levels of accruals, for which we are not able to simply compare earnings quality by 
magnitude of accruals. Therefore, firms’ fundamental performance and economic 
performances are likely to differ for firms with extreme large accruals versus less 
extreme large accruals.  
 
 
2.2.2.2 Abnormal Accruals  
Various studies emphasize abnormal accruals in the empirical accounting 
research. The term of “abnormal accruals” is generated from an accruals model as a 
measure for earnings quality. There are significant areas of research distinguish 
abnormal from normal accruals by directly modeling the accruals process. The 
normal accruals are expected to capture adjustments that reflect firms’ financial 
performance while the abnormal accruals are meant to capture discretion in applying 
accounting standards or earnings management. These accruals models attempt to 
directly capture problems in the accounting measurement system. The residual from 
the accrual model represents the management discretion or estimation errors. The 
general interpretation is that if the normal component of accruals is estimated 
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properly, then the abnormal component represents earnings management that is of 
lower quality of earnings.  
There are some widely used accruals models in the accounting research, which 
are discussed below respectively. 
 
Jones (1991) Model (time-series model) 
                                 
                            
This model specifies that change in normal accruals should be expected during 
the event period. The relationship between total accruals and its explanatory 
variables is estimated before the event period using the first regression model, with 
the assumption that accruals in previous event period are free of earnings 
management. All variables are scaled by total assets.       is used to capture the 
effects of changes in working capital, and      is used to capture the long term 
accruals such as depreciation. The coefficients of    and    are then used to estimate 
normal accruals during the event period. The difference between total accruals and 
estimated normal accruals in the event period is the measure of abnormal accruals.  
The problem with this model is that correlation or error with firm performance 
can bias tests. Residual is correlated with accruals, earnings and cash flow. Dechow 
Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Dechow Richardson and Tuna (2003) indicate that 
the Jones model encounters Type I (classify accruals as abnormal when they are a 
representation of fundamental performances) and Type II (classify accruals as 
normal when they are not) misspecification errors.   
 
Modified Jones Model (Dechow Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) (time-series model) 
                                 
The problem with the Jones model is that       is included as part of the 
estimate of normal accruals. However, if revenues are manipulated in the test period, 
then this will be included in the estimate of normal accruals. That means, the 
earnings management will not be detected. Dechow et al (2005) modify the Jones 
model to adjust for changes in credit sales in order to reduce the Type II errors, that 
only cash sales are considered in estimating normal accruals. Since debtors are 
frequently manipulated, this modification combats potential bias in normal accruals 
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and increase the power Jones model to yield residual that is uncorrelated with 
expected revenue accruals and better reflect earnings management.  
However, this heavily relies on assumption that all sales in credit are actually 
being manipulated, which will give rise of Type I error that is more than Jones 
model suffers. 
 
Cross-sectional Jones and Modified Jones Model (Peasnell, Pope and Young, 
2000) 
In the prior models of normal accruals, the parameters are estimated on a time 
series for each company. This makes significant assumptions about the stability of 
the model over time and also places considerable restrictions on the companies for 
which abnormal accruals can be estimated.  
Peasnell et al (2000) suggest that accruals models can be modeled at the firm 
level, which allows variation across firms in estimating normal accruals. The 
approach in Peasnell et al (2000) is to use cross-sectional estimates of the parameters 
based on the industry in which each company is located. Firm-level estimation, 
however, assumes time-invariant parameter estimates and typically imposes sample 
survivorship biases. The models are therefore most frequently estimated cross-
sectionally, with observations taken from the same industry.  
This specification assumes constant coefficient estimates within the industry. 
Dechow et al (2010 pg.358) suggest that some firms may have large residuals 
because of variation induced by industry classification rather than because of 
earnings management or errors. The measurement error in the residual will be related 
to industry factors. For example, the model may have a poorer fit in growth 
industries, and growth may be associated with the quality of accruals. 
 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach 
                                  
Accruals are regressed as function of past, present, and future cash flows given 
their purpose to vary the timing of cash flow recognition in earnings because 
accruals anticipate future cash collections/payments and reverse when cash 
previously recognized in accruals is received/paid (Dechow et al, 2010). This model 
focuses on short-term working capital accruals.       or absolute    proxies for 
accrual quality as an unsigned measure of extent of accrual errors.  
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However, this model focuses on short-term accruals and it does not address 
errors in long-term accruals such as depreciation and goodwill that are likely to 
reflect earnings management. 
 
 
McNichols (2002) – Discussion of Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach 
                                                   
McNichols (2002) considers the implications from Jones (1991) model and 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and combines their variables from both models. 
The intuition behind this is that earnings management is what cannot be explained by 
(1) current and past performance of comapnies and (2) cash flows of companies.   
Her results suggest that estimation error      includes effects from firms’ 
fundamental effects and real manipulation. It is correlated with partitioned variables 
such as cash flows. Therefore, studies need to consider implications from Jones 
models and Dechow and Dichev model in order to develop more powerful 
approaches, which help to estimate earnings quality and analyse the role of 
management discretion in influencing earnings quality. 
 
Discretionary estimation errors (Francis LaFond Olsson and Schipper, 2005) 
                                                   
where,                                                        
              
As suggested by McNichols (2002), Francis et al (2005) include variables from 
both Jones (1995) model and Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, and extend the 
model to decompose the standard deviation of the residual from the accruals model 
into an innate component that reflects the firm’s operating environment and a 
discretionary component (  ) that reflects earnings management. Innate estimation 
errors are the predicted component from       regression. The standard deviation 
(     ) represents the quality of the accruals to capture the firm’s fundamental 
performance, and the residual (  ) represents abnormal accrual quality; higher 
standard deviations are lower quality.  
However, the innate characteristics could also reflect estimation errors, which 
reduces the power of residual to reflect earnings management (i.e., a Type I error). 
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Alternatively it could induce bias (in an unknown direction) into the proxy for 
distortion (Type II error). Therefore, further research is needed to evaluate the 
importance of these issues. 
 
 
Performance matched (Kothari Leone and Wasley, 2005) 
                    
          
Kothari et al (2005) identify a firm from the same industry with the closest 
level of Return On Assets (ROA) to that of the sample firm and deduct the control 
firm’s abnormal accruals (i.e., residuals) from those of the sample firm to generate 
“performance-matched” residuals.  
However, this approach is likely to add noise to the measure of discretionary 
accruals because normal accruals that generate the residuals explain low level of the 
variation in accruals, and it is applied when correlated performance is an important 
issue. In addition, the performance matching can extract too much distortion when 
earnings are being manipulated, resulting in low power of the tests. 
 
Strengths of Abnormal accrual models 
The measure attempts to isolate the manipulated or error component 
(distortion) of accruals. The use of these models has become the widely accepted 
methodology in accounting to measure distortion in earnings (Dechow et al, 2010 
pg.351). 
Problems of Abnormal accrual models 
Tests of earnings management are joint tests of the accounting theory and the 
abnormal accrual model as a proxy for detecting earnings management. It is difficult 
to model what accruals should be. Abnormal accruals models encounter estimation 
errors. Quality of accruals are associated various economic factors such as size of the 
companies, growth of companies, industry characteristics and etc. Correlated omitted 
variables associated with firms’ fundamentals financial performance are the 
important concerns. 
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2.2.3 Earnings Smoothness 
The measure of earnings smoothness is related to earnings persistence. The 
basic idea of an accrual-based accounting system is that accruals compensate the 
timing and matching problems (issues of cash payments and receipts), so as to make 
earnings more informative about firms’ performance than cash flows. The 
assumption of standard setter is that accrual-based earnings are a better measure of 
fundamental performance than a measurement system that is based on cash receipts 
and payments. Hence, smoothing is an outcome of an accrual-based accounting 
system (Dechow et al, 2010 pg.361). Walker (2013) suggests there is some evidence 
that many firms choose to engage in smoothing as part of a long-term equilibrium 
reporting strategy and that firms benefit from this by virtue of a less volatile share 
price, but this literature is underdeveloped. 
However, the assumption may have its own drawback, which means earnings 
smoothing maybe achieved by management to hide or delay the information 
regarding firms’ performance or management could engage earnings smoothing 
through the selection of accounting choices in applying the accounting system. 
Beidleman (1973) defined earnings smoothing as “an attempt on the part of the 
firm’s management to reduce abnormal variations in earnings to the extent allowed 
under sound accounting and management principles”. Hence, empirical research on 
earnings smoothing are related to these two aspects, one is the management’s 
accounting choices and the other is on whether earnings smoothing better reflect 
firms’ fundamental performance in the absence of accounting choices.  
The most commonly used measure of earnings smoothing are the variant of the 
variability of earnings relative to cash flows from operations: 
                          
The intuition behind this is that the purpose of accruals is to have a measure of 
firms’ financial performance, which is less volatile than the underlying cash flow. So 
variability of earnings should be lower than the variability of the underlying cash 
flows. However, too little variability of earnings relative to variability of cash flows 
may be the product of earnings management.  
Furthermore, some studies (Lang et al, 2003 and 2006; Barth et al, 2008; and 
etc.) regress changes in earnings and changes in cash flows from operations 
respectively with economic variables such as size, growth, leverage, changes in debt, 
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turnover, and cash flows as control variables, and then obtain the ratio of variance of 
residuals from regressing each metric to compute the measure of earnings smoothing 
(the ratio of variability of earnings relative to cash flows). Metrics of regressing 
changes in earnings and changes in cash flows from operation are as follows: 
    0           𝐺        𝐿             𝑏            
  6     
     0           𝐺        𝐿             𝑏            
  6     
Dechow and Dichev (2002), who suggested that lower variability in earnings 
exhibit higher quality of accounting. However, too little variability of earnings 
relative to variability of cash flows may be the product of earnings management. If 
firms manage their earnings, the variance of residuals from regression of    is 
expected to be much lower than the variance of residuals from regression of    . 
  
Strengths of Earnings Smoothing 
Income smoothing appears to be a common corporate practice in many 
countries around the world. Earnings smoothing mitigates the timing problems 
associated in cash flows under accrual-based system. However, too much smoothing 
may be an indication of earnings management. If the volatility of earnings relative to 
volatility of cash flows is too small, which may imply the product of earnings 
management. 
Problems of Earnings Smoothing 
Earnings smoothing is an outcome of an accrual-based accounting system, 
however, too much smoothing may be an indication of earnings management. It only 
captures the role of accruals that mitigates the volatility of cash flows. It does not 
provide the evidence how earnings management is being practiced. Furthermore, 
accruals have the role of recognising future losses to inform about firms’ future 
financial performance, but earnings smoothing does not capture this role.  
 
2.2.4 Target Beating 
Recently, earnings quality research has gained significant new knowledge, 
such as target beating. Studies find a discontinuity in the distribution of reported 
earnings around zero level: a statistically small number of firms with small losses 
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and a statistically large number of firms with small profits (Hayn, 1995; Degeorge, 
1996; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Hayn (1995) first introduces the concept of the 
pooled and cross-sectional distribution of reported earnings approach to examine 
whether there is any evidence of earnings manipulation. She plots the distribution of 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) and identifies there is a discontinuity around zero 
earnings. Similarly, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) propose small earnings increases 
could indicate earnings management based on a statistically unusual number of firms 
with small decreases in earnings. Further, Degeorge et al (1999) document that 
meeting or beating an analyst forecast is an indication of earnings management 
based on the discontinuity in the distribution of forecast errors: reported earnings 
less consensus analyst forecasts.  
The common interpretation of this discontinuity in earnings distribution is that 
firms with small losses intentionally manage earnings upwards to report a small 
profit, implying that observations at or slightly above earnings targets have low 
quality of earnings. The measures such as small profits and small loss avoidance 
have been identified as an indication of earnings management. This measure is used 
as one specific proxy of earnings quality in earnings quality studies. Recently, 
studies usually use the ratio of small profit to small losses as the measure of small 
loss avoidance. An observation is classified as small profit (small loss) if positive 
(negative) earnings after tax fall within the range of 1 percent of lagged total assets, 
that means small losses are defined to be in the range (-0.01, 0.00), and small profits 
are defined to be in the range (0.00, 0.01). 
The evidence on whether small profit and small loss avoidance represent 
earnings management is mixed. The discontinuity around zero earnings is with the 
assumption that earnings follow a smooth distribution when earnings management is 
absent. If there are discontinuities in the distribution at predictable points, indicate 
the presence of earnings management. However, Dechow Richardson and Tuna 
(2003) find that discretionary accruals present no difference in small profit versus 
small loss firms. Durtschi and Eason (2005, 2009) indicate that discontinuity is 
explained by statistical and sample bias issues related to scaling by price. Beaver 
McNicholes and Nelson (2007) suggest that the discontinuity around zero earnings 
can be interpreted as asymmetric taxes rather than opportunistic management. 
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Strengths of Target Beating 
The measure is easy to compute; the concept is intuitively appealing; and 
survey evidence suggests earnings management around earnings targets. It is free on 
the mixed effects of firms’ fundamental performance and accounting measurement 
system. 
Problems of Target Beating 
It provides the evidence of how earnings are actually managed. It does not 
provide the whole picture of accounting quality. The discontinuity around zero 
earnings is with the assumption that earnings follow a smooth distribution when 
earnings management is absent, but the distribution of earnings without earnings 
management is unknown in the first place. Furthermore, there might be other 
economic reasons for discontinuities in the earnings distribution. For example, 
Beaver McNicholes and Nelson (2007) suggest that the discontinuity around zero 
earnings can be interpreted as asymmetric taxes rather than earnings management. 
 
2.2.5 Earnings Conservatism 
Earnings conservatism in some studies is being addressed as asymmetric 
timeliness and timely loss recognition. The principle of earnings conservatism is that 
future bad news is anticipated, whereas future good news is not. A major change that 
occurred concurrently with the declining relevance of earnings is that more 
companies began reporting losses (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). A number of studies 
focus on timely loss recognition because there is a demand for timely loss 
recognition to combat management’s opportunistic intentions (Basu, 1995; Pope and 
Walker, 1999; Ball Kothari and Robin, 2000; Givoly and Hayn, 2000). Assuming 
that the degree of asymmetric timeliness in a firm’s earnings is controllable by 
managers, at least in part, and that managers rationally respond to demand through 
their accounting choices, the correlation between demand and asymmetric timeliness 
suggests that asymmetric timeliness represents good quality of earnings (Dechow et 
al, 2010).  
Basu (1997) proposed the reverse earnings-returns regression model, which is 
frequently used in the earning quality research: 
                                             
where,   =1 if        <0 
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Issues on whether the bad news captured by accounting earnings through 
accruals process vary across countries or change over time is unaddressed. Generally 
investors observe firm’s current earnings, but there is either good or bad news about 
future earnings of the firm in the market. The model assumes that markets efficiently 
reflect losses in returns when such losses are incurred. A higher    implies more 
timely recognition of the incurred losses in earnings. The basic idea in the Basu 
model is that earnings capture future bad news not future good news, whereas return 
captures both future bad and good news. The dummy variable    is 1 when stock 
return is negative as it is impounding bad news about the future. When there is a bad 
news, earnings and returns recognise future losses altogether, which implies stronger 
association between returns and earnings (higher   ). 
Several papers address the issues associated with the measure of Basu (1997) 
model. In particular, Dietrich Muller and Riedl (2007) point out the reverse 
regression measure from Basu (1997) model is biased, this is further demonstrated in 
Givoly Hayn and Natarajan (2007), Beaver Landsman and Owens (2008), and 
Patatoukas and Thomas (2010). Therefore, due to the criticism of use of Basu  
(1997) model, the use of Basu’s alternative measure has increased, which is 
particular used in the market where equity returns are not available. For example, the 
Basu’s alternative measure is adopted in the study of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) for 
examining accounting quality of public and private firms in the UK. The Basu’s 
alternative model is as follows: 
     0                                      
    is the change in income from year     to t, scaled by beginning book 
value of total assets, and        is a dummy variable equal to 1 if       is 
negative. The idea is that changes revert since they are not permanent. Negative 
changes revert quicker because bad news is more fully recognized in income. 
Therefore,    will be negative when        < 0 and Basu (1997) finds support for 
this prediction. 
 
Strengths of Earnings Conservatism 
Earnings conservatism is at the heart of accounting. It acts as a check on over 
optimistic stock markets. It is different from the role of accruals in error correction, 
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which is somewhat mechanical. It measures the willingness of accruals to signal 
future poor performance, which is an important aspect (role) of accruals. 
DeFond (2010) points out if debt holders value timely loss recognition, and 
earnings management is used to avoid covenant violations (e.g., DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002), then debt holders are 
also potentially influenced by earnings management. Hence, earnings conservatism 
is particularly used to avoid debt covenant violations. Earnings conservatism aims at 
disentangling the measurement of the process from the process itself by assuming 
that returns appropriately reflect fundamental financial information. 
Problems of Earnings Conservatism 
The net effect of timely loss recognition on earnings quality is unknown 
because it results in lower persistence during bad news periods than during good 
news periods (Dechow et al, 2010 pg.363), since both persistence and conservatisms 
affect the quality of earnings. Furthermore, timely loss recognition as the measure of 
earnings quality relies strong assumption that accounting regulators are producing a 
high quality earnings number, and returns are providing an equal representation of 
timely loss recognition. This assumption creates problems in cross-country studies 
where variation in market structures and information flow are significant different 
across countries. 
 
2.3 Comments about the proxies of Accounting Quality 
In the light of discussion above, each proxy of earnings quality has its own 
strengths and drawbacks. The literature is limited in pointing out which proxy is the 
best in measuring quality of accounting, because each proxy measures different 
aspects of accounting quality.  
Dechow et al (2010 pg.349) indicate that a relationship that high accrual firms 
tend to have high discretionary accruals, have less persistent earnings, be more 
subject to legal enforcement action, and appear to beat benchmarks more often. They 
further suggest that there is more ambiguity in the relation between accruals and 
other earnings quality proxies such as timely loss recognition, smoothness, and target 
beating.  
In this thesis, we examine earnings quality across and within different groups 
of companies under current differential reporting framework. We use different
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proxies of accounting quality to measure different aspects of firms’ accounting 
quality. The purpose of this is to examine how differently that each group of 
companies behave in order to inform the future policy and discussion about 
differential reporting framework.  
We firstly start with the very basic analysis of cash flows and earnings and 
then step into more sophisticated measures of earnings quality such as earnings 
smoothing, target beating, earnings conservatism and earnings persistence.  
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Chapter 3: Effects of Regulation on Accounting Quality: Ratio 
Analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Background 
Currently, the IASB and the UK ASB have adopted different financial 
reporting standards for different classes of company. The IASB has full IFRS and 
IFRS for SMEs. In the UK, currently companies follow IFRS, UK GAAP and 
FRSSE; furthermore, some companies are exempted from statutory audit.  
In 2012, UK ASB proposes the new structure of financial reporting under the 
existing size criteria, that public and small companies will remain the same to follow 
full IFRS and FRSSE, and all other entities will follow IFRS for SMEs to replace 
UK GAAP. 
However, neither ASB nor IASB addressed whether the existing boundaries 
will be suitable for the future of differential reporting standards framework. 
Furthermore, there is no clear indication of expectation on accounting quality across 
different tiers of companies from both accounting standards boards. 
 
3.1.2 Issues Arising 
The objectives of having differential reporting standards include the concern of 
size issues, cost issues, agency issues, and economic importance of companies. 
Further, these concerns may influence accounting quality, and result variations in 
accounting quality across different groups of companies.  
Accounting quality is a way to evaluate how good the accounting system 
measures the firms’ financial performance (Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003). However, 
both regulation boards (IASB and UK ASB) have not made clear of what they 
expect in terms of accounting quality. Hence, it is difficult to evaluate the efficacy of 
this approach to regulation since the ASB (and IASB) do not specify what 
consequences should follow.  
Is differential reporting a response to the differential importance of companies 
and the differential cost of compliance? This approach would suggest that variation 
in financial reporting quality across companies is acceptable. Or is differential 
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reporting a response to the differential complexity of transactions and the incentive 
to report truthfully and fairly? This approach would suggest that variation in 
financial reporting quality across companies is not acceptable.  
 
1.2.1 Situations in which variations in accounting quality are acceptable 
If differential reporting is a response to differential importance of companies 
and the differential cost of compliance, the variations between each class of 
companies are acceptable. Public companies have more economic importance, and 
they have more demand from legal forces (accounting regulations and government) 
and market forces (investors, share-holders, and debt-holders). Public companies 
have made financial information publicly available, which give easy access to 
investors and shareholders. As for private companies, their equities are not publicly 
traded and they have less economic importance.  Hence, there is a smaller demand 
from the open market for private companies to have accounting quality as good as 
public companies. 
Compliance with IFRS is costly. Companies either have to appoint additional 
staff in the finance department or rely on their auditors to ascertain compliance with 
the requirement of IFRS. Small companies generally cannot afford the same quality 
of reporting as large companies. As well as having an influence on financial 
reporting requirements, this factor is the basis for exemptions from audit given to 
small companies. In addition, the increased costs as a result of the additional 
recognition and disclosure requirements, often add no value to the users (Greeff, 
2008). 
 
1.2.2 Situations in which variations in accounting quality are not 
acceptable 
If differential reporting is a response to the differential complexity of 
transactions and the incentive to report truthfully and fairly, then the variations of 
accounting quality between each class of companies are not acceptable. Larger 
companies have more complex transactions, and hence they need more complex 
regulations to neutralise the incentives for performance management. As for smaller 
entities, such complexities are rarely relevant, which means they may have simpler 
transactions with less facility for performance management. Therefore, the variations 
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in accounting quality between large and smaller entities are not acceptable. 
Due to agency issues, large companies have more incentives to manage 
earnings in order to hide or delay their poor financial performance, suggesting large 
companies need to be more regulated to prevent opportunistic earnings management. 
Smaller companies, on the other hand, do not suffer the agency problems and have 
fewer incentives to manage earnings, suggesting small companies do not need to be 
more closely regulated. Therefore, the outcome of accounting quality is expected to 
have less or no variations between large and smaller entities.  
 
3.1.3 Criticism of the regulation process 
Accounting standards are firstly emerged in early 1930s in the US because 
companies are trying to manage earnings to report better financial performances than 
it actually was.  Furthermore, in the late1960s, there was a lot of public criticism of 
financial reporting methods in the UK. Hence, accountings standards are in the 
position of disciplining companies to report good quality of earnings. However, what 
are regulators’ expectations of accounting quality? Do they expect higher accounting 
quality for larger entities and lower accounting quality for smaller entities? Or do 
they expect equalized accounting quality across all tiers of companies.  However, 
with the development of accounting standards and differential reporting standards, 
the regulators have failed to mention how informative that they expect firms’ 
earnings to be.  
This issue is argued in Watts and Zimmerman (1979) and Young (2003), that 
regulators do not have enough understanding of what market and economy really 
desire, and the regulation process is the process of negotiation and lobbying in order 
to persuade the users that work of theirs is valuable, correct and useful.  
Therefore, in the absence of expectation on how good that accounting quality 
across different sizes of firms should be, the proposal of future structure of financial 
reporting in the UK (FRED 48) under existing boundaries may encounter some 
issues regarding accounting quality across different tiers of companies. Will the new 
structure of financial reporting framework fit the existing size criteria? Will there be 
any medium-sized companies need to regulate as public listed companies? Will there 
be any small companies regulate as medium-sized companies. Hence, the analysis of 
accounting quality across three tiers of companies under current boundaries is 
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needed in order to inform the future policy.  
3.1.4 Objective of this chapter 
Accounting standards are needed to help discipline the companies in order to 
help the market reach equilibrium quicker (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979). Further, 
the role of accounting standards is to balance the effects from both the demand of 
reporting high quality of financial information from the market and the incentives of 
managing earnings from companies, suggesting that companies should have the 
same accounting quality with the discipline of accounting standards.  
In the light of discussion of current issues arise from the development of 
differential reporting standards, and hence, the main objective of this chapter is to 
examine the effects of accounting regulations on accounting quality in order to 
inform future policy in differential reporting standards. That is we compare the 
accounting quality across different tiers of companies under existing boundaries in 
the UK. 
Currently, the UK adopts accruals accounting system for financial reporting. 
Under accruals system, firms’ cash flows are transformed into reported earnings by 
accruals. Earnings are more informative about firms’ financial performances than 
cash flows (Dechow, 1994).  
Assuming the quality of accounting standards is maintained in high quality, 
that accounting quality is about whether firms’ cash flows have been correctly 
transformed into reported earnings. Accruals play a crucial role in the transforming 
process, because cash flows encounter timing and matching issues, which could not 
be the best measure for firms’ real financial performance. Hence, accruals are used 
in solving the timing and matching problems associated in cash flows, and 
transformed cash flows into reported earnings to better reflect firms’ actual financial 
performance. However, accruals component in the earnings, on the other hand, will 
suffer earnings management, which lower accounting quality.  
With previous discussion on the measures of accounting quality in the second 
chapter, there are many proxies used to measure accounting quality, and each proxy 
measures different aspect of accounting quality. In this chapter, we use the ratio of 
cash flows relative to earnings (CFO/E) to measure the level of accruals for different 
groups of companies. The purpose of this is to obtain the general view of accounting 
quality for different groups of companies, and how differently that each group of 
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companies behave.   
3.1.5 Chapter Outline 
In section 3.2 of this chapter, the hypothesis is developed based on the 
literature of accounting standards and accounting quality; follow by the sample and 
data in section 3.3. The rationale of measuring accounting quality is provided in 
section 3.4. The measures of accounting quality (ratio of cash flows relative to 
earnings) and results are discussed in section 3.5. Conclusion is provided in the 
section 3.6 of this chapter. 
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3.2 Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Unclear Objectives and Expectation from Regulators  
With the development of differential reporting framework and growing 
importance of SMEs in the economy, the concern of having different sets of 
accounting standards for SMEs have been brought to the fore. IASB issued IFRS for 
SMEs in 2009, and ASB proposed to replace UK GAAP with FRS 102 (which is 
based on IFRS for SMEs) in 2012.  However, the objective of having differential 
reporting standards for different groups of companies from regulators is unclear in 
terms of accounting quality. 
The objective of IASB for developing IFRS for SMEs is based on the nature of 
users’ needs, is to develop a separate set of standards (general-purpose statements) 
for companies without public accountability, regardless of size, is that greater 
comparability across countries. The main objective of ASB in the UK for proposing 
FRS 102 to replace the current UK GAAP, is to enable users of accounts to receive 
high-quality understandable financial reporting proportionate to the size and 
complexity of the entity and the users’ information needs (ASB 2012).  
The ASB’s proposal is generally in line with IASB’s thinking. However, this 
seems contradicting in terms of size criterion, the IASB suggested that IFRS for 
SMEs is for companies without public accountability regardless of size, whereas the 
ASB proposed three tier system based on the size of companies with elimination of 
public accountability. Both regulation boards (IASB and UK ASB) have not made 
clear of their objectives of developing new accounting standards for SMEs and their 
objectivities of accounting standards somehow conflict in terms of comparability and 
size criteria. 
In the process of regulating accounting standards, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1979 pg.273) argue that regulators are basically regulating in the dark, the process 
of developing new accounting standards is the process of negotiation, because the 
regulators do not have enough understanding of how companies going to behave. 
Young (2003 pg.637) further argues who indicated that standards and accounting 
practices are to be seen as emergent from a rational process that separates the 
technical and political rather than as the result of the desires or wants of a particular 
agent or the demand of economic reality. She specifically points out accounting 
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standard boards engaged variety of efforts such as rhetorical strategies to persuade 
individuals that the work of theirs is valuable, appropriate, useful and correct 
(Young, 2003 pg.621).  
 
3.2.2 The Role of Accounting Quality in Policy Making process 
Accounting quality is referred as the term of earnings quality in accounting 
information. Accounting quality can be defined as the extent to which the financial 
statement information reflects the underlying economic situation. In particular, 
Dechow et al (2010 pg.344) define the earnings quality as “higher quality earnings 
provide more information about the features of firm’s financial performance that are 
relevant to a specific decision made by specific decision-maker”.  
Accounting quality is one way to measure firms’ financial performances and 
behavior, and accounting quality research is influencing standard setters and 
regulators. For instance, a report on audit quality by the US Department of the 
Treasury (2008) references numerous accounting quality studies (e.g., Ogneva et al., 
2007; Myers et al., 2003). The Treasury Department in the US also publishes a 
commissioned study by an academic researcher that summarizes the accounting 
quality literature on restatements (i.e., Scholz, 2008). Further, the Congressional 
debates leading up to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 cite several 
academic studies (e.g., DeFond et al., 2002). DeFond (2010) indicates that there are 
several cases in which the Treasury Department and the FASB have sought informal 
input directly from accounting academics regarding research studies that potentially 
inform proposed standards (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Hanlon et al., 2008). DeFond 
(2010) suggested there is ample evidence that accounting quality plays a role in the 
process of policy-making.  
However, Watts and Zimmerman (1979) argue that academic accounting 
research is used in the “market for excuses” to buttress and justify standard setters’ 
preconceived notions. For example, Ramanna (2008) suggests that the decision to 
promulgate fair-value accounting for goodwill was politically motivated, rather than 
the result of policy makers carefully evaluating and weighing the evidence in the 
academic literature. DeFond (2010) further argues that although regulators were 
aware of the accounting quality literature, it was unclear whether or how accounting 
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quality research actually influences policy makers’ decisions because standard 
setters and lawmakers might selectively cite research in order to achieve political 
ends.  
DeFond (2010) suggests there is ample evidence that accounting quality plays 
a role in the process of policy-making and influences the standard setters and 
regulators in the process of policy-making. However, in the development of IFRS for 
SMEs and the issues of FRED 48 in the UK, regulators have not mentioned neither 
how they consider accounting quality in the policy-making process nor what they 
expect SMEs in the future in terms of accounting quality. Regulators emphasize the 
development of differential reporting standards for SMEs is mainly to reduce the 
reporting burden and cost of SMEs (ASB 2012a; IASB 2009). However, it is 
difficult to predict what regulators expect because they have not made clear what 
they expect in the future in terms of behavior of SMEs such as what accounting 
quality they expect for SMEs since accounting quality is one way of measuring 
firms’ financial behavior. This is consistent with DeFond (2010), who suggested that 
it was unclear whether or how accounting quality research actually influences policy 
makers’ decisions because standard setters and lawmakers might selectively cite 
research in order to achieve political ends.  
 
3.2.3 Mixed findings in Accounting Quality studies 
Different users’ needs, agency issues, size and complexity and costs are the 
factors drive differential reporting standards for SMEs. In the mean time, these 
factors could also influence the accounting quality across different classes of 
companies under differential reporting framework. These factors suggest that larger 
companies need to be more closely regulated than smaller ones. But there are a 
number of issues, which arise from this approach. For example, regulation may lag 
behind the practices of large companies; hence, the quality of reporting in large 
companies may be adequate. Large companies may develop schemes to circumvent 
the reporting requirements if agency issues dominate the needs of their potential 
users. However, smaller companies may have so many exemptions from the 
regulations, which apply to larger companies that the quantity and quality of 
reporting is insufficient.  
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Furthermore, findings in the literature regarding accounting quality for public 
and private companies are mixed. Beatty Ramesh and Weber (2002) find that public 
firms have a greater propensity to manage earnings than private firms, whereas 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) report the opposite. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) find that 
financial reporting in public companies is more informative than in private 
companies. However, Givoly et al (2010), who provide no conclusion on which 
group of companies have better accounting quality, but suggested that accounting 
quality for public and private companies are driven by two effects: demand from the 
market for good accounting quality and incentives from managing earnings to 
deceive users.  
Leuz (2003) shows that there are no differences in information asymmetries 
between companies reporting under IAS and US GAAP on the Germany’s Neuer 
Markt. This evidence is further supported by Leuz et al (2003), who report no 
association between accounting frameworks and the country level of earnings 
management for a large set of countries. Van Tendeloo/Vanstraelen (2005) find no 
differences in the level of earnings management of companies reporting under 
German GAAP and IAS. Barth et al. (2005), on the other hand, for a large sample of 
countries show that IAS adopters report earnings of higher quality.  
 
3.2.4 Assumption based on the need and objective of accounting standards 
With the development of differential reporting standards for SMEs, it is 
important to examine the accounting quality across different classes of companies 
under current differential reporting regimes. This is because, firstly, regulators do 
not specify what accounting quality they expect for different groups for companies. 
Secondly, accounting quality influences the standard setters and regulators and plays 
a role in policy-making process. Thirdly, accounting research regarding accounting 
quality across different types of companies provides no clear conclusion which 
group of companies have better accounting quality.  
Accounting standards determine how the accounting information on earnings 
should be computed and reported. High quality of standards influences the users’ 
perception of quality of financial information (Wulandari and Rahman, 2004 pg.2). 
High quality accounting standards are perceived to provide consistent, comparable, 
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relevant and reliable financial information to the investors for decision-making of 
specific investment (Wulandari and Rahman, 2004 pg.2).  
Accounting standards are needed to help discipline companies in order to help 
the market reach equilibrium quicker. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) indicate that 
accounting standards limit the opportunistic distortions, which will result high 
accounting quality. Further, Givoly et al (2010) suggest that the role of accounting 
standards is to balance the effects from both the demand of reporting high quality of 
financial information from market and the incentives of managing earnings from 
companies.  
Furthermore, UK financial reporting regulations and principles are 
substantially equivalent for private and public companies (Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005 pg.84), so the quality of accounting standards for different groups of 
companies is expected to be similar. The reason to have different reporting standards 
between large companies and SMEs is to provide proportionate solution for SMEs 
while maintaining the quality of financial reporting (ASB, 2012a pg.14). 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the quality of financial 
reporting for public and private companies under current reporting framework in the 
UK. That means we compare the quality of financial reporting between each group 
of companies, which are large companies following full IFRS, private medium 
companies following UK GAAP, and small companies following FRSSE.  
Therefore, the role of accounting standards is to discipline companies to report 
high quality of accounting information. The assumption could be made based on the 
role of accounting standards in the market since the quality of accounting standards 
for public and private companies are substantially similar (Ball and Shivakuamr, 
2005). Under the discipline of accounting standards, the hypothesis questions in this 
chapter are as follows: 
 
Is there any variation in accounting quality for different groups of companies under 
differential reporting regimes? 
 
Do different groups of companies belong to the same type of distribution of quality 
of earnings? 
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3.3 Sample and Data 
 
In this chapter, we investigate the accounting quality in public companies as 
well as in the SMEs under differential reporting regimes in the UK. Current structure 
of financial reporting regimes in the UK is as follows: public EU quoted companies 
are following full IFRS to prepare consolidated accounts, private non-small 
(medium) companies are following UK GAAP
2
 and small companies are following 
FRSSE.
3
   
The main data applied in this paper is obtained from the “Financial Analysis 
Made Easy” (FAME) database supplied by Bureau Van Dijk. The database provides 
financial statement information of public and private British companies. The 
database is updated monthly. When a firm converts from one type to another (private 
to public, for example), all its past information is classified in subsequent versions of 
FAME under the latest type.  
We therefore checked the firm type in older versions of the database for each 
year over the sample period, 2008-2010. The reason why we choose these years is 
that companies are aware that differential reporting standards for SMEs are proposed 
by IASB. It is interesting to analyse how different groups of companies behave 
during this period in order to inform the future policy. We examine firms’ behavior 
cross-sectionally based on industries classification in the UK.  
Changes in type were verified against the listing or delisting date from the 
London Share Price database and/or the date of last change of name in the FAME 
database (conversion from private to public requires a name change in the UK). The 
main advantage of the FAME database is that it includes privately held corporations, 
allowing us to focus on an economically important group of firms that is relatively 
under-represented in most of academic accounting research.  
We select public and private companies-observations that are active from years 
of 2008 to 2010. We exclude companies that are subsidiary as their reporting 
requirement is different. The criterion for the subsidiary in FAME is that the 
                                                        
 
3
 There are still public companies following UK GAAP and private companies following IFRS, these 
companies are excluded in our studies, given our intuition of this research is to compare three classes 
companies that are public quoted companies following IFRS, medium companies following UK 
GAAP and small companies following FRSSE respectively.  
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minimum path of the ultimate owner is 50.01%. We also screen out private firms 
whose legal form is not equal to the status of corporations such as legal forms like 
sole proprietorships or partnerships. We exclude banks, insurance companies and 
other financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6799). We also exclude companies that 
without known value of total assets in the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010 in order to 
mitigate the data errors.  
In the UK, sections 382 and 465 of the Companies Act 2006 define private 
companies as SMEs for the purpose of accounting requirements. According to this a 
small company is one that fulfill at least two criteria of following, which include (1) 
turnover of not more than £6.5 million, (2) a balance sheet total of not more than 
£3.26 million and (3) not more than 50 employees. A medium-sized company has to 
satisfy at two of following criteria: (1) a turnover of not more than £25.9 million, (2) 
a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and (3) not more than 250 
employees. Typically, we select active public companies for the years of 2008-2010, 
private medium companies with turnover greater than £6.5 million and balance sheet 
worth greater £3.26 million for the years of 2008-2010, and small companies with 
annual turnover of £6.5 million or less and have an annual balance sheet worth no 
more than £3.26 million for the years of 2008-2010.  
We therefore obtain the initial sample by dividing companies observations 
based on the size criteria from Companies Act into three groups of companies, which 
are large companies (public companies), medium companies (private medium-sized 
companies) and small companies.  
Current structure of financial reporting regimes in the UK requires public EU 
quoted companies following full IFRS to prepare consolidated accounts, private non-
small companies following UK GAAP and small companies following FRSSE. We 
then match the initial sample into corresponding Financial Reporting standards, 
which means we will have large companies-observations only following IFRS, 
medium companies-observations only following UK GAAP and small-companies 
observations only following FRSSE in the years. However, certain information for 
Small Companies observations may not be available in the database as Small 
Companies under Companies Act generally do not have to submit full audited 
accounts, they only need to submit abbreviated accounts, (no Profit & Loss account 
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and Cash flow statement).
4
  
Several previous studies computed earnings quality proxies based on group of 
firms, such as Leuz et al. (2003) and Barth et al. (2008) typically used country-level 
observations. To better control for firm characteristics and economic influences, we 
choose a finer partition for our three types of companies-observations based on the 
industry-level, which is from industry sectors classification in FAME. Companies-
observations are then grouped into 10 major industry sectors based on UK two digit 
SIC 2007, which include
5
: Primary, Manufacturing, Utility, Construction, 
Wholesale, Service, Transport, Telecom, Other service, Education & Health. The 
reason of using two digits SIC codes is to analyse the difference in accounting 
quality across different industry groups in a broader range. Finer or detailed SIC 
codes may not present any significant difference in accounting quality across groups. 
However, using broad two digits SIC codes may introduce noise in the results, we 
therefore control outliers using winsorizing.  
Table 1 summarises the final sample for empirical testing with the number of 
companies and the number of companies distributed in 10 industries. Our sample 
comprises 46,146 UK companies for the observation-year of 2008-2010 available in 
the database of FAME. There are larger portions of companies distributed in 
Manufacturing, Wholesale, and Education & Health.    
 
 
 
                                                        
4 They are exempted from statutory audit if companies qualify as small companies and with 
turnover of no more than £6.5 million and total assets of no more than £3.26 million. By 
having full exemption of statutory audit, there could be disadvantage. Banks, credit 
managers, customers and suppliers rely on information from Companies House to assess 
creditworthiness and will be reassured by an independent audit. 
5 Refer to List of Abbreviation for details. 
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TABLE 3.1: Industrial Distribution of Numbers of Large, Medium-sized and Small companies 
 
Industries Description
a Number of Large 
Companies 
Number of Medium 
Companies 
Number of Small 
Companies 
Number of All 
Companies 
1 Primary
 
94 675 168 937 
2 Manufacturing
 
528 7494 367 8389 
3 Utility 29 273 37 339 
4 Construction 127 1975 1092 3194 
5 Wholesale  318 6438 1485 8241 
6 Service 55 1282 204 1541 
7 Transport 97 1731 320 2148 
8 Telecom 39 339 111 489 
9 Other services 37 1087 359 1483 
10 Education & Health 929 14302 4154 19385 
Total 
 
2253 35596 8297 46146 
 
This table displays the industry sectors’ distribution of the large, medium and small companies.  
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium 
companies are those have turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 
employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more 
than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
 
The sample is constructed from the FAME database. 
 
a
 Refer to list of abbreviation for detailed description of each industry section. 
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3.4 Rationale for Measures of Accounting Quality 
3.4.1 Overview 
Under accruals system, firms’ cash flows are transformed into reported 
earnings by accruals. Earnings are more informative about firms’ financial 
performances than cash flows (Dechow, 1994).  Accruals play a crucial role in the 
transforming process, because cash flows encounter timing and matching issues, 
which could not be the best measure for firms’ real financial performance. Hence, 
accruals are used in solving the timing and matching problems associated in cash 
flows, and transformed cash flows into reported earnings to better reflect firms’ 
actual financial performance.   
Assuming the quality of accounting standards is maintained in high quality, 
that quality of earnings is all about whether firms’ cash flows have been correctly 
transformed into reported earnings. Accruals component in the earnings, on the other 
hand, will suffer earnings management, which drives studies on accounting quality 
increasing enormously. From previous discussion on measures of accounting quality 
in the second chapter, each proxy measures different aspect of accounting quality. 
Therefore, in this chapter, we firstly adopt the most fundamental rationales for 
measuring accounting quality for different groups of companies. The purpose of this 
is to obtain a general view of how different groups of companies behave.  
 
3.4.2 Rationales of Measures of Accounting Quality 
The measure of accounting quality in this section is based on the rationale of 
earnings persistence and magnitude of accruals. Initially, accounting quality is 
addressed by earlier literature as accrual quality. Healy (1985) indicated that 
accruals-based measures are now widely employed in tests of the accounting quality. 
Assuming the accounting standards are properly enforced under regulated economy, 
that accounting quality or earnings quality is all about whether firms’ cash flows 
have been correctly transformed into reported earnings, which is deemed to be more 
informative about firms’ financial performances. Accruals are playing a crucial role 
in the transforming process, because cash flows are encountering timing and 
matching issues, which could not be the best measure for firms’ real financial 
performance. Hence, accruals are used in solving the timing and matching problems 
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associated in cash flows, and transformed cash flows into reported earnings to reflect 
firms’ actual financial performance. Therefore, accounting quality is very much 
related to whether accruals are being correctly used to transform cash flows into 
informative reported earnings.  
3.4.2.1 Earnings Persistence 
Basically, if earnings are persistent, the level of earnings will be continually 
recurring from accounting to accounting period. This type of measure are 
usually adopted for the research of usefulness of earnings to equity investors 
for valuation, with assumption that more persistent earnings will yield better 
inputs to equity valuation models, and hence a more persistent earnings 
number is of higher quality than a less persistent number (Dechow et al, 2010). 
Higher persistence of earnings will yield better inputs to equity valuation 
models and will be able to generate sustainable cash flows in the future, 
implying high quality of earnings. Furthermore, Walker (2013 pg.475) 
suggests that earnings persistence is as part of a long-term equilibrium 
reporting strategy, and firms benefit from this by virtue of a less volatile share 
price.  
3.4.2.2 Magnitude of Accruals 
In the light of earnings persistence, accruals are crucial component in earnings 
affecting earnings persistence. This tries to capture whether accruals are 
performing a useful function in making adjustments to cash flows. If accruals 
are too small then there seems to be little point. As accruals do not perform its 
roles in compensating timing and matching problems of cash flows properly. If 
accruals are too large, then earnings might appear not to have any economic 
substance. As extreme large level of accruals involved in earnings is low 
quality because they represent a less persistent component of earnings. 
Therefore, appropriate magnitude of accruals in earnings is indicative of good 
earnings quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002 pg.54).  
However, different firms’ characteristics may drive the accruals to be different, 
for instance, companies in different industries or different sizes are likely have 
different level of accruals, for which we could not simply compare earnings 
quality by magnitude of accruals. Therefore, industry analysis on magnitude of 
accruals is demanded.  
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3.4.3 Cash flows to Earnings Analysis 
Cash flows and earnings reflect firms’ the most fundamental financial 
reporting behaviour. We use the ratio of cash flows relative to earnings to measure 
level of accruals based on the rationales of earnings persistence and magnitude of 
accruals. The purpose of this is to obtain the general understanding of firms’ 
financial reporting behaviour across different groups of companies (large, medium 
and small companies).  
Cash flow could also be used to measure firm performance. However, over 
finite intervals, reporting cash flows is not necessarily informative. This is because 
cash flows have timing and matching problems that cause them to be a “noisy” 
measure of firm performance. Earnings are used as the summary measure of firm 
performance produced under the accrual basis of accounting by wide range of users. 
(Dechow, 1994). However, earnings potentially suffer from a problem that cash 
flows do not, namely manipulation by the management of the company. Managers 
may have incentives to manage earnings to smooth reported earnings, to boost stock 
price, to decrease income tax expense, to make firms look better, to maximize 
managers' compensation, or to decrease political visibility. Firms could use reporting 
discretion to mask or misstate economic performance and earnings could be 
temporarily inflated by accrual choices (Burgstahler et al., 2006). For example, firms 
can overstate reported earnings to achieve certain earning targets or report 
extraordinary performance in specific instances such as an equity issuance (Teoh et 
al., 1998).  
Cash flow from operation (CFO) is difficult to manage unless firms 
intentionally front load or defer the recognition of cash accompanying revenue or 
expense. Therefore, CFO should be a good indicator of a firm's operating 
performance. A bad performer may have a strong incentive to employ income-
increasing accounting strategies, while a good performer in general may have 
relatively less incentives to employ income-decreasing strategies except for some 
extremely good performers. 
Since we are examining both public and private companies and stock prices are 
only available for quoted companies, we are unable to measure the performance of 
companies in terms of stock returns but instead we can examine the quality of their 
accounts based firms’ earnings, cash flows and accruals. Under accruals-based 
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accounting system, cash flows (cash receipts and payments) are transformed by 
accruals into reported earnings, which better reflect firms’ fundamental financial 
performance. However, Dechow (1994) indicates earnings are produced under 
accruals basis of accounting will suffer from earnings manipulation, because 
accruals can be intentionally manipulated by managers for specific reasons and 
incentives. Too large or too small level of accruals may be an indication of poor 
accounting quality.  
Therefore, we assume that cash flows are free of manipulation
6
 and analyse the 
accounting quality for each group of companies based on earnings relative to cash 
flows. In this chapter, we firstly use cash flows from operation (CFO) to earnings (E) 
ratio to obtain the idea of level of accruals. The purpose of this is to obtain the basic 
understanding of financial behaviour for each class of companies. Ratio is applied 
into large (public listed companies), medium-sized and small companies 
respectively. 
                                                        
6
 Note further that we assume that cash flows are free of manipulation, although this is not always the 
case (e.g. Roychowdhury 2005). 
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3.5 Measures of Accounting Quality and Results 
3.5.1 Cash flows from operation to earnings (CFO/E) ratio 
Cash flows from operation (CFO) to earnings (E) ratio are used to measure 
companies’ performance related to the quality of accounting in this chapter. The 
purpose of doing so is to obtain the basic understanding of financial behaviour for 
each class of companies. 
For each group of companies, they are divided into 10 industries; comparisons 
of the ratio are made between companies as well as industries. Following the study 
of Dechow (1994), and taking note of no requirement of cash flow statement to be 
prepared by SMEs, hence, the cash flows from operations (CFO) are measured as 
follows: 
              
where: 
    = Cash flow from operation for the year; 
  = Profit after tax and extraordinary items for the year; 
    = Depreciation for the year; 
    = Increase in Debtors + Increase in Stock – Increase in Creditors for the year. 
 
Therefore, the first measurement of firms’ performance related to earnings 
quality is: 
                                               
   
 
      
where: 
i = 1, …,     ; 
g = L (Large), M (Medium), S (Small); 
k = Industry 1, 2, … 10; 
        = Cash flow from operation for company i in group g and industry k; 
      = Profit after tax and extraordinary items for company i in group g and 
industry k. 
Ratio of cash flows from operation to earnings could indicate that how much 
cash flow that companies could generate that is relative to earnings under the 
observation-year. Based on Dechow (1994) who suggests that accruals improve the 
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earnings’ ability to measure firms’ performance relative to cash flows, suggesting 
more accruals signify greater improvement over the underlying cash flows. 
However, Sloan (1996) indicates that extreme large level of accruals is indicative of 
poor earnings quality. Basically, this ratio is developed under this intuition, by 
simply looking at ratio of cash flow relative to earnings so as to obtain the level of 
accruals. If the ratio is high in absolute value, which may indicate the level of 
accruals is high.  
Our primary objective of this chapter is to examine whether differential 
reporting framework (differential accounting standards) has made accounting quality 
different across different classes of companies. By comparing the level of accruals 
across different groups of companies would give us a general view of how they 
behave.  
If the ratio is high in absolute value, which may indicate the level of accruals is 
high. This is because if the absolute value is large, the absolute value of cash flows is 
far greater than the absolute value of earnings. Given earnings comprising of cash 
flows and accruals, if the absolute value of cash flows is far greater than the absolute 
value of earnings, the level of accruals will be high.  
However, if ratio of cash flows to earnings is negative, this includes two 
situations, (1) positive cash flows with negative earnings and (2) negative cash flow 
with positive earnings. Positive cash flows with negative earnings are the indication 
of accruals adjusting matching and timing problems encountered by cash flows. 
However, those companies having negative cash flow with positive earnings are 
likely to have accruals back up their losses in order to report profit. Therefore, taking 
into account of these situations, we split the observations into two categories: one is 
with positive earnings and the other one is with negative earnings in order to further 
analyse the role of accruals.  
 
3.5.1.1 Results of cash flows to earnings ratio  
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics for CFO and Earnings for each group 
of companies. Large companies amounts the largest CFO and Earnings compared 
with the other two groups of companies. There is a huge gap between lowest and 
highest of CFO and Earnings, which is indicative of large variances of CFO and 
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earnings in each group. Further, large companies amounts the highest variance, 
followed by medium companies, and small companies the last. 
[Table 3.2 Here] 
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TABLE 3.2: Summary Statistics for CFO and Earnings 
 
 
 Large Companies Medium-sized Companies Small Companies 
Variables                   
No. of observations 2,253 2,253 35,596 35,596 8,297 8,297 
Mean 56,317 20,664 5,731 3,539 187 163 
Std Deviation 790,745 209,895 159,555 151,689 1,022 1,030 
Min -2,614,000 -913,000 -20,500,000 -20,500,000 -26,979 -26,980 
1st Percentile -25,153 -48,200 -23,100 -23,261 -1,469 -1,123 
5th Percentile -3,839 -6,089 -3,107 -2,941 -428 -251 
25th Percentile -59 -76 0 1 4 18 
Median 464 234 565 281 125 113 
75th Percentile 3,465 1,728 1,969 1,044 280 211 
95th Percentile 119,400 60,992 17,450 9,861 910 616 
99th Percentile 1,118,000 505,000 119,400 77,100 2,514 1,758 
Max 32,200,000 7,968,000 9,754,000 9,750,000 32,949 33,114 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for variables of     and  . The statistics are reported separately for large, medium-sized and small companies. 
All values are in thousands form (except the standard deviation).  
 
Variable Definition:    = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010;     = Net cash flow from operation in the 
observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in 
Working Capital. 
 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are 
those have turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK 
GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 
employees, following with FRESSE. 
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[Table 3.3 Here] 
Table 3.3 presents the detailed descriptive statistics of 
   
 
 across different 
industries for large, medium-sized and small companies. The means of 
   
 
 for 
three types of companies seem very different but they are not statistically 
different (-1.06, -0.37 and 1.61). Medium companies have the highest mean 
(7.60) may suggest that the level of accruals is higher than large companies (-
5.99) and small companies (0.98). The mean of large companies is negative, 
which could be either positive cash flows with negative earnings or negative cash 
flows with positive earnings. Therefore, analysis of 
   
 
 based on positive and 
negative earnings is needed, which will be discussed in next section. From 25
th
 
percentile to 75
th
 percentile, the 
   
 
 does not differentiate too much across three 
groups of companies, suggesting three groups of companies within this region 
have similar level of accruals. The standard deviation of 
   
 
 in medium 
companies is largest (775.30), followed by large companies (576.30) and small 
companies (31.50). The large variance could be due to the influences of extreme 
values (outliers) in each group of companies, as shown in Table 3.1, there is huge 
gap between lowest and highest value of CFO and earnings.   
The first finding in Table 3.3 is that the overall accounting quality for three 
types of companies does not vary too much given the mean of ratio is not 
statistically significant between each other, but accounting quality within 
medium companies group is varied the most and accounting quality within small 
companies is rather similar given the largest standard deviatoin in medium 
companies and the smallest standard deviation in small companies. 
Table 3.3 also presents the result of 
   
 
 across different industries for each 
group of companies. With 10 industry sectors allocated into each group of 
companies, it is possible to analyse the behavior of each group of companies in 
each industry. The means of 
   
 
 from 10 industries in large companies group are 
almost similar except the means in Construction (8.07) and Education & Health 
(-17.49) are relatively large in absolute value, suggesting companies in these two 
industries have higher level of accruals. The negative ratio will then be analysed 
based on positive and negative earnings group. Whereas the mean of 
   
 
 in 
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Primary (0.03) is less than 1 that cash flows only amounts a few percentage of 
their earnings, implying that companies in Primary sector have more accruals 
component in their earnings. As for standard deviation of 
   
 
 across different 
industries for large companies, only Construction (64.72) and Education & 
Health (897.10) amounts the higher standard deviation.  
Therefore, the second part of findings in Table 3.3 is that accounting 
quality for large companies across different industries is almost similar, except 
companies in Construction and Education & Health, which have higher means 
and higher standard deviation, suggesting level of accruals is higher in these two 
sectors. Further, companies in Primary sector have the smallest mean, implying 
that their earnings have more accrual component and less cash flows to back up 
their earnings, which may lead less persistence of earnings. 
The means of 
   
 
 from 10 industries in medium companies group varies 
from each industry. There are two negative means in Primary (-0.27) and 
Construction (-2.82), which need to be analysed in positive and earnings group. 
Education & Health amounts the highest mean, suggesting that medium 
companies in this sector have the highest level of accruals. The standard 
deviations of 
   
 
 vary across different industries for medium companies, with 
Education & Health amounts (1,219.00) the highest. Therefore, third part of 
findings in Table 3 is that accounting quality is different within medium 
companies across different industries, given different means and different 
standard deviations across industries.  
As for small companies, the mean of 
   
 
 across different industries does 
not vary too much, with only Transport having largest mean (4.10) and largest 
standard deviation (62.17). Another finding in Table 3.3 is that quality within 
small companies group does not vary too much.  
Comparing the means of three types of companies across industries, the 
final findings in Table 3.3 is that, overall the behavior of medium companies is 
different from small and large companies, given the statistically significant 
differences in Construction (1.69, -1.76), Service (2.42), Telecom (1.76) and 
Education & Health (1.68). Further, the accounting quality of large companies 
and small companies does not have much difference, except in Wholesale (1.96). 
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Standard deviations in medium companies across industries are relatively larger 
than that in large and small companies, suggesting that accounting quality across 
industries in medium companies is varied more than in large and small 
companies. 
 
Key findings from Table 3.3: 
1. The level of accruals in medium companies is relatively higher than large 
companies and small companies, given medium companies amount the 
highest mean of 
   
 
. 
2. The accounting quality is varied the most within medium companies 
because they have large standard deviations across 10 industries. 
3. Overall, the accounting quality of medium companies is different from 
large and small companies, though the means of 
   
 
 are not statistically 
different. 
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TABLE 3.3: Industrial Distribution and Summary Statistics for ratio of CFO to Earnings 
 
                                               
   
 
       
Large Companies ( =L) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 94 528 29 127 318 55 97 39 37 929 2,253 
Mean 0.03 1.48 2.13 8.07 1.41 2.42 2.38 0.49 1.71 -17.49 -5.99 
Std Deviation 4.28 10.92 2.31 64.72 14.54 10.76 22.96 14.75 2.77 897.10 576.30 
Min -21.65 -139.60 -4.07 -28.07 -170.10 -44.67 -128.20 -85.67 -4.93 -21,554.00 -21,554.00 
1st Percentile -21.65 -20.00 -4.07 -18.12 -25.12 -44.67 -128.20 -85.67 -4.93 -57.67 -35.29 
5th Percentile -7.00 -2.28 0.01 -9.13 -3.30 -2.08 -5.28 -4.39 -1.28 -8.25 -5.28 
25th Percentile -0.29 0.41 1.26 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.52 0.93 0.61 -0.08 0.10 
Median 0.34 1.12 1.91 0.99 1.13 1.51 1.51 1.96 1.17 1.00 1.03 
75th Percentile 1.13 2.19 2.72 2.72 2.07 2.59 3.34 3.01 2.74 2.15 2.22 
95th Percentile 3.13 8.29 8.51 19.10 5.99 15.77 13.06 12.55 7.70 12.44 10.80 
99th Percentile 22.67 22.21 8.81 60.80 28.72 58.13 178.00 18.00 12.25 83.70 50.52 
Max 22.67 161.00 8.81 722.00 143.80 58.13 178.00 18.00 12.25 10,817.00 10,817.00 
 
Medium-sized Companies ( =M) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 675 7,494 273 1,975 6,438 1,282 1,731 339 1,087 14,302 35,596 
Mean -0.27 0.81 1.72 -2.82 0.19 3.70 3.02 5.17 1.30 17.85 7.60 
Std Deviation 36.52 103.40 25.59 128.40 60.62 32.82 71.63 48.73 85.60 1,219.00 775.30 
Min -885.80 -8,138.00 -142.00 -3,932.00 -2,457.00 -182.20 -992.00 -166.20 -1,620.00 -13,040.00 -13,040.00 
1st Percentile -59.08 -27.52 -67.83 -152.60 -51.00 -38.03 -55.06 -23.67 -57.44 -51.96 -48.75 
5th Percentile -5.42 -4.69 -10.14 -15.45 -8.29 -4.66 -7.56 -5.11 -6.21 -6.36 -6.79 
25th Percentile 0.35 0.28 0.23 -0.82 -0.13 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.51 0.37 0.18 
Median 1.15 1.12 1.15 1.02 1.04 1.22 1.27 1.01 1.16 1.00 1.00 
75th Percentile 2.31 2.18 2.28 2.86 2.38 2.63 2.96 1.97 2.14 1.81 2.16 
95th Percentile 7.73 9.03 8.60 13.87 11.09 10.65 13.29 12.67 8.90 10.33 10.40 
99th Percentile 29.85 44.86 70.43 85.29 50.78 87.27 65.20 91.91 60.80 76.09 60.38 
Max 155.20 1,862.00 306.40 1,882.00 1,072.00 721.00 2,322.00 669.50 1,924.00 118,239.00 118,239.00 
(Continued on next page) 
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Small Companies ( =S) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 168 367 37 1,092 1,485 204 320 111 359 4,154 8,297 
Mean 1.19 2.61 -5.02 2.72 -0.55 1.17 4.10 0.44 1.05 0.72 0.98 
Std Deviation 25.26 19.88 38.62 40.55 22.37 7.19 62.17 5.16 5.76 31.50 31.50 
Min -139.00 -159.50 -232.50 -561.10 -464.00 -40.00 -182.00 -37.00 -22.36 -1,298.00 -1,298.00 
1st Percentile -128.60 -23.00 -232.50 -50.00 -67.67 -18.50 -44.00 -28.86 -13.14 -28.83 -36.69 
5th Percentile -4.22 -4.57 -8.31 -8.35 -9.00 -6.00 -5.10 -2.08 -2.73 -3.20 -5.29 
25th Percentile 0.68 0.21 0.59 -0.16 0.02 0.57 0.23 0.45 0.77 0.69 0.44 
Median 1.04 0.98 1.07 1.00 0.96 1.10 1.02 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.00 
75th Percentile 1.67 1.48 1.42 2.25 1.80 1.71 1.91 1.38 1.27 1.33 1.50 
95th Percentile 8.18 6.00 5.44 15.08 8.83 6.94 6.82 3.87 2.97 5.50 7.50 
99th Percentile 136.30 117.70 19.13 75.56 34.00 28.00 60.00 7.45 10.00 35.00 41.20 
Max 205.00 191.00 19.13 682.00 101.00 61.50 1,076.00 18.65 91.00 327.00 1,076.00 
            
t-stat (L-M)a 0.21 0.53 0.25 1.69* 1.10 -0.74 -0.22 -1.32 0.15 -1.13 -1.06 
t-stat (L-S)b -0.58 -0.98 1.12 0.91 1.96** 0.81 -0.41 0.02 1.21 -0.62 -0.37 
t-stat (M-S)c -0.61 -1.14 1.03 -1.76* 0.77 2.42*** -0.28 1.76* 0.10 1.68* 1.61 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of  
   
 
      across different industries for large, medium-sized and small companies, where,   = 1, …,     ;   = L (Large 
companies), M (Medium-sized companies), S (Small companies);   = Industry 1, 2, … 10. 
Variable definitions:   = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010;     = Net cash 
flow from operation for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the 
observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital. 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies 
are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
a
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and medium-sized companies’ means. 
b
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and small companies’ means. 
c
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between medium-sized and small companies’ means. 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant different at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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With negative 
   
 
, there could be two scenarios. The first scenario is that 
positive cash flows with negative earnings, which is the indication of matching and 
timing problems for cash flows not the result poor quality of accounting. Second one 
is that companies have negative cash flow with positive earnings, which might be the 
indication of poor quality of accounting. Furthermore, from Table 3.3, large 
companies have a negative mean of 
   
 
, which may include two scenarios. 
Therefore, the observations are divided into two groups: one is with positive 
earnings (Table 3.4) and the other one is with negative earnings (Table 3.5). 
 
3.5.1.2 Results of cash flows to earnings ratio – Positive Earnings Group 
 
[Table 3.4 Here] 
Table 3.4 presents the result of 
   
 
 across different industries for each group of 
companies with positive earnings. The means of 
   
 
 for three types of companies are 
not statistically different, suggesting that the accounting quality of three types 
companies is relatively similar statistically. Still, medium companies (11.27) have 
higher level of accruals than large (5.03) and small (1.59) companies do. Given the 
results in Table 3.3, that large companies have negative mean of 
   
 
. However, after 
splitting companies into positive and negative earnings groups in Table 3.4, the 
mean of large companies turns to positive. The reason why large companies have 
negative means may be due to the financial crisis during years of 2008-2010. The 
standard deviation of 
   
 
 for medium companies is the largest (877.60), follow by 
large companies (420.10) and small companies (24.56), suggesting that accounting 
quality in medium companies group is more varied than large and small companies.  
The first findings in Table 3.4 is consistent with Table 3.3, that the overall 
accounting quality for companies with positive earnings does not vary too much 
between the three groups. But accounting quality within medium companies group is 
varied the most and accounting quality within small companies is least varied. 
Another finding in Table 3.4 is that large companies with positive earnings 
across industries behave similarly, given all positive means and relatively similar 
variances across industries, except companies in Education & Health with largest 
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mean (8.43) and largest standard deviation (661.90). In Table 3.3, the mean of 
Primary is the smallest and the mean of Education & Health is negative, however, in 
Table 3.4 here, all means of 
   
 
 are greater than one and positive, implying that loss-
making companies influence the overall results in these industries.  
Medium companies with positive earnings in Table 3.4 have rather different 
means and standard deviations. Primary and Other Services have a mean less than 1, 
0.61 and 0.54, suggesting that medium companies in these industries have less cash 
flows to back up their earnings. Construction has the negative mean, which is the 
same in Table 3.3, suggesting that medium companies in Construction use accruals 
to back up the negative cash flows into positive earnings, which may suggest that 
companies in this sector have more tendencies to manage earnings. The standard 
deviations of all medium companies with positive earnings across industries are 
relatively large, with Education & Health having the largest standard deviation 
(1418.00). The third part of findings in Table 3.4 is that quality of earnings is varied 
within medium companies with positive earnings. Companies in Construction may 
have more tendencies to manage earnings.  
The means of 
   
 
 in small companies with positive earnings are similar across 
industries, except in Wholesale (-0.01). Negative cash flows amount 1 percent of 
positive earnings in Wholesale, implying that companies use accruals to back up the 
negative cash flows into positive earnings and have more tendencies to manage 
earnings into positive. Overall, the variances of 
   
 
 across industries for small 
companies with positive earnings are relatively similar.  
The final finding in Table 3.4 is that, the accounting quality of small 
companies in Construction, Wholesale, Service, Telecom and Other Services is 
statistically different with large and medium companies. Large companies and 
medium companies are not so different across industries, except in Construction 
(2.23). Again, variances in medium companies across industries are relatively larger 
than that in large and small companies, suggesting that accounting quality across 
industries in medium companies is varied more than in large and small companies.  
 
Key Findings from Table 3.4: 
1. In consistent with Table 3.3, medium companies have higher level of 
accruals than large and small companies with positive earnings.  
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2. Furthermore, the accounting quality is still varied the most within medium 
companies group with positive earnings. 
3. Medium companies in Construction and small companies in Wholesale may 
have more tendencies to manage earnings, as accruals are used to back up the 
negative cash flows into positive earnings. 
4. The accounting quality of small companies in Construction, Wholesale, 
Service, Telecom and Other Services is statistically different with large and 
medium companies. This may be due to the nature of small business.  
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TABLE 3.4: Industrial Distribution and Summary Statistics for ratio of CFO to Earnings (Positive Earnings) 
 
                                               
   
 
     , where,     
Large Companies ( =L) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 27 371 25 95 265 41 73 32 28 646 1,603 
Mean 1.73 2.27 2.54 3.56 2.32 3.48 5.49 3.46 2.14 8.43 5.03 
Std Deviation 4.80 12.55 2.05 11.39 11.45 12.29 21.03 4.08 2.87 661.90 420.10 
Min -7.00 -139.60 0.01 -18.12 -29.00 -44.67 -15.50 -2.63 -4.93 -5,134.00 -5,134.00 
1st Percentile -7.00 -19.50 0.01 -18.12 -19.23 -44.67 -15.50 -2.63 -4.93 -115.70 -29.00 
5th Percentile -2.75 -1.47 0.08 -9.13 -2.48 0.80 -1.23 -2.16 -0.79 -5.50 -2.96 
25th Percentile -0.03 0.87 1.61 0.38 0.58 1.06 1.10 1.70 1.07 0.48 0.69 
Median 0.90 1.48 2.01 1.17 1.26 2.04 2.07 2.18 1.66 1.30 1.46 
75th Percentile 2.29 2.62 2.78 2.95 2.15 3.46 3.69 3.49 2.88 2.74 2.72 
95th Percentile 5.27 10.96 8.51 22.27 5.99 15.77 15.61 12.55 7.70 15.26 12.94 
99th Percentile 22.67 27.57 8.81 60.80 39.25 58.13 178.00 18.00 12.25 125.00 60.67 
Max 22.67 161.00 8.81 60.80 143.80 58.13 178.00 18.00 12.25 10,817.00 10,817.00 
 
Medium-sized Companies ( =M) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 520 5,802 190 1,510 5,263 851 1,327 244 804 10,195 26,706 
Mean 0.61 3.23 4.50 -4.58 1.39 7.32 5.84 7.25 0.54 25.93 11.27 
Std Deviation 40.74 39.57 27.44 134.60 53.83 38.34 75.26 56.02 71.35 1,418.00 877.60 
Min -885.80 -909.90 -67.83 -3,932.00 -2,457.00 -58.67 -279.50 -166.20 -1,620.00 -3,405.00 -3,932.00 
1st Percentile -28.85 -13.38 -64.49 -163.60 -27.74 -12.23 -21.97 -17.51 -42.75 -26.00 -26.15 
5th Percentile -1.74 -2.54 -1.03 -12.89 -5.51 -0.15 -2.78 -2.73 -1.41 -2.71 -3.66 
25th Percentile 0.93 0.71 1.00 -0.31 0.28 1.18 0.92 0.85 1.00 0.95 0.75 
Median 1.46 1.32 1.62 1.28 1.24 2.03 1.66 1.18 1.43 1.05 1.23 
75th Percentile 2.64 2.45 2.72 3.20 2.60 3.56 3.50 2.45 2.52 2.30 2.58 
95th Percentile 8.66 9.52 11.50 14.50 11.88 16.41 14.22 14.93 12.08 11.69 11.59 
99th Percentile 29.85 48.35 162.90 69.88 50.78 133.00 65.20 91.91 58.89 77.94 62.93 
Max 155.20 1,862.00 306.40 1,591.00 1,072.00 721.00 2,322.00 669.50 689.80 118,239.00 118,239.00 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3.4 (Continued) 
 
Small Companies ( =S) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 135 316 30 870 1,173 148 269 84 296 3,454 6,775 
Mean 3.70 3.00 1.68 2.75 -0.01 2.08 6.31 1.19 1.33 1.28 1.59 
Std Deviation 22.61 21.27 3.52 38.27 21.68 7.70 66.19 2.58 6.04 15.65 24.56 
Min -84.43 -159.50 -1.82 -561.10 -464.00 -40.00 -44.00 -9.20 -18.50 -445.00 -561.10 
1st Percentile -20.04 -12.50 -1.82 -36.69 -37.33 -22.89 -10.13 -9.20 -13.14 -13.00 -21.00 
5th Percentile -1.13 -3.12 -1.75 -5.97 -7.23 -1.73 -3.82 -0.72 -0.53 -1.62 -3.25 
25th Percentile 0.98 0.42 0.88 0.15 0.18 0.97 0.48 0.74 0.94 0.83 0.64 
Median 1.15 1.00 1.19 1.04 1.00 1.26 1.08 1.05 1.07 1.00 1.01 
75th Percentile 1.79 1.57 1.42 2.38 1.86 2.00 1.96 1.41 1.29 1.36 1.56 
95th Percentile 9.00 6.00 4.46 16.00 8.97 7.00 11.00 3.10 2.95 5.00 7.52 
99th Percentile 136.30 117.70 19.13 54.20 34.00 41.18 62.33 18.65 16.90 25.07 36.81 
Max 205.00 191.00 19.13 682.00 98.00 61.50 1,076.00 18.65 91.00 327.00 1,076.00 
            
t-stat (L-M)a 0.55 -1.16 -0.96 2.23** 0.90 -1.65 -0.11 -1.04 0.62 -0.59 -0.53 
t-stat (L-S)b -0.92 -0.54 1.13 0.46 2.46** 0.70 -0.17 2.93*** 1.26 0.27 0.33 
t-stat (M-S)c -1.17 0.18 1.35 -1.98** 1.44 3.59*** -0.10 1.69* -0.31 1.76* 0.91 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of  
   
 
      across different industries for large, medium-sized and small companies with positive E (Earnings), where,   = 1, …, 
    ;   = L (Large companies), M (Medium-sized companies), S (Small companies);   = Industry 1, 2, … 10. 
Variable definitions:   = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010;     = Net cash 
flow from operation for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the 
observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital. 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies 
are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
a
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and medium-sized companies’ means. 
b
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and small companies’ means. 
c
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between medium-sized and small companies’ means. 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant different at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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3.5.1.3 Results of cash flows to earnings ratio – Negative Earnings Group  
If companies with negative earnings with positive cash flows, which give rise 
to a negative 
   
 
. This suggests that companies have enough cash flows to back up 
the negative earnings, i.e. less tendency to manage earnings. If the 
   
 
 turns to 
positive, it means companies have negative earnings with negative cash flows. The 
extremely high level of accruals may be an indication of poor accounting quality.  
 
[Table 3.5 Here] 
In Table 3.5, the overall means for three types of companies are all negative, 
suggesting companies have cash flows to back up their losses, especially in large 
companies (-33.15). This also suggests that level of accruals is higher in large 
companies than medium and small companies. The means of 
   
 
 are not statistically 
different between each group of companies with losses. Again, the standard 
deviations of 
   
 
 for three types of companies are different, with large companies 
having the greatest (846.00). 
Considering within industry variation, large companies in Construction, which 
amount the positive means with negative earnings (21.44), suggesting that large 
companies in this industry have more negative cash flows relative to losses. The 
standard deviations of 
   
 
 across industries are relatively small except in 
Construction (128.00) and Education & Health (1281.00). In general, large 
companies with losses behave relatively similar except in Construction and 
Education & Health, which the level of accruals is high and variations in accounting 
quality are high.  
Medium companies with losses behave similarly except in Construction and 
Other Services, where means of 
   
 
 are positive, suggesting that medium companies 
in these two industries have more firms with negative cash flows relative to negative 
earnings. The standard deviations of 
   
 
 across industries are relatively different 
though the overall variances are smaller than those in large companies.  
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The results of small companies in Table 3.5 are similar to large companies, as 
only Construction amounts the positive means of 
   
 
. However, the standard 
deviations of 
   
 
 are large in Utility (87.76) and Education & Health (68.38).  
Overall, medium companies in Primary, Utility, and Service behave differently 
from large and small companies. Furthermore, the variances within each industry in 
medium companies group are larger than those in large and small companies, 
suggesting the variations in accounting quality within medium companies group is 
the largest.  
 
Key findings from Table 3.5: 
1. Level of accruals in large companies is higher than medium and small 
companies, but the mean of 
   
 
 is negative (positive cash flows with negative 
earnings). This may be due to the financial crisis, that large companies are 
required to write off huge losses during this period. 
2. The variation in accounting quality within medium companies group is still 
the largest. 
3. Considering variation within each industry, Construction is different from 
other industries, which has higher variation in accounting quality and less 
cash flows to back up the losses.  
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TABLE 3.5: Industrial Distribution and Summary Statistics for ratio of CFO to Earnings (Negative Earnings) 
 
                                               
   
 
     , where,     
Large Companies ( =L) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 67 157 4 32 53 14 24 7 9 283 650 
Mean -0.65 -0.37 -0.48 21.44 -3.10 -0.70 -7.08 -13.08 0.37 -76.66 -33.15 
Std Deviation 3.88 4.99 2.42 128.00 24.47 1.49 26.31 32.09 2.04 1,281.00 846.00 
Min -21.65 -40.43 -4.07 -28.07 -170.10 -5.44 -128.20 -85.67 -1.28 -21,554.00 -21,554.00 
1st Percentile -21.65 -26.89 -4.07 -28.07 -170.10 -5.44 -128.20 -85.67 -1.28 -35.29 -36.75 
5th Percentile -7.21 -8.14 -4.07 -17.50 -6.44 -5.44 -22.35 -85.67 -1.28 -11.36 -9.21 
25th Percentile -0.44 -0.05 -1.88 -0.73 -1.03 -0.66 -3.37 -4.39 -0.83 -0.91 -0.68 
Median 0.21 0.51 0.56 0.34 -0.09 -0.26 -0.41 -0.08 -0.17 0.20 0.26 
75th Percentile 0.79 0.92 0.93 1.01 0.91 0.02 0.64 0.86 0.61 1.00 0.94 
95th Percentile 2.73 3.39 1.03 10.80 3.80 0.27 1.22 0.93 5.41 8.85 4.23 
99th Percentile 2.91 8.23 1.03 722.00 28.72 0.27 7.22 0.93 5.41 15.00 14.67 
Max 2.91 8.29 1.03 722.00 28.72 0.27 7.22 0.93 5.41 52.75 722.00 
 
Medium-sized Companies ( =M) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 155 1,692 83 465 1,175 431 404 95 283 4,107 8,890 
Mean -3.24 -7.51 -4.65 2.89 -5.20 -3.45 -6.24 -0.16 3.47 -2.19 -3.42 
Std Deviation 15.23 204.70 19.43 105.80 84.41 15.03 57.23 19.71 117.10 424.60 305.60 
Min -98.71 -8,138.00 -142.00 -544.00 -1,842.00 -182.20 -992.00 -80.64 -254.20 -13,040.00 -13,040.00 
1st Percentile -96.82 -95.36 -142.00 -110.70 -149.00 -84.03 -128.30 -80.64 -146.00 -120.50 -125.00 
5th Percentile -21.36 -13.68 -35.77 -20.44 -31.20 -13.81 -29.41 -9.51 -14.96 -16.54 -18.07 
25th Percentile -1.56 -1.27 -2.23 -2.76 -2.61 -1.68 -2.83 -1.08 -1.79 -1.28 -1.61 
Median 0.11 0.26 0.04 0.07 -0.09 -0.31 -0.20 0.35 -0.07 0.52 0.23 
75th Percentile 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.46 1.00 0.65 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 
95th Percentile 4.23 6.09 3.29 11.33 7.75 1.26 5.58 3.32 2.92 5.00 5.70 
99th Percentile 25.73 31.06 13.55 166.60 51.77 7.62 55.80 149.40 77.82 72.83 49.71 
Max 33.50 1,191.00 13.55 1,882.00 743.80 16.55 274.00 149.40 1,924.00 18,349.00 18,349.00 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3.5 (Continued) 
 
Small Companies ( =S) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 33 51 7 222 312 56 51 27 63 700 1,522 
Mean -9.10 0.18 -33.73 2.56 -2.56 -1.24 -7.57 -1.89 -0.26 -2.03 -1.77 
Std Deviation 32.47 6.16 87.76 48.55 24.72 4.90 31.79 9.16 3.97 68.38 52.12 
Min -139.00 -23.00 -232.50 -242.00 -228.00 -18.50 -182.00 -37.00 -22.36 -1,298.00 -1,298.00 
1st Percentile -139.00 -23.00 -232.50 -103.00 -116.00 -18.50 -182.00 -37.00 -22.36 -112.00 -128.60 
5th Percentile -128.60 -6.62 -232.50 -15.52 -17.80 -10.60 -48.20 -28.86 -6.00 -19.50 -18.17 
25th Percentile -1.68 -1.54 -8.31 -1.06 -0.98 -1.10 -1.15 -0.72 -0.86 -0.39 -0.78 
Median -0.22 0.44 -0.32 0.38 0.53 0.49 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.83 0.68 
75th Percentile 0.99 1.06 2.40 1.39 1.40 0.91 1.35 1.00 1.10 1.13 1.17 
95th Percentile 3.00 13.51 5.44 9.92 8.63 1.82 4.56 3.87 4.75 7.27 7.05 
99th Percentile 8.18 26.00 5.44 99.00 33.67 12.00 6.18 5.40 10.00 153.10 84.00 
Max 8.18 26.00 5.44 493.80 101.00 12.00 6.18 5.40 10.00 326.70 493.80 
            
t-stat (L-M)a 1.97** 1.43 1.70* 0.80 0.50 3.33*** -0.14 -1.05 -0.44 -0.97 -0.89 
t-stat (L-S)b 1.49 -0.58 1.00 0.83 -0.15 0.70 0.07 -0.91 0.75 -0.98 -1.44 
t-stat (M-S)c 1.01 -1.52 0.87 0.06 -0.93 -2.27** 0.25 0.65 0.53 -0.02 -0.21 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of  
   
 
      across different industries for large, medium-sized and small companies with negative E (Earnings), where,   = 1, …, 
    ;   = L (Large companies), M (Medium-sized companies), S (Small companies);   = Industry 1, 2, … 10. 
Variable definitions:   = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010;     = Net cash 
flow from operation for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for the 
observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital. 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies 
are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
a
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and medium-sized companies’ means. 
b
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between large and small companies’ means. 
c
 t-statistic for two-tailed of difference between medium-sized and small companies’ means. 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant different at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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3.5.1.4 Overall Comments for the ratio of cash flows to earnings: 
Under this method, there are a few findings. The variations of accounting 
quality within medium companies are higher than large and small companies. The 
level of accruals in medium companies is higher than large and small companies.  
Large and small companies have less variation when earnings are positive and 
more variation when earnings are negative. However, medium companies have more 
variation when earnings are positive and less variation when earnings are negative. 
Under effects of accounting standards and differential reporting framework, 
the accounting quality for medium companies is different from large and small 
companies. 
The advantage of this method is that it gives us the basic idea of what is going 
on in the actual data for public and private companies. This method gives a general 
understanding of level of accruals across different groups of companies as well as 
across industries.  However, it does not present the comparison within each industry. 
Therefore, in the next method, we take account of this issue.  
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3.5.2 Deviation (from the Industries’ average) of the CFO/E ratio  
The ratio of CFO/E reflects both accounting characteristics and economic 
characteristics. The quality of earnings differs in different accounting frameworks as 
well as in different economic environments. The previous method provides a general 
view of accounting quality across different industries. Companies in different 
industries may have different reporting behavirour. Firms that operate in different 
industries may have different fundamental business characteristics that affect the 
quality of earnings. For instance, values of the cash flows may be affected by the 
industry in which the company operates. Therefore, the comparison of accounting 
quality within each industry needs to be further analysed. In this section, we compare 
the accounting quality within each industry for three groups of companies. 
We examine 
   
 
 within each industry for three groups of companies, by taking 
deviations from the average of 
   
 
 in each industry for each group of companies.  
 
 
   
 
       is the ratio of cash flow from operations to earnings for company i 
in group   and industry k: 
where, i =1, ...,     . 
  = L (large), M (medium), S (small). 
k =1,2...,10. 
 
The average ratio of cash flow from operations to earnings, for group   
companies in industry   is as follows:  
  𝐺        = ∑  
   
 
     
   
    /      
 
The deviation of the ratio of cash flow from operations to earnings for 
company i from the industry average of group   is as follows:  
    
   
 
    
   
 
        𝐺  
   
 
     
In order to be consistent with previous method, the analysis is based on each 
group of companies with all earnings group, positive earnings group and negative 
earnings group.    
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3.5.2.1 Results of Deviation from Industry Average  
Results of how each group of companies deviate from its own industry average 
are shown in Table 3.6-3.8. With the mean constructed to be 0, the analysis will not 
focus on the mean but on the variance.  
 
[Table 3.6 Here] 
The standard deviations for three types of companies are different, medium 
companies amount the largest (775.30), follow by large companies (576.20) and 
small companies (31.48). The standard deviations from each industry for large 
companies are relatively small and similar, except the variance in Education and 
Health (897.10) is large, which drives the overall variations of large companies 
greater. The standard deviations from each industry for medium companies are 
relatively larger than those in large and small companies.  
Deviations of ratio (
   
 
) for large and small companies from 5
th
 to 95
th
 
percentile are relatively smaller than that from medium companies, suggesting 
variations within each industry are larger for medium companies. Furthermore, 
medium companies have higher extreme values for each industry.  
Education & Health amounts the highest variations for large and medium 
companies. As for small companies, Utility, Constructions and Education & Health 
amount higher variations.  
 
Key Findings from Table 3.6 
1. From the comparison of deviation from its own industry average, medium 
companies still amount the largest variations, implying that accounting 
quality in medium companies varied the most within each industry.  
2. Education & Health have higher variations in accounting quality for all 
groups of companies.  
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TABLE 3.6: Summary Statistics of Deviation of ratio of CFO to Earnings from Industry Average 
    
   
 
    
   
 
        𝐺  
   
 
     
Large Companies ( =L) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 94 528 29 127 318 55 97 39 37 929 2,253 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std Deviation 4.28 10.92 2.31 64.72 14.54 10.76 22.96 14.75 2.77 897.10 576.20 
Min -21.68 -141.10 -6.20 -36.14 -171.50 -47.09 -130.60 -86.15 -6.64 -21,537.00 -21,537.00 
1st Percentile -21.68 -21.48 -6.20 -26.18 -26.54 -47.09 -130.60 -86.15 -6.64 -40.18 -26.54 
5th Percentile -7.03 -3.77 -2.12 -17.20 -4.71 -4.50 -7.66 -4.87 -2.99 9.25 -7.30 
25th Percentile -0.32 -1.07 -0.87 -7.97 -1.37 -2.32 -1.86 0.44 -1.10 17.41 -0.71 
Median 0.31 -0.36 -0.22 -7.08 -0.28 -0.91 -0.87 1.47 -0.53 18.49 1.43 
75th Percentile 1.10 0.71 0.59 -5.35 0.66 0.17 0.96 2.53 1.03 19.64 18.30 
95th Percentile 3.10 6.81 6.38 11.04 4.58 13.35 10.68 12.07 5.99 29.93 23.68 
99th Percentile 22.64 20.73 6.68 52.74 27.31 55.72 175.60 17.51 10.55 101.20 55.72 
Max 22.64 159.50 6.68 713.90 142.40 55.72 175.60 17.51 10.55 10,835.00 10,835.00 
 
Medium-sized Companies ( =M) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 675 7,494 273 1,975 6,438 1,282 1,731 339 1,087 14,302 35,596 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std Deviation 36.52 103.40 25.59 128.40 60.62 32.82 71.63 48.73 85.60 1,219.00 775.30 
Min -885.50 -8,139.00 -143.70 -3,929.00 -2,457.00 -185.90 -995.00 -171.40 -1,621.00 -13,058.00 -13,058.00 
1st Percentile -58.81 -28.32 -69.55 -149.80 -51.19 -41.73 -58.08 -28.84 -58.74 -69.81 -57.85 
5th Percentile -5.15 -5.50 -11.86 -12.63 -8.48 -8.36 -10.58 -10.29 -7.52 -24.21 -20.22 
25th Percentile 0.62 -0.53 -1.49 2.00 -0.32 -3.58 -2.83 -4.95 -0.79 -17.49 -16.82 
Median 1.43 0.31 -0.57 3.84 0.85 -2.47 -1.75 -4.17 -0.15 -16.85 -2.03 
75th Percentile 2.58 1.37 0.56 5.68 2.19 -1.07 -0.07 -3.20 0.84 -16.05 0.90 
95th Percentile 8.00 8.22 6.88 16.69 10.90 6.96 10.27 7.49 7.59 -7.52 7.66 
99th Percentile 30.12 44.05 68.71 88.11 50.59 83.58 62.18 86.74 59.50 58.23 54.64 
Max 155.50 1,862.00 304.70 1,884.00 1,072.00 717.30 2,319.00 664.30 1,923.00 118,221.00 118,221.00 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3.6 (Continued) 
 
Small Companies ( =S) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 168 367 37 1,092 1,485 204 320 111 359 4,154 8,297 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std Deviation 25.26 19.88 38.62 40.55 22.37 7.19 62.17 5.16 5.76 31.50 31.48 
Min -140.20 -162.10 -227.50 -563.80 -463.50 -41.17 -186.10 -37.44 -23.41 -1,299.00 -1,299.00 
1st Percentile -129.80 -25.60 -227.50 -52.71 -67.12 -19.67 -48.09 -29.29 -14.19 -29.56 -37.44 
5th Percentile -5.41 -7.18 -3.29 -11.07 -8.45 -7.17 -9.19 -2.52 -3.78 -3.92 -6.79 
25th Percentile -0.51 -2.40 5.61 -2.88 0.57 -0.59 -3.87 0.02 -0.28 -0.03 -1.10 
Median -0.14 -1.63 6.09 -1.72 1.51 -0.07 -3.08 0.56 0.00 0.28 0.28 
75th Percentile 0.49 -1.12 6.44 -0.47 2.35 0.55 -2.18 0.94 0.22 0.60 0.98 
95th Percentile 7.00 3.40 10.46 12.37 9.38 5.77 2.73 3.43 1.92 4.78 6.65 
99th Percentile 135.10 115.10 24.15 72.85 34.55 26.83 55.91 7.01 8.95 34.28 40.01 
Max 203.80 188.40 24.15 679.30 101.50 60.33 1,072.00 18.21 89.95 326.30 1,072.00 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the deviation of  
   
 
      from average of each industry in each group of companies (i.e. large, medium-sized 
and small companies), where,   = 1, …,     ;   = L (Large companies), M (Medium-sized companies), S (Small companies);   = Industry 1, 2, … 10. 
Variable definitions:   = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010;     
= Net cash flow from operation for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and 
extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital;   𝐺        = ∑  
   
 
     
   
    /     , is defined as the 
average ratio of cash flow from operations to earnings, for group   companies in industry  . 
 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are 
those have turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK 
GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 
employees, following with FRESSE. 
  
Chapter 3: Effects of Regulation on AQ (Ratio Analysis) – Measures and Results (3.5) 
 94 
 
[Table 3.7 Here] 
The results of how each group of companies deviate from its own industry 
average with positive earnings is given in Table 3.7. The variations in large 
companies across industries are relatively similar and small, except in Education ahd 
Health, which is consistent with the result in Table 3.6. The standard deviations of 
large and small companies are generally less than the results presented in Table 3.6, 
suggesting that the accounting quality for large and small companies is more packed 
when earnings are positive. However, the standard deviation for medium companies 
has increased when earnings are positive, implying that there are large discrepancies 
in earnings quality within medium companies group with positive earnings.  
The deviations within each industry for medium companies still varied the 
most comparing with large and small companies. Education & Health have the 
highest variations in large and medium companies when earnings are positive. 
Constructions and Transport are more varied in small companies when earnings are 
positive. 
 
Key Findings from Table 3.7: 
1. When earnings are positive, medium companies have even higher variation in 
accounting quality than large and small companies.  
2. The variation within each industry is high in medium companies.  
3. Education & Health have more varied accounting quality in large and 
medium companies. 
4. The accounting quality for Constructions and Transport are more varied in 
small companies when earnings are positive. 
Chapter 3: Effects of Regulation on AQ (Ratio Analysis) – Measures and Results (3.5) 
 95 
TABLE 3.7: Summary Statistics of Deviation of ratio of CFO to Earnings from Industry Average with Positive Earnings 
    
   
 
    
   
 
        𝐺  
   
 
    , when     
Large Companies ( =L) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 27 371 25 95 265 41 73 32 28 646 1,603 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std Deviation 4.80 12.55 2.05 11.39 11.45 12.29 21.03 4.08 2.87 661.90 420.10 
Min -8.73 -141.80 -2.54 -21.68 -31.31 -48.15 -20.99 -6.08 -7.07 -5,142.00 -5,142.00 
1st Percentile -8.73 -21.77 -2.54 -21.68 -21.54 -48.15 -20.99 -6.08 -7.07 -124.10 -37.31 
5th Percentile -4.47 -3.73 -2.46 -12.69 -4.80 -2.69 -6.72 -5.62 -2.92 -13.93 -10.05 
25th Percentile -1.76 -1.39 -0.94 -3.18 -1.74 -2.42 -4.39 -1.76 -1.07 -7.95 -6.90 
Median -0.83 -0.78 -0.54 -2.39 -1.06 -1.44 -3.42 -1.28 -0.48 -7.13 -2.07 
75th Percentile 0.56 0.35 0.24 -0.61 -0.17 -0.03 -1.80 0.04 0.74 -5.69 -0.52 
95th Percentile 3.55 8.69 5.96 18.71 3.67 12.29 10.13 9.10 5.56 6.83 7.57 
99th Percentile 20.94 25.31 6.27 57.24 36.94 54.65 172.50 14.55 10.11 116.60 57.11 
Max 20.94 158.70 6.27 57.24 141.50 54.65 172.50 14.55 10.11 10,809.00 10,809.00 
 
Medium-sized Companies ( =M) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 520 5,802 190 1,510 5,263 851 1,327 244 804 10,195 26,706 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std Deviation 40.74 39.57 27.44 134.60 53.83 38.34 75.26 56.02 71.35 1,418.00 877.50 
Min -886.40 -913.10 -72.33 -3,927.00 -2,458.00 -65.98 -285.30 -173.40 -1,621.00 -3,431.00 -3,927.00 
1st Percentile -29.46 -16.61 -68.99 -159.00 -29.13 -19.55 -27.81 -24.76 -43.29 -51.93 -41.39 
5th Percentile -2.35 -5.77 -5.53 -8.30 -6.90 -7.47 -8.62 -9.98 -1.95 -28.64 -26.05 
25th Percentile 0.32 -2.52 -3.50 4.27 -1.11 -6.14 -4.92 -6.40 0.46 -24.98 -24.41 
Median 0.85 -1.91 -2.88 5.86 -0.15 -5.28 -4.19 -6.07 0.89 -24.88 -3.18 
75th Percentile 2.02 -0.79 -1.78 7.79 1.21 -3.76 -2.34 -4.80 1.98 -23.63 -0.07 
95th Percentile 8.05 6.29 7.00 19.08 10.49 9.10 8.38 7.69 11.54 -14.24 7.96 
99th Percentile 29.23 45.12 158.40 74.47 49.39 125.70 59.36 84.67 58.35 52.01 54.49 
Max 154.60 1,859.00 301.90 1,596.00 1,071.00 713.70 2,316.00 662.30 689.30 118,213.00 118,213.00 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3.7 (Continued) 
 
Small Companies ( =S) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 135 316 30 870 1,173 148 269 84 296 3,454 6,775 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std Deviation 22.61 21.27 3.52 38.27 21.68 7.70 66.19 2.58 6.04 15.65 24.53 
Min -88.13 -162.50 -3.50 -563.90 -464.00 -42.08 -50.31 -10.39 -19.83 -446.30 -563.90 
1st Percentile -23.74 -15.50 -3.50 -39.45 -37.32 -24.97 -16.44 -10.39 -14.47 -14.28 -23.29 
5th Percentile -4.83 -6.12 -3.43 -8.73 -7.22 -3.81 -10.13 -1.90 -1.86 -2.90 -5.92 
25th Percentile -2.72 -2.58 -0.80 -2.61 0.19 -1.11 -5.83 -0.45 -0.39 -0.45 -1.34 
Median -2.55 -2.00 -0.50 -1.71 1.01 -0.82 -5.23 -0.14 -0.26 -0.28 -0.28 
75th Percentile -1.91 -1.42 -0.26 -0.37 1.87 -0.08 -4.35 0.22 -0.04 0.08 0.46 
95th Percentile 5.30 3.00 2.77 13.25 8.98 4.92 4.70 1.91 1.62 3.72 5.94 
99th Percentile 132.60 114.70 17.45 51.45 34.01 39.10 56.03 17.46 15.58 23.79 34.06 
Max 201.30 188.00 17.45 679.20 98.01 59.42 1,070.00 17.46 89.67 325.70 1,070.00 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the deviation of  
   
 
      from average of each industry in each group of companies (i.e. large, medium-sized 
and small companies) with positive E (Earnings), where,   = 1, …,     ;   = L (Large companies), M (Medium-sized companies), S (Small companies);   = 
Industry 1, 2, … 10. 
Variable definitions:   = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010;     
= Net cash flow from operation for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and 
extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital;   𝐺        = ∑  
   
 
     
   
    /     , is defined as the 
average ratio of cash flow from operations to earnings, for group   companies in industry  ; 
 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are 
those have turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK 
GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 
employees, following with FRESSE. 
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[Table 3.8 Here] 
Table 3.8 presents the deviation from each industry’s average when earnings 
are negative. Standard deviations of large and small companies have increased 
comparing with the results in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, implying that the earnings 
quality in large and small companies are more varied when earnings negative.  
Overall, variations in large companies for each industry are relatively small, 
except variations in Construction and Education & Health, which drive the overall 
variations in large companies bigger. The overall variations of medium companies 
has decreased, but still amount larger variances for each industry.  
When earnings are negative, Education & Health still have the highest 
variations in large and medium companies. As for small companies, Utility and 
Education & Health have larger variations in accounting quality. 
 
Key Findings from Table 3.8: 
1. Variations in accounting quality for large and small companies are larger in 
negative earnings than that in positive earnings. 
2. The variation in medium companies is still larger comparing with large 
companies, except Construction and Education & Health.  
3. Education & Health still have higher variation among industries for each 
group of companies. 
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TABLE 3.8: Summary Statistics of Deviation of ratio of CFO to Earnings from Industry Average with Negative Earnings 
    
   
 
    
   
 
        𝐺  
   
 
    , when     
Large Companies ( =L) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 67 157 4 32 53 14 24 7 9 283 650 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std Deviation 3.88 4.99 2.42 128.00 24.47 1.49 26.31 32.09 2.04 1,281.00 845.10 
Min -21.00 -40.06 -3.59 -49.51 -167.00 -4.74 -121.10 -72.59 -1.65 -21,478.00 -21,478.00 
1st Percentile -21.00 -26.52 -3.59 -49.51 -167.00 -4.74 -121.10 -72.59 -1.65 41.37 -38.93 
5th Percentile -6.56 -7.77 -3.59 -38.93 -3.33 -4.74 -15.28 -72.59 -1.65 65.30 -20.42 
25th Percentile 0.21 0.33 -1.41 -22.17 2.07 0.04 3.71 8.69 -1.20 75.75 0.80 
Median 0.86 0.88 1.04 -21.10 3.01 0.44 6.66 13.00 -0.54 76.86 4.20 
75th Percentile 1.44 1.29 1.41 -20.43 4.02 0.72 7.72 13.94 0.25 77.66 76.72 
95th Percentile 3.38 3.76 1.51 -10.64 6.90 0.97 8.29 14.01 5.04 85.51 78.92 
99th Percentile 3.56 8.61 1.51 700.60 31.82 0.97 14.30 14.01 5.04 91.66 90.23 
Max 3.56 8.66 1.51 700.60 31.82 0.97 14.30 14.01 5.04 129.40 700.60 
 
Medium-sized Companies ( =M) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 155 1,692 83 465 1,175 431 404 95 283 4,107 8,890 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std Deviation 15.23 204.70 19.43 105.80 84.41 15.03 57.23 19.71 117.10 424.60 305.60 
Min -95.47 -8,131.00 -137.30 -546.90 -1,837.00 -178.70 -985.80 -80.49 -257.70 -13,038.00 -13,038.00 
1st Percentile -93.57 -87.85 -137.30 -113.60 -143.80 -80.58 -122.00 -80.49 -149.50 -118.30 -118.80 
5th Percentile -18.12 -6.17 -31.13 -23.33 -26.00 -10.36 -23.17 -9.36 -18.42 -14.35 -15.12 
25th Percentile 1.68 6.24 2.42 -5.65 2.59 1.77 3.41 -0.93 -5.26 0.91 0.63 
Median 3.35 7.77 4.68 -2.82 5.10 3.15 6.04 0.50 -3.54 2.72 3.19 
75th Percentile 4.19 8.51 5.65 -1.43 6.20 4.10 7.21 1.16 -2.48 3.19 5.92 
95th Percentile 7.47 13.61 7.94 8.44 12.95 4.71 11.82 3.47 -0.54 7.19 10.84 
99th Percentile 28.97 38.57 18.19 163.70 56.97 11.07 62.04 149.60 74.36 75.03 52.37 
Max 36.74 1,199.00 18.19 1,879.00 748.90 20.00 280.20 149.60 1,921.00 18,351.00 18,351.00 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3.8 (Continued) 
 
Small Companies ( =S) 
Industries Primary Manufacturing Utility Construction Wholesale Service Transport Telecom Other Service Education&Health All Industries 
No. of observations 33 51 7 222 312 56 51 27 63 700 1,522 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std Deviation 32.47 6.16 87.76 48.55 24.72 4.90 31.79 9.16 3.97 68.38 52.02 
Min -129.90 -23.18 -198.80 -244.60 -225.40 -17.26 -174.40 -35.11 -22.10 -1,296.00 -1,296.00 
1st Percentile -129.90 -23.18 -198.80 -105.60 -113.40 -17.26 -174.40 -35.11 -22.10 -109.90 -120.90 
5th Percentile -119.50 -6.80 -198.80 -18.09 -15.24 -9.36 -40.64 -26.97 -5.74 -17.47 -16.44 
25th Percentile 7.43 -1.72 25.42 -3.62 1.58 0.14 6.41 1.17 -0.60 1.64 -0.82 
Median 8.88 0.26 33.41 -2.19 3.08 1.73 8.15 2.49 0.91 2.86 2.55 
75th Percentile 10.09 0.88 36.13 -1.18 3.96 2.15 8.91 2.89 1.36 3.16 3.40 
95th Percentile 12.10 13.33 39.17 7.36 11.18 3.06 12.12 5.76 5.01 9.30 10.76 
99th Percentile 17.29 25.82 39.17 96.44 36.22 13.24 13.74 7.29 10.26 155.10 83.03 
Max 17.29 25.82 39.17 491.20 103.60 13.24 13.74 7.29 10.26 328.70 491.20 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the deviation of  
   
 
      from average of each industry in each group of companies (i.e. large, medium-sized 
and small companies) with negative E (Earnings), where,   = 1, …,     ;   = L (Large companies), M (Medium-sized companies), S (Small companies);   = 
Industry 1, 2, … 10. 
 
Variable definitions:   = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010;     
= Net cash flow from operation for company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after interest, tax and 
extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital;   𝐺        = ∑  
   
 
     
   
    /     , is defined as the 
average ratio of cash flow from operations to earnings, for group   companies in industry  ; 
 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium 
companies are those have turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, 
following with UK GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and 
not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
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3.5.2.2 Overall Comments for deviation from industry average  
Overall, results of deviation from industry average are consistent with the 
results of 
   
 
 ratio, that medium companies have the highest variations across and 
within each industry. 
 Large and small companies have smaller variations when earnings are 
positive, and larger variations when earnings are negative. As for medium 
companies, it is the opposite, that behavior is more varied when companies make 
profit. In terms of behavior in industries, Construction, Transport and Education & 
Health amount higher variation in earnings quality.    
This method presents the variation within each industry for three groups of 
companies. However, it does not indicate how many companies behave differently 
and whether they behave differently in the entire distribution when comparing three 
types of companies. Therefore, in next method, we compare the distribution of the 
ratio of cash flows to earnings for three groups of companies.  
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3.5.3 Distributions of CFO/E  
The descriptive results for 
   
 
 ratio only present the comparisons of large, 
medium and small companies in terms of mean, variation of the ratio and extreme 
values. In order to compare the accounting quality across three groups of companies, 
we also need to obtain the entire distribution of 
   
 
 ratio. This approach allows us to 
understand how each group of companies is distributed entirely and how many 
companies have fallen out of the distribution.  
With the descriptive statistics of 
   
 
, we are able to obtain a frequency 
distribution. Firstly, we take the mean and ±2σ of 
   
 
 as dividing point in the 
distribution, which means we will have a distribution with four regions (i.e. 
   
 
 < -
2σ, -2σ ≤ 
   
 
 < mean, mean ≤ 
   
 
 ≤ 2σ, and 
   
 
 > 2σ). Secondly, we calculate the 
frequency of companies, which fall into each region for each group of companies. 
Thirdly, we convert the frequency number into percentage of number of each group. 
Companies have higher absolute value of 
   
 
 suggest companies have higher level 
of accruals in earnings. Therefore, if companies’ 
   
 
 fall out the region of ±2σ, that 
may indicate underlying have extreme level of accruals.  
As discussed earlier, negative 
   
 
 could be due to two situations, where 
positive cash flows with negative earnings and negative cash flow with positive 
earnings. Companies with positive cash flows and negative earnings have fewer 
tendencies to manage earnings. However, those companies with negative cash flow 
and positive earnings have more tendencies to manage earnings.  
Hence, each group of companies’ distribution will then be split into two groups 
of distributions – distribution for the positive earnings group and distribution for the 
negative earnings group. Due to the two possible situations of negative 
   
 
, we 
revise the regions of the frequency distribution for positive and negative earnings 
group respectively. The regions for positive earnings group will be -2σ, 0, mean +2σ. 
The regions for negative earnings group will be -2σ, mean, 0, + 2σ.  
The reason of constructing the distribution of 
   
 
 ratio is to examine how 
differently that large, medium and small companies distributed. It is able to show the 
entire distribution for each group of companies so as to give us an overview of how 
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each group of companies behave in terms of accounting quality. Furthermore, it is 
able to show how many proportions of companies with extreme level of accruals. 
 
 
3.5.3.1 Results of Distribution of cash flows to earnings ratio  
 
[Figure 3.1 Here] 
Figure 1 presents the result of frequency distribution of 
   
 
 using the mean and 
standard deviation of each large, medium and small companies sample. Panel A 
presents the frequency distribution of 
   
 
 based on all companies-observations. 
Panel B presents the frequency distribution of 
   
 
 based on companies positive 
earnings group. Panel C presents the frequency distribution of 
   
 
 based on 
companies with negative earnings group.  
Panel A indicates that, small companies (57.78%) have more proportions of 
observations greater than mean, comparing with large (9.99%) and medium 
companies (7.05%). The majority of observations for large (89.66%) and medium 
(92.85%) companies fall below the mean. Further, the proportions of large and small 
companies fall out the ±2σ regions are relatively more than medium companies, 
suggesting there are more large and small companies with extreme level of accruals.  
From Panel B, companies fall below 0 have negative cash flows and positive 
earnings, suggesting that companies have more tendencies to use accruals to manage 
negative cash flows into positive earnings. The proportions of observations fall into -
2σ ≤ 
   
 
 ≤ 0 are relatively similar for three groups of companies, which are around 
15% of each sample. When earnings are positive, there are fewer proportions of 
medium companies (5.13%) lie into the range of mean ≤ 
   
 
 ≤ 2σ, but more 
proportions of medium companies (79.72%) fall into the range of 0 <
   
 
 < mean, 
comparing with large and small companies. Furthermore, there are still more 
proportions of large and small companies fall out the ±2σ regions in positive 
earnings group.  
When earnings are negative, companies fall below 0 have positive cash flows 
and negative earnings, implying companies have more cash flows to back up their 
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losses, i.e. fewer tendencies to manage earnings. From Panel C of Figure 1, the 
proportions of large (38.92%+1.08%) and small (15.97+17.87%) companies below 0 
are less than medium (28.30+16.72%) companies. This suggests that when earnings 
are negative, there are more proportions of medium companies that are able to cover 
their losses with the positive cash flows comparing with large and small companies. 
However, there are more proportions of medium and small companies fall out the 
±2σ regions, suggesting that medium and small companies have more proportions of 
companies with extreme level of accruals when earnings are negative. 
 
Key Findings from Figure 3.1: 
1. Overall, the distribution of medium companies is different from large and 
small companies.  
2. When earnings are positive, the distributions for large and small companies 
are similar, that more proportions of companies have extreme level of 
accrual. 
3. When earnings are negative, there are more proportions of medium 
companies that are able to cover their losses comparing with large and small 
companies. 
4. Furthermore, there are more proportions of small companies with extreme 
level of accruals across different earnings group. 
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Figure 3.1: Statistical frequency distribution of ratio of CFO to Earnings 
Panel A:  
 
Panel B:  
 
Panel C:  
 
This figure presents statistical frequency distribution of 
   
 
 based on the mean and standard 
deviation of each companies sample, where,     = mean of 
   
 
 for each type of companies in each 
earnings group, σ = standard deviation of 
   
 
 for each type of companies in each earnings group. 
Variable definitions:   = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company   in 
group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010;     = Net cash flow from operation for 
company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after 
interest, tax and extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in 
Working Capital. 
Total No. of Large: 2,253 
Total No. of Medium: 35,596 
Total No. of Small: 8,297 
Total No. of Large: 1,603 
Total No. of Medium: 26,706 
Total No. of Small: 6,775 
Total No. of Large: 650 
Total No. of Medium: 8,890 
Total No. of Small: 1,552 
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Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have turnover of not more than 
£25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, 
following with UK GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a 
balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with 
FRESSE. 
 
The percentage is calculated as the number of companies in each slot divided by the total number of 
each group of companies in each earnings group. 
The region is defined based on the mean and standard deviation (σ) of statistical distribution of 
   
 
. 
The distributions consist of three earnings groups – all companies, companies with positive earnings, 
and companies with negative earnings. Each mean and 2σ belongs to each type of companies (i.e. 
large, medium and small companies) in each earnings group. 
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3.5.4 Distributions of SMEs vs. Distribution of Large companies  
Previously, we obtain the distribution of CFO/E ratio for large, medium and 
small companies from previous tests. In order to compare the three types of 
distributions, we then examine whether the observations in medium and small 
companies have come from the same distribution as large companies. The intuition is 
to test whether the observations in medium and small companies could have 
occurred in the distribution of large companies.  
Large companies follow full IFRS, which is more detailed accounting 
standards than UK GAAP and FRSSE. Under effects of accounting standards, we 
take the accounting quality as benchmark to compare with medium and small 
companies. That means we take the measure of 
   
 
 for large companies as 
benchmark. Firstly, we take the mean and ±2σ of 
   
 
 from large companies to set up 
different regions for comparisons with medium and small companies. That means we 
have a distribution with four regions with three dividing points:     ,      , 
    . Secondly, we calculate how many proportions of observations from each 
group of companies fall into each region in order to examine how observations in 
medium and small companies could have occurred in the distribution of large 
companies.  
For each group of companies, sample will again be split into two parts – 
distribution for positive earnings group and distribution for negative earnings group. 
The regions of distribution for each earnings group will be based on the mean and 
±2σ of 
   
 
 from large companies. Due to two situations discussed earlier when 
   
 
 
is negative, following with previous distribution method, the regions for positive 
earnings group will be     , 0,     ,     ; and the regions for negative earnings 
group will be     ,     , 0,     . 
The advantage of this method is that allows us to compare how differently that 
SMEs behave from large companies.   
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3.5.4.1 Results of comparisons of distributions cash flows to earnings ratio  
 
[Figure 3.2 Here] 
Figure 3.2 presents the comparisons of frequency distribution of 
   
 
 between 
large, medium and small companies based on the mean and standard deviation of 
   
 
 
from large companies across different earnings group. Panel A of Figure 3.2 presents 
the comparisons of distribution based on all earnings groups. Panel B presents the 
comparison based on positive earnings group, whereas Panel C presents the 
comparison based on negative earnings group.  
Panel A of Figure 3.2 presents the result of comparisons of distribution from 
all earnings groups, there are more proportion of small companies have occurred in 
     ≤ 
   
 
 <       comparing with large and medium companies. Furthermore, 
medium and small companies have fewer proportions with extreme level of accruals 
comparing with large companies. Overall, the distribution of medium and small 
companies are similar with large companies.  
When earnings are positive, the comparisons of distribution between large, 
medium and small companies are shown in Panel B. The distribution of medium 
companies is quite similar with large companies. The proportions of three groups of 
companies fall below 0 are similar, suggesting proportions of companies have more 
tendencies to manage earnings are similar. As for small companies, there are more 
proportions of 
   
 
 just above 0 and below the      (77.92%), but less proportions 
of 
   
 
 above the      comparing with large and small companies. This suggests 
that there are more proportions of large and small companies have higher level of 
accruals comparing with small companies. 
When earnings are negative, as shown in Panel C, the distribution of medium 
companies is different from large and small companies. There are nearly 46% of 
medium companies that is smaller than 0, which are more than the proportions of 
large and small companies. This suggests that there are more proportions of medium 
companies have positive cash flows when earnings are negative. Furthermore, 
medium companies have more proportions of companies fall out the ±2σ, suggesting 
that more proportions of medium companies with extreme level of accruals than 
large and small companies. 
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Key Findings from Figure 3.2: 
The findings are generally consistent with previous findings from Figure 3.1. 
When earnings are positive, distributions of large and medium companies are 
similar, that there are more proportions of companies have higher level of accruals. 
However, the proportions of companies below 0 are similar across three groups of 
companies. The proportions of large companies with extreme level of accruals are 
larger than medium and small companies.  
When earnings are negative, medium companies seem to outperform large and 
small companies, because the proportions of medium companies with positive cash 
flows relative to negative earnings are more than that of large and small companies. 
However, there are more proportions of medium companies with extreme level of 
accruals than large and small companies. 
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Figure 3.2: The Comparison of statistical frequency distribution of ratio of CFO to 
Earnings between Large, Medium and Small Companies 
Panel A: 
 
Panel B: 
 
Panel C:  
 
This figure presents the comparison of statistical frequency distribution of ratio of 
   
 
 between large, 
medium and small companies based on the sample mean and standard deviation of large companies in 
each earnings group, where,      = mean of 
   
 
 in large companies in each earnings group,   = 
standard deviation of 
   
 
 in large companies in each earnings group. 
 
Variable definitions:   = Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items for company   in 
group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010;     = Net cash flow from operation for 
company   in group   and industry   in the observation year of 2010, it is defined as Net income after 
Total No. of Large: 2,253 
Total No. of Medium: 35,596 
Total No. of Small: 8,297 
Total No. of Large: 1,603 
Total No. of Medium: 26,706 
Total No. of Small: 6,775 
Total No. of Large: 650 
Total No. of Medium: 8,890 
Total No. of Small: 1,552 
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interest, tax and extraordinary items for the observation year of 2010 + Depreciation – Changes in 
Working Capital. 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have turnover of not more than 
£25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, 
following with UK GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a 
balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with 
FRESSE. 
 
The percentage is calculated as the number of companies in each slot divided by the total number of 
each group of companies in each earnings group.  
The region is defined based on the mean and standard deviation (σ) of statistical distribution of 
   
 
 
from large companies. The distributions consist of three earnings groups – all companies, companies 
with positive earnings, and companies with negative earnings.  
In order to compare the statistical distribution of 
   
 
, we take the distribution of large companies as 
benchmark, and calculate the number of each medium and small companies happens to fall into the 
regions of distribution of large companies in each earnings group. The      and     belongs to the 
distribution of large companies in each earnings group. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter is to compare the accounting quality of large 
(public companies), medium and small companies under current differential 
reporting framework. The variation of accounting quality for each group depends on 
the objectives of differential reporting. However, the regulators do not specify the 
expectation of accounting quality and consequences that different groups of 
companies should follow. The purpose of this chapter is to compare the accounting 
quality of different groups companies under different accounting standards, so as to 
examine whether differential reporting framework has led any variation of 
accounting quality between groups.  
From the analysis of ratio of cash flows relative to earnings, the basic 
understanding of financial reporting behaviours for each group of companies is 
obtained. Overall, large companies and small companies have similar financial 
reporting behaviour across industries. Medium companies are different from large 
and small companies, that they have higher level of accruals in general and the most 
varied earnings quality across and within each industry. That means, under current 
regulatory reporting regimes, the variation of accounting quality exists in medium 
companies, whereas for large and small companies, their behaviours are quite 
similar.  
Possible explanations of less variation in accounting quality for large and small 
companies may be that large companies are closely regulated and small companies 
have little opportunities to manage earnings. Medium companies have higher level 
of accruals and the most varied accounting quality. This may be due to medium 
companies are small enough to have possible exemption from regulations but big 
enough to have opportunities to manage earnings.  
Given the quality of differential reporting standards are equal, the accounting 
quality is different across different groups of companies. This suggests that 
accounting standards do not restrain the variations in accounting quality for medium 
companies, whereas large and small companies are disciplined. 
However, the ratio (
   
 
) only measures the level of accruals, and it is not a 
sophisticated measure of accounting quality, as quality of accruals is driven by other 
economic factors. Hence, this chapter provides only some preliminary results and 
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basic understanding of financial reporting behaviours across three groups companies. 
In the next chapter, we will examine the cash flows and earnings in more 
sophisticated ways with controls of economic factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Effects of Regulation on AQ (Variability and Loss Recognition) – Introduction (4.1) 
 113 
Chapter 4: Effects of Regulation on Accounting Quality: 
Variability and Loss Recognition Tests 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Overview of Chapter 3 
The main motivation of this study is driven by the development of differential 
reporting standards from ASB as well as IASB. The objectives of having differential 
reporting standards include the concern of size issues, cost issues, agency issues, and 
economic importance of companies. Further, these concerns are major factors 
driving accounting quality to be different. However, both regulation boards (IASB 
and UK ASB) have not made clear of what they expect in terms of accounting 
quality. 
Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to analyse the quality of financial 
reporting for public and private companies under current reporting framework in the 
UK in order to inform the discussion about the suitability of existing boundaries 
(differential reporting framework) between the groups. Firms’ accounting quality is 
disciplined by legal forces and market forces, and hence, we examine accounting 
quality from the discipline of legal forces and market forces.  
In the previous chapter (chapter 3), we examine the effects of accounting 
regulations on accounting quality. That we compare accounting quality between 
large, medium, and small companies under current regulatory reporting regimes. We 
use the ratio of cash flows relative to earnings to measure accounting quality. We 
examine accounting quality across and within each industry and distribution of 
accounting quality for each group of companies.  
The results indicate that accounting quality for medium companies is different 
from large and small companies. Medium companies have higher level of accruals 
and more variations across and within each industry. Furthermore, there are more 
proportions of large and small companies with extreme level of accruals when 
earnings are positive. When earnings are negative, there are more proportions of 
medium companies have extreme level of accruals.   
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Objective of the Chapter 4 
In this chapter, we continue to to examine whether there is any variation in 
accounting quality across three groups companies under the effects of accourning 
regulations. The objective, hypothesis and data of this chapter will be the same as 
chapter 3. Samples of companies are still based on large, medium and small 
companies. We adjust for the different factors which may affect accruals, so we can 
properly compare the differences between large, medium and small companise under 
current regulatory reporting regimes. 
In previous chapter, ratio (
   
 
) measures the level of accruals, which only 
provides some preliminary results and basic understanding of financial reporting 
behaviours across three groups companies. Furthermore, accruals are influenced by 
different factors. In this chapter, firstly, we take account of the economic factors by 
looking at the volatility of earnings and volatility of cash flows to measure 
accounting quality. This measure is able to give us a view of general earnings 
management. Secondly, we measure accounting quality by target beating. This 
measure gives us a view of how earnings are being specifically managed across 
different groups of companies. 
 
Outline of the chapter 
Following this introduction, previous literature on accounting quality across 
different accounting standards as well as different sizes of firms is presented in 
section 4.2. Discussion of sample and data is in section 4.3. First measures of 
accounting quality (earnings smoothing) and results are discussed in section 4.4. 
Second measure of accounting quality (target beating) and results are provided in 
section 4.5. Conclusion of this chapter is provided in last section of this chapter, 
section 4.6. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
Prior Literatures on Accounting Quality 
From prior studies, earnings are explored from different aspects, in this 
chapter, in order to be consistent with measures of accounting quality from previous 
chapter, we further examine earnings and cash flows with associated factors and 
distribution of earnings. The measures of accounting quality are based on Barth et al 
(2008) and Givoly et al (2010). 
Most of researches on accounting quality are based on comparability and 
employ various measures and proxies for accounting quality such as accrual proxies, 
earnings persistence, earnings smoothing, conservatism and target beating. Dechow 
et al (2010) indicate that no single measure of accounting quality is superior to 
others, as different proxies measure different aspects of accounting quality. Hence, 
studies tend to use different measures of accounting quality to better facilitate the 
findings. The summary of some prior studies on the comparability of accounting 
quality across different accounting standards as well as across different sizes of 
companies is presented below in the format of authors’ names, major findings and 
methods they use to measure accounting quality. 
 
4.2.1 Accounting quality across different accounting standards  
Some prior studies on accounting quality across different accounting standards 
are listed below. Some studies find that accounting quality in common-law 
accounting standards is higher than in code law countries’ accounting standards 
(Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Bartov, Goldberg and Kim, 2005). Furthermore, 
studies also find firms adopt IAS have better accounting quality than firms adopt 
domestic standards (Barth et al, 2008). However, some studies find that accounting 
quality under IAS is not better than (or does not differ with) those under domestic 
accounting standards (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007; Eccher and Healy, 2003).  
The results from prior studies on accounting quality across different 
accounting standards are mixed. This could be due to studies differ in the 
effectiveness of controls for incentives from a particular set of accounting standards 
and effects of the economic environment (Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2010). 
Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) 
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 Findings: Accounting earnings in enhanced common-law accounting standards 
countries are substantially more timely and conservative than code law 
countries’, particularly in incorporating losses. 
 Methods: Conservatism (following Basu, 1997) – unrealized increases in cash 
flows generally do not flow into reported earnings until when the underlying 
cash flow increases occur, but unrealized decreases are more likely to be 
incorporated quickly. 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) 
 Findings: They find no differences in the level of earnings management of 
companies reporting under German GAAP and IAS. 
 Methods: (1) Cross-sectional Jones (1991); (2) Correlation between cash flows 
and accruals 
Bartov, Goldberg and Kim (2005) 
 Findings: They have found that earnings based on IAS are more value relevant 
than earnings based on German standards. 
 Methods: Value relevance model (they estimate the model on based time-series 
and cross-sectional analysis, in order to find the value relevance of reported 
earnings and stock returns) 
Hung and Subramanyam (2007) 
 Findings: They find that accounting amounts based on German standards and 
those based on IAS that are disclosed in accordance with requirements for 
first-time adopters of IAS do not differ in value relevance and conservatism. 
 Methods: (1) Relative Value Relevance model (taking market value of equity 
as dependent variables and book value of equity, income before extraordinary 
items, inverse mill ratio as control variables; the higher the R-square 
implying that higher value relevance of book value of equity and income); 
(2) Conservatism following Basu (1997). 
Eccher and Healy (2003) 
 Findings: They compare accounting amounts based on IAS and Chinese 
standards and find that those based on IAS are not more value relevant than 
those based on Chinese standards for firms that can be owned by foreign 
investors. 
 Methods: Estimate future cash flows with current cash flows, accruals, changes 
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in inventory, and changes in receivables as control variables. The coefficients 
on accruals and the coefficients on changes in receivables and inventory 
themselves will be non-zero if management judgment in reporting accruals is 
useful for forecasting future operating cash flow performance. 
Barth, Landsman and Lang, (2008) 
 Findings: They find firms adopt IAS report earnings of higher quality for a 
large sample of countries. 
 Methods: (1) Earnings variability (variance of residuals from changes in 
earnings with control variables of size, growth, cash flows, auditors etc; 
smaller variance of residuals implies earnings smoothing, and poor 
accounting quality); (2) Earnings smoothing; (3) Small loss avoidance; (4) 
Timely loss recognition 
 
4.2.2 Accounting Quality across different sizes of firms 
Studies on accounting quality across public and private companies are listed below. 
Most of studies find that public companies have higher accounting quality than 
private companies (Beatty, Ke and Petroni, 2002; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; 
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz, 2006; Hope, Thomas and Vyas, 2012). However, Givoly 
et al (2010) find that public companies report more conservative but have more 
incentives to manage earnings than private companies. 
Studies on comparability of accounting quality across different sizes of 
companies are mixed, that public companies tend to report more conservatively 
because of higher demand and tough regulations whereas private companies have 
lower accruals quality because of less market demand and less legal enforcement. 
 
Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) 
 Findings: They examine the earnings quality of public banks and private 
banks. They find that public banks have a greater propensity to manage 
earnings than private banks. 
 Methods: (1) Target beating; (2) Discretionary Accounting Choice with 
financial variables in banking sector. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
 Findings: They find that private companies (excluding small companies) in the 
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UK have poorer loss recognition timeliness than public companies. This is 
the effect of the financial market demand. 
 Methods: (1) Timely loss recognition (following Basu 1991); (2) Accrual 
based timely loss recognition (measures the contemporaneous relationship 
between accruals and cash flows). 
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) 
 Findings: Private companies (excluding small companies) in the EU have more 
earnings management than public companies. Earnings management is lower 
in countries with strong legal systems. 
 Methods: (1) Proxies of Earnings Management (including small profit relative 
to small losses, absolute values of accruals over cash flows, standard 
deviation of earnings over standard deviation of cash flows, correlation 
between changes in accruals and changes in cash flows) 
Givoly, Hayn and Katz (2010) 
 Findings: They find that US private equity companies (with public debt) have 
better quality than public equity companies. This is the effect of earnings 
opportunism. Interestingly, on loss recognition timeliness they find similar to 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005), that public equity companies report more 
conservatively than private equity companies. 
 Methods: (1) Earnings persistence (expect coefficient in accruals component is 
larger, that accruals are more informative about future earnings); (2) Accruals 
model proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols 
(2002) and Francis et al (2005); (3) Small profit relative to small losses; (4) 
Accruals based timely loss recognition following Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) 
Hope, Thomas and Vyas, (2012) 
 Findings: They present clearer results than Givoly et al (2010). Private firms 
have lower financial reporting quality and are less conservative than public 
firms. 
 Methods: (1) Accruals estimation errors following McNichols (2002); (2) 
Absolute values of accruals over absolute values of cash flows following 
Burgstahler et al (2006); (2) Conservatism following Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005)
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4.3 Sample and Data 
 
In order to be consistent with previous chapter, in this chapter, we use the same 
data as the previous chapter from FAME database under current financial reporting 
structure, which include public EU quoted companies are following full IFRS to 
prepare consolidated accounts, private non-small (medium) companies are following 
UK GAAP
7
 and small companies are following FRSSE.
8
  
Under the definition of size of companies from sections 382 and 465 of the 
Companies Act 2006, we select active public companies for the years of 2008-2010, 
private medium companies with turnover greater than £6.5 million and balance sheet 
worth greater £3.26 million for the years of 2008-2010, and small companies with 
annual turnover of £6.5 million or less and have an annual balance sheet worth no 
more than £3.26 million for the years of 2008-2010. We therefore obtain three 
groups of companies-observations based on the size criteria from Companies Act, 
which are large companies (public companies), medium companies (private 
medium-sized companies) and small companies. 
We exclude companies that are subsidiary as their reporting requirement is 
different. The criterion for subsidiary in FAME is that the minimum path of ultimate 
owner is 50.01%. We also screen out private firms whose legal form is not equal to 
the status of corporations such as legal forms like sole proprietorships or 
partnerships. We exclude banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions 
(SIC codes 6000-6799). We also exclude companies that without known value of 
total assets in the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010 in order to mitigate the data errors. 
Each sample of companies (Large, medium and small companies) are then 
grouped into 10 major industry sectors based on UK SIC 2007, which include
9
: 
Primary, Manufacturing, Utility, Construction, Wholesale, Service, Transport, 
Telecom, Other service, Education & Health. The reason of using two digits SIC 
codes is to analyse the difference in accounting quality across different industry 
                                                        
7
 UK GAAP is a mixture of Financial Reporting Standards (FRS), Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practice (SSAP) and IFRS-based standards. 
8
 There are still public companies following UK GAAP and private companies following IFRS, these 
companies are excluded in our studies, given our intuition of this research is to compare three classes 
companies that are public quoted companies following IFRS, medium companies following UK 
GAAP and small companies following FRSSE respectively.  
9 Refer to List of Abbreviation for details. 
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groups in a broader range. Finer or detailed SIC codes may not present any 
significant difference in accounting quality across groups.  
However, using broad two digits SIC codes may introduce noise in the results, 
we therefore control outliers using winsorizing. We winsorized accounting items 
needed in the calculation of our earnings quality proxies at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile 
as in Barth et al (2008). We exclude those companies-observations where accounting 
items include profit, turnover, total assets and equity are exactly equal to zero since 
most likely they indicate missing data for the years of 2008-2010.  
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4.4 First Measure of Accounting Quality and Results 
 
In the previous chapter, we use ratio (
   
 
) to measure the level of accruals, 
which only provides some preliminary results and basic understanding of financial 
reporting behaviours across three groups of companies. However, the level of 
accruals only measure one aspect of accounting quality, and the accruals are affected 
by different economic factors. Therefore, in this chapter, we adjust for the different 
factors that may affect accruals, so we can properly compare the differences between 
large, medium, and small companise under current regulatory reporting regimes. 
Prior to discussing the measure of accounting quality in this chapter, the 
discussion about different factors that may affect accruals are provided in next 
section.  
 
4.4.1 Factors associated with Earnings and Cash flows 
Sloan (1996 pg.37) indicates that high level of accruals represents lower 
quality of earnings whereas Dechow and Dichev (2002 pg.54) suggest that high level 
of accruals signifies greater improvement over the cash flows. The ratio of cash 
flows relative to earnings may indicate the level of accruals used in transforming 
cash flows into reported earnings. The higher absolute value of the ratio is, the 
higher level of accruals component in the earnings. The ratio is only a crude 
measure, which only measure one aspect of accounting quality. There are some other 
effects associated with earnings and cash flows.  
The quality of accruals are associated with various firm’s characteristics such 
as size, ownership, turnovers, and leverage and etc. Dechow and Dichev (2002 
pg.46) suggest that factors such as firm size, cash flow volatility, sales variability, 
length of operating cycle and incidence of negative earnings realizations are 
summary indicators that capture the influence of the operating environment and 
business model on accruals quality.  
According to works by Lev (1992) and Gibbins, Richardson & Waterhouse 
(1992) about accounting quality and earnings management, accounting quality is a 
response to environment incentives. These incentives come from shareholders, 
investors, creditors, government, environmental pressure groups, unions, media, 
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accounting profession and regulation bodies, competitors. Financial markets, 
industry economic environment and some of the firm’s characteristics (such as size, 
performances, assets in place, internationalisation) can strengthen those incentives 
(Michaïlesco, 1999). Various studies (for example, Ashbaugh 2001; Pagano et al, 
2002); Lang et al, 2003; Lang et al, (2006); and Barth et al, 2008) include control 
variables for size, growth, leverage, and sales for examining quality of earnings.  
Therefore, in this chapter, we take account of different factors to measure 
accounting quality. We use earnings smoothing as the first measure of accounting 
quality in this chapter. Following Lang et al (2003) and Barth et al (2008), we adjust 
for different factors in estimating volatility of earnings and volatility of cash flows 
for the further analysis of accounting quality across different groups of companies. 
 
4.4.2 Literature on Earnings Smoothing 
Recently, the accounting quality literature has generated significant other 
measurement methods, such as earnings smoothing. Beidleman (1973 pg.653) define 
earnings smoothing as “an attempt on the part of the firm’s management to reduce 
abnormal variations in earnings to the extent allowed under sound accounting and 
management principles”. Beidleman (1973 pg.655) point out effective smoothing 
requires specification of the magnitude of the accruals with some precision and 
knowledge of techniques used to accomplish the desired adjustment (accruals). The 
magnitude (level) of the accruals depends upon the prospective level of current 
earnings relative to normal accruals. Ronen and Sadan (1981 pg.3) suggest that the 
income smoothing is used to reduce earnings fluctuations rather than to maximize or 
minimize reported earnings. Trueman and Titman (1988 pg.138) indicate that 
corporate manager may rationally want to smooth reported income, to reduce the 
estimate of various claimants of the firm about the volatility of its underlying 
earnings process, which, in turn, lowers their assessment of the probability of 
bankruptcy and could have a positive effect on the firm's market value.   
Further, Dechow et al (2010 pg.361) indicate that smoothing is an outcome of 
accrual-based system, since the basic idea of an accrual-based earnings system is that 
accruals mitigates the timing issues of cash payments and receipts, so as to make 
earnings more informative about firms’ performance than cash flows. The role of 
accruals component in earnings is to reduce and adjust the volatility of cash flows, so 
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as to make earnings better reflect firms’ financial performance. Therefore, earnings 
smoothing is related to earnings persistence. We would expect a certain level of 
volatility of earnings, and the volatility of earnings is expected to be less than 
volatility of cash flows. Therefore, too little variability of earnings may be the 
product of earnings smoothing (earnings management).  
Income smoothing is desirable for management is still in debate. There is some 
evidence that income smoothing can reduce share price volatility, but this literature 
is underdeveloped (Walker, 2013). Even it is desirable, the questions on whether it is 
an intentional outcome of management or whether earnings smoothing is used to 
normalize reported income will be raised (Beidleman, 1973 pg.653). Accruals that 
lead to smoothness can hide or delay the measurement of changes in fundamental 
performance, which presumably would be decision useful, thus, smoothness may not 
be an indication of greater decision usefulness or higher earnings quality (Dechow et 
al, 2010 pg.361).  
Studies have found that earnings smoothing is a case of earnings management, 
it attempts to make earnings look less variable over time. For instance, Gordon 
(1964) predicts that so long as managers have discretion over accounting methods, 
they smooth reported income and the rate of growth in income. Dye (1988) 
demonstrates that a risk-averse manager who is precluded from borrowing and 
lending in the capital markets has an incentive to smooth his firm's reported income 
under agency setting. Beidleman (1973) identifies that the size and timing of 
discretionary revenue and expenses play an important role in the smoothing process. 
Goel and Thakor (2003) indicate that earnings smoothing is a special case of 
earnings management involving inter-temporal smoothing of reported earnings 
relative to economic earnings.  
Earnings smoothing attempts to make earnings look less variable over time 
(Goel and Thakor, 2003). Prior studies suggest that firms with less earnings 
smoothing exhibit more earnings variability (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Barth, Landsman and Lang, 
2008). Especially, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) find that earnings smoothing is 
less pronounced in common law countries. Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006) 
suggest that timely recognition of gains and losses, which is consistent with higher 
earnings quality, tends to increase the volatility of earnings relative to cash flows. 
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Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) show managers with less incentive to manage 
earnings should exhibit higher variability in reported earnings.  
Based on the above discussions, good accounting quality is expected to have 
certain level of smoothing, because too little earnings smoothing or too much 
earnings smoothing may be an indication of poor accounting quality. However, the 
optimal level of earnings smoothing is unknown.   
In this thesis, our main objective is to analyse how differently that different 
groups of companies behave. We are not in the position to comment which group of 
companies has better accounting quality. This is because earnings smoothing only 
measures one aspect of accounting quality, and the literature on whether earnings 
smoothing is desirable provides unclear conclusion.  
 
4.4.3 Variability of Earnings  
Methodology of Variability of Earnings 
We have considered variety of accounting characteristics in quality of 
earnings, which have been examined in prior studies. The ratio of cash flows relative 
to earnings ratio has been determined as the measure of accounting quality in 
previous chapter. The simple cash flow from operation over earnings (CFO/E) ratio 
captures the fundamental financial reporting behavior across different sizes of firms. 
Given the reported earnings is made of cash flows and accruals, that accruals are 
used to solve to the timing and matching problems of cash flows. Hence, CFO/E 
ratio is able to present the level of accruals.  
However, the CFO/E ratio only measures one aspect of accounting quality, and 
quality of accruals is sensitive to a variety of other factors. Prior tests might be an 
initial indication of firms’ financial reporting behavior in a general view. Therefore, 
in order to further examine how reported earnings are related to operating cash 
flows, following Barth et al (2008), we estimate each reported earnings and cash 
flows with controls of factors that related to accounting quality. 
As discussed earlier, accruals and earnings are influenced by both economic 
effects and accounting effects. Thus, in order to compare the quality of earnings 
between each group of companies (large, medium and small companies), firstly we 
need to adjust economic factors for earnings and then compare their earnings based 
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on accounting effects. These factors should be at least partially mitigated by our 
inclusion of control variables. To incorporate our controls we first estimate a 
regression of the change in annual net income scaled by total assets (Lang et al, 
2006). We then use the residuals from underlying regression to compute our measure 
of earnings variability. Accordingly, variability of     is the variance of the 
residuals from the regression of the change in earnings scaled by total assets 
[          ]. Hence, following Lang et al (2006) and Barth et al (2008), our 
regression model on earnings variability is as follows: 
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Where,  
i = 1, …,     ; 
g = L (Large), M (Medium), S (Small); 
k = Industry 1, 2, … 10; 
     changes in net income scaled by total asset; 
      the natural logarithm of end of year value of equity; 
𝐺       percentage change in sales; 
𝐿    end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value; 
        percentage change in total liabilities; 
      sales divided by end of year total assets; 
    annual net cash flow from operating activities divided by end of year total 
assets. 
 
Basic intuition is that accruals that lead to smoothness can hide or delay the 
measurement of changes in fundamental performance, which presumably would be 
decision useful, thus, smoothness may not be an indication of greater decision 
usefulness or higher earnings quality (Dechow et al, 2010 pg.361). Hence, we adjust 
economic factors according to prior studies (e.g. Lang et al 2003; Lang et al 2006; 
Barth et al 2008) and use the measure of volatility of change in earnings deflated by 
total assets as the measure of earnings quality. If firms smooth their earnings, the 
volatility of change in earnings is expected to be small. 
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In order to compare the differences in accounting quality between each group 
of companies, following Barth et al (2008), we test for the significant differences 
between each group of firms based on the empirical distribution of R-squares from 
the regression. We obtain the empirical distribution of differences for each group of 
companies (i.e. large companies, medium companies and small companies) by 
estimating the above regression using the method of bootstrapping.   
Specifically,  
 We firstly estimate the above equation by splitting observations into 
three groups of companies to fit into the equation.  
 We randomly select (5% of number of each group of companies), with 
replacement, firm-observations from each group of companies and then 
run the value relevance regressions for each group 1,000 times.  
 We will then obtain 1,000 R-squared for each group of firms for 
particular test. In testing the significant difference between each group, 
we take the differences between 1,000 R-squared from each group of 
companies and then use the variance of 1,000 differences to compute 
the z-stat to see whether the difference is greater than zero.  
 
Results of Variability of Earnings 
 
[Table 4.1 Here] 
Descriptive Statistics for all variables 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics relating to each variable used in the 
measure of earnings smoothing. Values below 5
th
 level and above 95
th
 level are 
different from values at other percentiles for all variables. Therefore, we winsorized 
each variable at 95% level in testing the variability of earnings and ratio of 
variability of earnings to variability of cash flows.  
In terms of test variables, large companies and small companies have less 
variance in changes in earnings than medium companies. Especially large 
companies, they have the lowest variances in changes in earnings and changes in 
cash flows. Medium companies are more likely to manage earnings downwards 
compared with previous years.  
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Large and medium companies tend to have more growth than small companies. 
Large companies are more highly levered than medium and small companies. 
Medium and small companies are more likely to issue debts and have higher sales 
turnover than large companies. Cash flows of each group companies are varied.  
 
 
 
[Table 4.2 Here] 
Variability of Earnings 
Table 4.2 presents results of the variability of change in earnings across large 
(public companies), medium and small companies in the observation year. Medium 
companies exhibit the lowest variability of changes in earnings (0.0056) and small 
companies have the highest variability of changes in earnings (0.021). The 
variability of changes in earnings for large companies (0.0073) is in between of 
medium and small companies. Based on the assumption of Barth et al (2008), lower 
variability of changes in earnings is the evidence of earnings smoothing. This 
suggests that medium companies are more likely to smooth their earnings than large 
and small companies. 
 
[Figure 4.1 Here] 
Empirical Distribution of R-squares 
In order to compare the differences in accounting quality between each group 
of companies, we test for the significant differences between each group of firms 
based on the empirical distribution of R-squares from regression. That means, we 
firstly randomly select firm observations for each group of companies, and then fit 
these observations into the variability of changes in earnings model. We then obtain 
the empirical distribution of R-squared by repeating above procedures by 1,000 
times. The distributions of 1,000 R-squared for each group of companies are 
presented in Figure 3. The distribution of medium companies is significantly 
different from large and small companies.  
 
Key Findings from Table 4.2: 
1. Medium companies have lower variability of change in earnings than large 
and small companies.  
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2. The variability of changes in earnings for medium companies is significantly 
different from large and small companies, given the distribution of R-squares 
of medium companies is different from large and small companies  
3. These suggest that accounting quality for large and small companies is quite 
similar, whereas medium companies have different reporting behaviour from 
large and small companies.  
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TABLE 4.1: Summary Statistics Relating to Variables used in Earnings Quality Model Analysis 
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Large Companies 
 
Number Mean Std Deviation Min 1st Percentile 5th Percentile 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 95th Percentile 99th Percentile Max 
Test Variables 
    2,253 0.09* 1.47 -2.75 -0.57 -0.19 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.25 1.03 42.19 
    2,253 0.09* 3.37 -6.94 -0.68 -0.27 -0.05 0.00 0.06 0.31 0.93 158.00 
Control Variables 
     2,128 9.03* 2.27 1.39 3.99 5.82 7.53 8.72 10.27 13.27 15.20 18.29 
𝐺      1,987 2.45* 76.01 -1.27 -0.78 -0.36 -0.06 0.05 0.18 0.76 3.44 3,143.00 
𝐿   2,253 128.10* 2,635.00 -11,358.00 -17.72 -1.49 0.34 1.04 2.60 14.00 306.10 103,022.00 
       2,248 0.53* 7.91 -1.16 -0.88 -0.49 -0.11 0.01 0.20 1.14 4.13 304.70 
     2,039 1.39* 1.44 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.35 1.09 1.93 3.89 6.15 22.33 
   2,253 0.13* 3.02 -2.14 -0.55 -0.20 -0.01 0.05 0.13 0.32 0.73 143.00 
 
Medium Companies 
 
Number Mean Std Deviation Min 1st Percentile 5th Percentile 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 95th Percentile 99th Percentile Max 
Test Variables 
    35,560 -3.21* 612.00 -114,506.00 -0.71 -0.18 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.24 0.99 5,778.00 
    35,560 -3.42* 622.80 -116,338.00 -1.03 -0.40 -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.37 1.29 5,894.00 
Control Variables 
     32,123 8.47* 1.75 0.00 4.23 5.95 7.47 8.28 9.34 11.65 13.57 18.84 
𝐺      30,482 2.33* 197.00 -1,258.00 -0.80 -0.39 -0.06 0.04 0.18 0.69 3.29 31,117.00 
𝐿   35,560 7.29* 5,958.00 -942,675.00 -40.58 -4.84 0.32 1.16 3.06 17.28 118.20 595,936.00 
       35,274 1.72* 99.83 -17.57 -0.97 -0.53 -0.11 0.01 0.20 0.94 4.41 16,632.00 
     31,270 2.66* 51.99 -0.27 0.01 0.05 0.57 1.36 2.26 4.54 8.97 5,479.00 
   35,560 -2.92* 674.10 -126,806.00 -0.64 -0.19 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.38 1.05 3,500.00 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 4.1 (Continued) 
Small Companies 
 
Number Mean Std Deviation Min 1st Percentile 5th Percentile 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 95th Percentile 99th Percentile Max 
Test Variables 
    8,205 0.05* 66.53 -5,809.00 -1.10 -0.29 -0.03 0.01 0.11 0.65 4.21 818.50 
    8,205 -0.06* 66.11 -5,809.00 -1.54 -0.57 -0.11 0.01 0.18 0.87 4.00 765.50 
Control Variables 
     7,124 6.07* 1.48 0.00 1.10 3.30 5.30 6.28 7.16 7.87 8.61 10.73 
𝐺      7,561 1.36* 46.45 -9.32 -0.76 -0.36 -0.06 0.06 0.26 1.34 7.78 3,546.00 
𝐿   8,205 4.68* 74.51 -3,084.00 -33.41 -3.87 0.15 0.70 2.28 15.08 103.80 2,781.00 
       8,122 1.068* 38.57 -19.26 -0.96 -0.60 -0.15 0.03 0.31 1.62 7.22 3,251.00 
     7,691 3.70* 30.15 -0.41 0.02 0.07 1.05 2.01 3.13 6.80 19.01 1,746.00 
   8,205 2.21* 105.30 -198.50 -0.94 -0.31 0.00 0.11 0.29 1.05 4.85 9,232.00 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in models of testing earnings quality. Sample of firms are selected in the observation years of 2009 and 2010 
from FAME database.  
 
Variable Definition: Test Variables:      is the change in earnings, where earnings is scaled by end-of-year total assets;     is the change in cash flow from operations, 
where cash flow is scaled by end-of-year total assets, cash flow from operation is defined as Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items in the observation year + 
Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital;  
Control Variables:      is the natural logarithm of value of equity in millions of dollars as of the end of the year; 𝐺      is the percentage change in sales; 𝐿   is end-of-
year total liabilities divided by end-of-year book value of equity;        is the percentage change in total liabilities;      is sales divided by end-of-year total assets;    is 
the cash flow from operating activities, scaled by end-of-year total assets 
 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies 
are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
 
*, indicates significantly different from other types of companies at 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 4.2: Result of Volatility of Earnings for Large, Medium and Small Companies 
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Large Companies (N=2253) Medium Companies (N=35596) Small Companies (N=8297) 
Variability of     0.0073 0.0056* 0.021 
R-square 0.072 0.116 0.286 
 
This table presents results of regression from     on various control variables. We based the analysis on control variables as defined in Table 4.1. We define variability of 
    as the variance of residuals from a regression of the     on the control variables. We compute the residuals from the regression of each variable on the control variables. 
     is defined in Table 4.1.  
 
Variable Definition: Test Variables:      is the change in earnings, where earnings are scaled by end-of-year total assets;  
Control Variables:      is the natural logarithm of market value of equity in millions of dollars as of the end of the year; 𝐺      is the percentage change in sales; 𝐿   is 
end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-of-year book value of equity;        is the percentage change in total liabilities;      is sales divided by end-of-year total assets; 
   is the cash flow from operating activities, scaled by end-of-year total assets 
 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies 
are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
 
Each sample of companies is winsorized at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile in order to control the influence of outliers. 
 
* indicates significantly different from other types of companies at 5% level (one-tailed). 
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Figure 4.1: The empirical distribution of 1,000 R-squares for each group of 
companies 
 
 
 
This figure presents the empirical distribution of R-square from bootstrapping regression 
model of changes in earnings. 
 
The model of variability of changes in earnings is: 
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 Dependent Variable:      is the change in earnings, where earnings is scaled by 
end-of-year total assets;  
 Control Variables:      is the natural logarithm of market value of equity in 
millions of dollars as of the end of the year; 𝐺      is the percentage change in 
sales; 𝐿   is end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-of-year book value of 
equity;        is the percentage change in total liabilities;      is sales divided by 
end-of-year total assets;    is the cash flow from operating activities, scaled by end-
of-year total assets 
 
The bootstrap procedures are as follows: we firstly randomly select firm observations from 
each group of companies to fit into the model of variability of changes in earnings; the 
sample size is 5% of number of firms from each group of companies. Secondly, we repeat 
above procedure by 1000 times. We then obtain 1000 R-squares for each group of 
companies. The frequency distribution is plotted based on 1000 R-squares. 
 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million 
and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies are those 
have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 
million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
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4.4.4 Variability of Earnings relative to Variability of Cash flows  
Methodology of Variability of Earnings relative to Variability of Cash flows 
According to Dechow (1994 pg.19), who suggests that the proper role of 
accruals in earnings is to smooth the variability of cash flows encounter (such as 
timing and match problems). Therefore, we would expect the volatility of earnings is 
less than volatility of cash flows. But, too little variability of earnings relative to 
volatility of cash flows may be the product of earnings management. 
However, the previous test only presents the level of volatility of earnings 
across three groups of companies. It does not adjust for inherent variability of 
business. It does not distinguish between high/low variability of cash flows. 
Therefore, in this section, we use the ratio of variability of changes in earnings 
to variability of changes in cash flows while adjusting economic factors as in the 
previous earnings quality test. To adjust for the underlying volatility of cash flows, 
we include same control variables as in previous test to mitigate the effect of other 
factors. We estimate following equation similar to the previous model of volatility of 
changes in earnings, but with     as the dependent variable: 
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where, 
i = 1, …,     ; 
g = L (Large), M (Medium), S (Small); 
k = Industry 1, 2, … 10; 
     changes in cash flow scaled by total asset; 
      the natural logarithm of end of year value of equity; 
𝐺       percentage change in sales; 
𝐿    end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value; 
        percentage change in total liabilities; 
      sales divided by end of year total assets; 
    annual net cash flow from operating activities divided by end of year total 
assets. 
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As in the previous measure, we take a two-step approach of first estimating 
separate regressions of change in earnings with the control variables and then 
compare the variance residuals from each regression. Our resulting variable, 
variability of     relative to     is the ratio of the variance of residual from change 
in net income model to the variance of residual from change in cash flows model: 
 
               𝜈      
where, 
    = variance; 
         
∗   residual from regressing         with control variables; 
         
∗ = residual from regressing         with control variables. 
 
The role of accruals component in earnings is to reduce and adjust the 
volatility of cash flows, so as to make earnings better reflect firms’ financial 
performance. For example, Dechow (1994 pg.19) suggests that the proper role of 
accruals in earnings is to smooth the variability of cash flows encounter (such as 
timing and match problems). Therefore, we would expect the volatility of earnings is 
less than volatility of cash flows. 
However, accruals component in earnings mitigates the timing and matching 
problems in cash flows, but in the mean time accruals that lead to smoothness can 
hide or delay the measurement of changes in fundamental performance (Dechow et 
al, 2010). Therefore, based on this, we would expect a certain level of volatility of 
earnings, which is less than volatility of cash flows. However, too little variability of 
earnings relative to variability of cash flows may be the product of earnings 
management. 
 
Result of Variability of Earnings relative to Variability of Cash flows  
 
[Table 4.3 Here] 
Table 4.3 presents the result of volatility of earnings relative volatility of cash 
flows.  
Medium and small companies have higher volatile cash flows (0.018 and 0.050) 
than large companies (0.011). Medium companies have the lowest ratio of variability 
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of changes in earnings over variability of changes in cash flows (0.311). Large 
companies have the highest ratio (0.663). Small companies (0.42) are in between 
large and small companies.  
Based on Dechow (1994), the proper role of accruals in earnings is to smooth 
the variability of cash flows encounter, the variability of the change in earnings 
should be lower than the variability of change in cash flows. Three groups of firms 
have lower volatility of earnings relative to volatility of cash flows.  
However, if the volatility of earnings is too small comparing with volatility of 
cash flows, this may be an indication of earnings management. According to Barth et 
al (2008), firms with more volatile cash flows typically have more volatile earnings. 
Medium companies have more volatile cash flows but less volatile earnings (i.e. the 
lowest ratio of volatility of earnings to volatility of cash flows), suggesting medium 
companies have more incentives to manage earnings by accruals.  
 
Key Findings from Table 4.3: 
1. Accounting quality of medium companies is different from large and small 
companies.  
2. Basically, more volatile cash flows are associated with more volatile earnings, 
large and small companies behave similarly based on this assumption. 
However, medium companies have less volatile earnings but more volatile 
cash flows, suggesting medium companies have incentives to smooth their 
earnings. 
3. Consistent with previous finding, medium companies are more likely to 
smooth their earnings than large and small companies. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Effects of Regulation on AQ (Variability and Loss Recognition) – 1st Measures and Results (4.4) 
 136 
TABLE 4.3: Volatility of Earnings relative to Volatility of Cash Flows across Large, Medium and Small Companies 
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Large Companies (N=2253) Medium Companies (N=35596) Small Companies (N=8297) 
Variability of     0.0073 0.0056 0.021 
R-square 0.072 0.116 0.286 
Variability     0.011 0.018 0.050 
R-square 0.294 0.363 0.419 
Variability of     over     0.663 0.311 0.42 
 
This table presents results of regression from     and     on various control variables. We based the analysis on control variables as defined in Table 4.1. We define 
variability of     (   ) as the variance of residuals from a regression of the     (   ) on the control variables, i.e. Var(       and  Var(𝜈    ); and the variability of     
over     as the ratio of the Variability of     divided by the Variability    . We compute both sets of residuals from a regression of each variable on the control variables. 
     and     are defined in Table 4.1.  
 
Variable Definition: Test Variables:      is the change in earnings, where earnings is scaled by end-of-year total assets; �     is the change in cash flow from operations, 
where cash flow is scaled by end-of-year total assets, cash flow from operation is defined as Net income after interest, tax and extraordinary items in the observation year + 
Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital;  
Control Variables:      is the natural logarithm of market value of equity in millions of dollars as of the end of the year; 𝐺      is the percentage change in sales; 𝐿   is 
end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-of-year book value of equity;        is the percentage change in total liabilities;      is sales divided by end-of-year total assets; 
   is the cash flow from operating activities, scaled by end-of-year total assets 
 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are those have 
turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies 
are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
 
Each sample of companies is winsorized at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile in order to control the influence of outliers. 
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4.5 Second Measure of Accounting Quality and Results 
Previously, we use earnings smoothing as a proxy to measure accounting 
quality. Earnings smoothing measures one aspect of accounting quality, which is a 
general measure that provides evidence on whether earnings management existed or 
not. However, it does not provide specifically why and how earnings are managed. 
Therefore, in this section, we focus on the specific measure of earnings 
management, which provides evidence on whether managers have incentives to 
manage earnings to report small profit rather than small losses. This measure 
examine earnings quality from the aspect of managers’ incentives, which suggests 
that managers have incentives to manage earnings to meet certain target, such as 
avoiding to report losses.  
4.5.1 Target Beating – Distribution of Small Profit and Small Loss 
Researchers have documented a “kink” in the distribution of reported earnings 
around zero: a statistically small number of firms with small losses and a statistically 
large number of firms with small profits (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997). A common interpretation of this discontinuity in the distribution is that firms 
with small losses intentionally manage earnings enough to report a small profit. 
Based on this finding, earnings measures such as small profits and small loss 
avoidance have been identified as an indication of earnings management, as one 
specific dimension of earnings quality.  
Therefore, following Degeorge et al (1999) and Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), we examine the distribution of earnings in terms of small profit and small 
losses in order to compare the accounting behaviours between each group of 
companies. 
4.5.2 Literature on Distribution of Small Profit and Small Loss 
Prior studies have found a discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings 
around zero level: a statistically small number of firms with small losses and a 
statistically large number of firms with small profits (Hayn, 1995; Degeorge, 1996; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). This discontinuity is widely interpreted as evidence 
that firms’ managers manage earnings in order to avoid losses. Specifically, prior 
research interprets the discontinuity as evidence that firms tend to exercise discretion 
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to move from the region of small loss to the region of small profit in the earnings 
distribution. 
Hayn (1995) first introduced the concept of the distribution of reported 
earnings approach to examine whether there is any evidence of earnings 
management. Hayn (1995) plots a histogram illustrating the distribution of the ratio 
of EPS (earnings per share) to price, based on the assumption that a greater than 
expected frequency of firms with small profit relative to firms with small losses 
reflects earnings management. The result of studies of Hayn (1995) has shown that 
there is a concentration of firms just above zero, while there are fewer than expected 
firms with small losses (i.e. just below zero).  
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) construct a statistical test with assumption that 
the cross-sectional distribution of earnings levels should be relatively smooth under 
the null hypothesis of no earnings management. They assume that there will be a 
decreased frequency of observations below the earnings threshold and an increased 
frequency of observations above the earnings threshold, relative to what would be 
expected if the underlying distribution without earnings management were smooth. 
Similarly, Degeorge et al (1999) have documented that meeting or beating an analyst 
forecast is an indication of earnings management based on the discontinuity in the 
distribution of forecast errors: reported earnings less consensus analyst forecasts.  
Following with Hayn (1995), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and Degeorge et 
al (1999), several studies find association between earnings management incentives 
and small profit relative small losses. For example, small positive profits are 
associated with greater incentives for earnings management in the fourth quarter 
(Kerstein and Rai, 2007; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007). The low audit effort will result 
strong association between target beating and greater opportunities for earnings 
management (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). Small positive profits are also 
associated with greater incentives for earnings management because of the 
availability of aggressive revenue recognition techniques (Altamuro, Beatty and 
Weber, 2005). Further, Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003) find association between 
deferred tax expenses and target beating, i.e. that deferred tax expense is useful in 
detecting earnings management to meet benchmarks such as avoiding losses. 
Burgstahler et al (2006) suggest that managers have incentives to avoid losses 
of any magnitude, they only have limited reporting discretion and are consequently 
unable to report profits in the presence of large losses. However, this is argued by the 
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“Big Bath” theory, when companies make losses, managers will find all losses they 
can possibly make and write-off against income to reduce asset in the current year, 
so future periods can show positive net income.  
However, the concentration (discontinuity) around zero earnings has the 
assumption that earnings follow a smooth distribution when earnings management is 
absent. The distribution of earnings without earnings management is unknown in the 
first place. In addition to the research on target beating, some studies have argued 
that there may be other reasons for discontinuities in the earnings distribution. For 
example, Durtschi and Eason (2005, 2009) have shown that discontinuity is 
explained by statistical and sample bias issues related to scaling by price. Beaver, 
McNichols and Nelson (2007) suggest that the discontinuity around zero earnings 
can be interpreted as the effect of asymmetric taxes on the earnings of profit and loss 
rather than opportunistic management. If firms were managing earnings up to avoid 
a loss, discretionary accruals are expected to be higher in the small profit group, 
however, Dechow, Richardson and Tunam (2003) have found that discretionary 
accrual presents no difference in small profit versus small loss firms. 
 
4.5.3 Methodology of Small Profit and Small Loss 
It is difficult to detect the presence or absence of earnings management, since 
earnings that are free of manipulation is not observable (Givoly, Hayn and Katz, 
2010). However, Hayn (1995) has shown that there is a concentration of firms just 
above zero, while there are fewer than expected firms with small losses (i.e. just 
below zero). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) construct a statistical test with 
assumption that the cross-sectional distribution of earnings levels should be 
relatively smooth under the null hypothesis of no earnings management.  
Degeorge et al (1999) present evidence that managers use accounting 
discretion to avoid reporting small losses. Small losses are more likely to lie within 
the bounds of insiders’ reporting discretion. Thus, the incidence of small profits 
relative to small losses indicates the extent to which a set of firms uses accounting 
discretion to avoid losses (Burgstahler et al, 2006). 
In line wih Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al (1999), we 
analyse the distribution of earnings level across different groups of companies as 
well as across industries in this section. The earnings level in the frequency 
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distribution (histogram) is deflated by lagged total assets. In order to obtain the 
distribution of earnings level, there are two important features of the distributional 
tests, which are the choice of the bin width and the test statistic for testing the 
significance of an expected discontinuity.  
According to Wand (1997 pg.59), bin width is the important parameter that 
needs to be specified when constructing a histogram. This is simply the length of the 
subintervals of the real line, sometimes called “bins,” on which the histogram is 
based. Ideally, the bin width should be chosen so that the histogram displays the 
essential structure of the data, without giving too much credence to the data set at 
hand (Wand, 1997 pg.59). 
Based on Degeorge et al (1999), we divide the distribution of earnings level 
into bins based histogram, and then identify the frequency numbers of companies lie 
in the regions of “just above zero earnings” and “just below zero earnings”. The bin 
widths are determined by Scott (1992) into a formula and followed by Degeorge et al 
(1999) in their studies. Hence, following Degeorge et al (1999), we postulate that the 
optimal bin width is a positive function of the variability of data (i.e., inter-quartile 
range) and a negative function of the number of observations: 
 
               
where: 
  = optimal bin width; 
    = interquartile range;  
  = number of observations. 
 
 
Once distribution of earnings level is obtained for each industry across three 
groups of companies, based on the procedures proposed by Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) and Givoly et al (2010), we test for the significance of the difference between 
the actual and theoretical frequency in a bin. We calculate the standardized 
differences for the interval just below zero and the interval just above zero.  
In testing the significance of the expected discontinuity in the empirical 
distributions for three groups of companies across industries, we follow the test 
statistic proposed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) with the expected number of 
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observations equal to an average of the number of observations in the two adjacent 
intervals: 
   
      
 
 
   
          
 
√   (    )       (         )           
 
where: 
      test statistic approximately distributed under a normal distribution; 
    = actual number of observations in the interval; 
    = expected number of observations in the interval; 
    = standard deviation of the difference, calculated as: 
    fraction of observations in the j-th interval. 
 
Under the assumption of no earnings management, the expected number of 
observations in any given interval is equal to the average of the number of 
observations in the two adjacent intervals (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge 
et al, 1999; Givoly et al, 2010). If managers manage earnings to meet the threshold 
or target, we would expect to find a shift of observations (significant difference will 
be presented between actual and expected frequency) from the bins that earnings are 
just below zero to the bins that earnings are just above zero. 
However, Durtschi and Eason (2009) indicate that discontinuity in the earnings 
distribution is affected by deflation, sample selection criteria, differences between of 
characteristics of observations lie in the intervals of “just below zero” and “just 
above zero”. Durtschi and Eason (2005, 2009) also show that the discontinuity is 
explained by statistical and sample bias issues related to scaling by price. Furhter, 
Beaver, McNichols and Nelson (2007) suggest that the discontinuity around zero 
earnings can be interpreted as the effect of asymmetric taxes on the earnings of profit 
and loss rather than opportunistic management. If firms were managing earnings up 
to avoid a loss, discretionary accruals are expected to be higher in the small profit 
group, however, Dechow, Richardson and Tunam (2003) have found that 
discretionary accrual presents no difference in small profit versus small loss firms. 
Again, the intuition of this chapter is to compare the accounting quality 
between each group of companies under current differential reporting framework. 
We do not compare which companies have better accounting quality, but instead we 
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examine whether there is variation in accounting quality between each group of 
companies. By using this measure of accounting quality (small profit and small 
losses), we are able to obtain the distribution of small profit and small losses for each 
group of companies to analyse how differently each group of companies manage 
earnings specifically.  
 
4.5.4 Results of Distribution of Small Profit and Small Loss 
 
[Table 4.4 Here] 
Results of Large Companies  
The first part of Table 4.4 presents the frequency distribution of earnings 
around zero-earnings for large companies, where earnings are defined to intervals 
just above and just below the zero-earnings that correspond to two bin-widths using 
the bin definition based on Degeorge et al (1999) and Givoly et al (2010). Overall, 
the actual frequency of large companies just above and just below the zero 
thresholds is larger than the expected frequency for these intervals. The standardized 
difference between the expected and accrual frequency is positive and significant 
(2.02) for the “just-below” region. This finding suggests there are more large-
companies are likely to report losses than expected. The standardized difference 
between the expected and actual frequency for the “just-above” region is 9.78, which 
is statistically significant at 1% level. The second finding is that there are more than 
expected of public companies reporting small profit. 
Large companies tend to have more companies to report small profit than 
expected in all industries except Primary, given the standardized difference between 
actual and expected frequency for the “just-above” region is positive. The 
differences are not statistically significant in Industry Primary, Manufacturing, 
Utility, and Wholesale, under the null hypothesis according to Degeorge et al (1999) 
would be distributed approximately normal (0,1). This suggests that “just-above” 
intervals as indication of earnings management are not obvious in these four 
industries for large companies.  
More than half of industries for large companies have fewer cases to report 
small loss than expected. Only Primary and Education & Health have significant 
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standardized difference between actual and expected frequency for “just-below” 
region. Primary has more than expected companies to report small loss and 
Education & Health have less than expected companies to report small loss.  
Overall, large companies across different industries have quite similar 
reporting behaviours that more than expected companies report small profit and 
small loss, suggesting that upward earnings management from small loss to small 
profit is not obvious in large companies. However, large companies in Education & 
Health tend to manage earnings upwards that too many companies report small profit 
and too few companies report losses.  
Results of Medium Companies  
Most of medium companies across industries have more (than expected) cases 
reporting small profit and fewer (than expected) cases reporting small loss. The 
standardized differences between actual and expected frequency are significant for 
“just-above” regions in most of industries except Primary and Transport. However, 
the standardized differences between actual and expected frequency in “just-below” 
region are not significant in most of industries except Primary (-2.22), Service (-
1.79), and Education & Health (-1,98). 
Service and Education & Health have too many companies report small profit 
and too few companies report small loss, suggesting medium companies in these 
industries have incentives to manage earnings upwards. Given differences in “just-
below” region are not significant, that concentration in “just-above” intervals as 
indication of earnings management is less obvious in other industries. 
Overall, medium companies have different reporting behaviours from large 
companies. Large companies have more companies report losses, whereas medium 
companies have fewer companies report losses. This finding suggests that medium 
companies have more incentives to manage earnings upwards as there are too many 
companies reporting small profits and too few companies reporting small losses.   
Results of Small Companies  
There are more small-companies reporting profits and fewer small-companies 
reporting losses, given the standardized difference between actual and expected for 
“just-above” and “just below” intervals are positive and negative respectively.  
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The standardized differences between actual and expected frequency are 
positive for “just-above” regions in most of industries except Service (-0.22). The 
underlying differences in “just-above” regions are significant in four industries only, 
which are Manufacturing (1.96), Utility (2.12), Construction (3.31), and Education 
& Health (4.37). The standardized differences between actual and expected 
frequency in “just-below” intervals are negative across most of industries except 
Service (1.51) and Telecom (1.03). However, the differences in “just-below” regions 
are not statistically significant in most of industries except Utility (-2.94) and 
Education & Health (-1.75). Consistent with large and medium companies, that 
Education & Health have too many small-companies report small profit and too few 
small-companies report small loss, suggesting small companies in Education & 
Health have incentives to manage earnings upwards. 
Overall, there are more small-companies reporting profits and fewer small-
companies reporting losses, but the standardized difference in “just-below” region is 
not significant (-1.02). This suggests that upward earnings management is not 
pronounced in small companies, though there is a significant concentration of 
companies in “just-above” intervals (4.99). 
Comparisons between large, medium and small companies 
Under the null hypothesis of Degeorge et al (1999), the standardized difference 
between actual and expected frequency would be distributed approximately normal 
(0,1). Generally, three groups companies have significant concentration of 
companies in “just-above” intervals. However, only medium companies have 
significant fewer companies reporting losses. Large companies have significant more 
companies in “just-below” intervals, suggesting large companies report more 
conservatively. Small companies do not have significant concentration in “just-
below” regions, implying upward earnings management is not pronounced in small 
companies.  
Therefore, consistent with our previous finding, that medium companies have 
different accounting quality from large and small companies. 
 
Key Findings from Table 4.4: 
1. Large companies have significant more companies in “just-below” intervals, 
suggesting large companies report more conservatively.  
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2. Small companies do not have significant concentration in “just-below” 
regions, implying upward earnings management is not pronounced in small 
companies.  
3. However, there are significant fewer medium companies than expected 
reporting losses, implying medium companies have incentives to manage 
earnings upwards to avoid reporting small losses. 
4. There are more companies than expected reporting small profit and fewer 
companies than expected report small losses in Education & Health across 
three groups of companies. 
5. Consistent with previous finding, medium companies are different from large 
and small companies. 
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TABLE 4.4: Frequency Distribution of Earnings around Zero-Earnings 
 
    Large Companies Medium Companies Small Companies 
Industries  Interval 
a 
Actual Expected 
b 
Std Diff 
c 
N Actual Expected Std Diff N Actual Expected Std Diff N 
Primary 
Just above zero 3 3.5 -0.24 
93 
46 39.5 0.84 
675 
21 13 1.64 
168 
Just below zero 12 5 1.97* 12 22.5 -2.22** 5 8.5 -1.19 
Manufacturing 
Just above zero 25 16.5 1.51 
528 
221 172.5 2.82*** 
7493 
44 30 1.96* 
367 
Just below zero 7 5.5 0.48 102 104 -0.16 10 13 -0.76 
Utility 
Just above zero 7 4.5 0.95 
29 
27 17 1.77* 
273 
14 7 2.12** 
37 
Just below zero 0 0.5 -1.02 9 12 -0.80 0 3.5 -2.94*** 
Construction 
Just above zero 15 7.5 1.84* 
127 
93 68.5 2.23** 
1975 
78 46 3.31*** 
1090 
Just below zero 3 7 -1.63 37 38.5 -0.20 17 20 -0.58 
Wholesale 
Just above zero 28 23.5 0.75 
318 
239 168 4.03*** 
6437 
86 71.5 1.36 
1484 
Just below zero 7 9.5 -0.74 76 93.5 -1.59 33 38 -0.71 
Service 
Just above zero 15 4.5 2.94*** 
55 
47 31 2.07** 
1282 
15 16 -0.22 
204 
Just below zero 2 0.5 1.02 16 25.5 -1.79* 6 8 -0.65 
Transport 
Just above zero 22 14 1.71* 
97 
77 63.5 1.33 
1730 
33 23.5 1.51 
320 
Just below zero 5 6 -0.37 36 37 -0.14 13 7 1.51 
Telecom 
Just above zero 15 4.5 3.17*** 
39 
27 16.5 1.85* 
339 
13 9 1.02 
111 
Just below zero 1 2 -0.73 14 9.5 1.06 7 4 1.03 
Other Service 
Just above zero 12 4 2.57** 
37 
123 79 3.68*** 
1087 
32 28.5 0.55 
358 
Just below zero 2 1.5 0.31 52 42 1.20 9 10.5 -0.41 
Education&Health 
Just above zero 105 50 5.12*** 
929 
414 331.5 3.49*** 
14300 
247 170 4.37*** 
4143 
Just below zero 21 33.5 -2.08** 226 263 -1.98** 75 94 -1.75* 
All 
Just above zero 181 73.5 9.78*** 
2252 
765 613.5 4.69*** 
35591 
368 259.5 4.99*** 
8282 
Just below zero 56 43 2.02** 383 445.5 -2.56** 133 147.5 -1.02 
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TABLE 13 (Continued) 
 
*, **, *** represents significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed) 
 
This table presents the frequency distribution of earnings scaled by lagged assets (Earnings/Lagged Total Assets) across 10 industries for large, medium and 
small companies. 
 
a  
Following Degeorge et al. (1999), the optimal bin width for each sample is a positive function of the variability of data (i.e., inter-quartile range) and a 
negative function of the number of observations, the bin width is calculated as            , where IQR is the sample inter-quartile range and N is the 
number of observations.  
 
b 
The expected frequency in the interval is computed as the average of the number of observations in the two adjacent intervals (
          
 
). 
 
c  
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), the standard difference (std diff) is measured as the difference between the actual and expected frequencies in the 
interval concerned, standardized by the standard deviation of this difference. The expected frequency of each interval is assumed to be the mean of the two 
immediately adjacent classes. In other words, if the number of observations in interval j is denoted by   , the probability of an observation occurring in 
interval j denoted by   , and the total number of observations in the sample denoted by N, the standardized difference for interval j is given by: 
 
   
          
 
√   (    )       (         )           
 
 
Large companies are companies that are public quoted companies following with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Medium companies are 
those have turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees, following with UK 
GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 
employees, following with FRESSE. 
 
Chapter 4: Effects of Regulation on AQ (Variability and Loss Recognition) – Conclusion (4.6) 
 148 
4.6 Conclusion  
The current financial reporting system in the UK follows three-tier differential 
reporting framework, that different group of companies follow different sets of 
accounting standards. It is very difficult to analyse efficacy of the differential 
reporting framework because the regulators do not specify the expectation of 
accounting quality and consequences that different groups of companies should 
follow. The variation of accounting quality for each group very much depends on the 
objectives of differential reporting. The purpose of this chapter is to compare the 
accounting quality across different groups of companies under different accounting 
standards, so as to examine whether differential reporting framework has led any 
variation of accounting quality between groups.  
We firstly measure accounting quality by earnings smoothing, which is a 
measure of general earnings management. This measure provides the evidence of 
whether earnings management exists across different groups of companies. We use 
earnings variability (with controls for various economic factors), and the ratio of the 
variability of earnings relative to the variability of cash flows (after adjusting 
economic factors). We find that accounting quality of medium companies is different 
from large and small companies, because the earnings in medium companies are 
smoother than large and small companies. 
Secondly, we measure accounting quality by examining the distribution of 
small profit and small loss, which is a measure of specific earnings management. 
This measure provides the evidence of whether managers have incentives to manage 
earnings to report small profit rather than small losses. We further find that the 
accounting quality of medium companies is different from large and small 
companies. There are more than expected number of medium companies reporting 
profit, and less than expected number of medium companies reporting losses. This 
suggests that medium companies have more incentives to manage earnings to avoid 
reporting losses. As for large and small companies, the upward earnings 
management is not pronounced.  
The results are generally consistent with the finding in previous chapter. Under 
the differential reporting framework, accounting standards do not ensure equal 
accounting quality across different groups of companies. There are more variations 
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in accounting quality for medium companies, whereas large and small companies are 
disciplined. Possible explanations of less variation in accounting quality for large 
and small companies may be that large companies are closely regulated and small 
companies have little opportunities to manage earnings. Medium companies have 
higher level of accruals and the most varied accounting quality. This may be due to 
medium companies are small enough to have possible exemption from regulations 
but big enough to have opportunities to manage earnings. 
As discussed earlier, accounting quality is disciplined by legal forces (effects 
of accounting standards on accounting quality) and market forces. Furthermore, from 
our findings, those large companies have good accounting quality. Large companies 
are closely regulated and disciplined by the market. Therefore, in the next chapter we 
consider the effects of market on accounting quality to further analyse the 
accounting quality across as well as within medium and small companies only. 
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Chapter 5: Effects of Debt-Holders on Accounting Quality 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Overview of previous chapters 
Currently, the IASB and the UK ASB have adopted different financial 
reporting rules for different classes of company. The IASB have IFRS and IFRS for 
SMEs. In the UK, companies follow IFRS, UK GAAP and FRSSE; furthermore, 
some companies are exempted from audit. However, it is difficult to evaluate the 
efficacy of this approach to regulation since the ASB (and IASB) do not specify 
what consequences should follow.  
The objectives of having differential reporting standards include the concern of 
size issues, cost issues, agency issues, and economic importance of companies. 
Further, these concerns also influence the accounting quality.  
Hence, the main objective of previous chapters is to compare the accounting 
quality across different groups of companies under the effects of accounting 
regulations in order to inform future policy and discussion about differential 
reporting.  
In previous chapters, we measure accounting quality by level of accruals 
(CFO/E), earnings smoothing, and distribution of small profit and small losses, in 
order to assess the general earnings management and specific earnings management 
across different groups of companies. We find that public companies have a similar 
accounting quality to small companies. Medium-sized companies have the most 
varied accounting quality within its own group and different reporting behaviour 
compared with public and small companies.  
Possible explanations of less variation in accounting quality for large and small 
companies may be that large companies are closely regulated and small companies 
have little opportunities to manage earnings. Medium companies have higher level 
of accruals and the most varied accounting quality. This may be due to medium 
companies are small enough to have possible exemption from regulations but big 
enough to have opportunities to manage earnings. 
Furthermore, if cost and economic importance were main concerns in 
differential reporting, the accounting quality of small companies would have 
possessed the lowest accounting quality, followed by medium companies and large 
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companies. If size and agency issues were the main objectives in differential 
reporting, the accounting quality of three groups of companies would not have many 
variations. Having the results of medium companies present the most variations in its 
own group and different accounting quality from large and small companies, would 
suggest that regulators are regulating in the dark without knowing what is actually 
happening in the market. That is consistent with finding of Watts and Zimmerman 
(1979) and Young (2003) who suggest that the process of policymaking is the 
process of lobbying and negotiations.  
 
Based on our previous findings, accounting regulations do not ensure 
accounting quality across different regimes of companies. Therefore, in this chapter, 
we consider the impacts of market forces on accounting quality, and compare 
accounting quality across as well as within different regimes of medium and small 
companies only.  
Prior to discussing the main objective of this chapter, the discussions about 
disciplines for different groups of companies are provided in next section. 
 
5.1.2 Disciplines of accounting quality 
There are two forces discipline accounting quality for firms, which are legal 
forces and market forces. Legal forces include accounting standards, auditors and tax 
authorities. Market forces include investors, shareholders, debt-holders, and 
creditors. The discussion about the effects of accounting regulations and the effects 
of market forces are provided below.  
 
5.1.2.1 Effects of Regulations on Accounting Quality 
Accounting standards are firstly emerged in early 1930s in the US because 
companies were trying to manage earnings to report better financial performances 
than it actually was (Business Accounting Basics, 2012). Hence, accounting 
standards are in the position to discipline companies so as to report high quality of 
earnings that could better reflect firms’ financial performance. Studies on association 
between accounting standards and accounting quality have increased significantly. 
The main objective of the IASC and IASB in developing accounting standards is to 
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develop an internationally acceptable set of high quality financial reporting 
standards. In achieving this, the IASC and IASB have issued principles-based 
standards, which remove allowable accounting alternatives and require accounting 
measurements that better reflect a firm’s economic position and performance (IASC, 
1989).  
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) show that accounting standards that limit 
opportunistic discretion result in accounting earnings that are more reflective of a 
firm’s underlying economics and, therefore, are of higher quality. Ball (2001) 
suggests that accounting quality will not be good if the accounting standards are not 
properly enforced. Further, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) suggest that lax enforcement 
of accounting standards can result in limited compliance, thereby limiting 
effectiveness of accounting standards. Reported earnings that better reflect a firm’s 
underlying economics, resulting from either principles-based standards or required 
accounting measurements, can increase accounting quality it provides investors with 
information to aid them in making investment decisions (Barth et al, 2008).  
However, studies suggest that accounting standards have no independent effect 
on accounting quality. For example, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) analyse the 
accounting quality in UK private firms, suggesting that the lower earnings quality in 
private firms does not imply the failure of accounting standards; it is the matter of 
market demand and supply for accounting quality. Further, there is so much 
information around for large companies that investors could access, and accounting 
information only plays small part of role in making decisions. Christensen, Lee, and 
Walker (2008) find that accounting quality improvements in conjunction with the 
application of new standards are dependent on the incentives of those preparing the 
accounts, rather than on whether the new standards are perceived to be of higher 
quality.  
Further, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that based on positive 
accounting theory, firms and market forces could produce an appropriate level of 
information disclosure without the need for accounting regulation. Sunder (2005) 
argues that heavy reliance on standards-based financial reporting, may have led 
accounting to focus narrowly on the objectivity of individual numbers, sacrificing 
fairness of the big picture.  
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5.1.2.2 Market discipline on Accounting Quality 
The market is mainly made of equity markets and debt markets and both 
markets have effects on accounting quality. Investors, equity-holders, and debt-
holders demand good accounting quality. Higher accounting quality improves the 
decision usefulness for investors and debt-holders. Givoly, Hayn and Katz (2010) 
indicate companies will have demand for good accounting quality from the external 
parties (market forces) such as shareholders, investors or debt-holders. Public 
companies and private companies have different market demands. Public companies 
have demands from both equity market and debt market to have good accounting 
quality. Since equities of private companies are not publicly traded in the open 
market, the demand of good accounting quality may come mainly come from the 
debt-holders. This is because Ball Robin and Sadka (2008) suggest debt-holders 
demand higher accounting quality from companies, as financial statements are their 
primary information source about the firm. 
 
Market Discipline for A.Q in Public Companies 
The equities and debts of public companies are publicly traded in the market. 
Further, public companies encounter agency issues. The shareholders, investors and 
debt-holders demand good quality of financial information from public companies. 
Public companies are deemed to have higher market demand for reporting higher 
quality of accounting information because accounting information is the main type 
of information contractually available to public equity holders (Givoly et al, 2010). 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) suggest that higher accounting quality is demanded 
from public companies because public companies face greater deal of legal 
obligations than private companies.  
According to Skinner (1997), who examines whether managers can reduce 
stockholder litigation costs by disclosing adverse earnings news “early”. He finds 
that voluntary disclosures occurred more frequently in quarters that result in 
litigation than in quarters that did not. He suggests that this result occurred because 
managers’ incentives to pre-disclose earnings news increase as the news becomes 
more adverse, presumably because this reduces the cost of resolving litigation that 
inevitably follows in bad news quarters. In addition, consistent with Skinner (1997), 
Givoly et al (2010) confirm the result that public companies have stronger incentives 
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to improve their accounting and disclosure regulations and enhance their financial 
transparency so as to mitigate potential lawsuits and to reduce the cost of their equity 
capital. Therefore, the accounting quality is well disciplined by the market forces for 
public companies. 
 
Debt-holders’ Discipline for A.Q in SMEs 
Since public companies have higher demand and discipline from market to 
report higher quality of accounting information, what kind of demand and discipline 
could small- and medium-sized entities (SMEs) face? SMEs do not suffer the agency 
problems and the market will demand less information from SMEs. However, there 
is a scenario when SMEs seek external financing, the external lenders (such as bank, 
creditors) will require SMEs to disclose more information in order to get financing. 
The major external financing for SMEs is from debt-holders. Debt-holders will 
examine firms’ accounting information by adopting stringent screening standards 
and monitor borrowers. Frankel et al (2011) find that active banks’ monitoring can 
improve accounting quality of borrowing firms. Further, the presence of banks 
suggests they perform some function intermediating between borrowers and savers 
more efficiently than is available via direct exchange in capital markets (Frankel et al 
2011).  
Furthermore, Ball, Robin and Sadka (2008) suggest that debt-holders demand 
more conservative accounting information than investors, because financial 
statements are their primary source of getting information about the firms. LeLand 
and Pyle (1977) suggest financial intermediation such as banks, by screening and 
monitoring borrowers, are able to solve potential moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems caused by the imperfect information between borrowers and lenders. 
Therefore, debt-holders discipline firms’ accounting quality and demand firms to 
have good accounting quality.  
 
5.1.3 Objective of this chapter 
There are two forces discipline accounting quality of firms, which are legal 
forces and market forces. Legal forces include accounting standards, auditors and tax 
authorities. Market forces include investors, shareholders, debt-holders, and 
creditors. Obviously, investors, shareholders, and debt-holders demand good 
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accounting quality. Accountings standards are in the position of disciplining 
companies to report good quality of earnings, but the results from previous chapters, 
large and small companies have similar accounting quality, whereas medium-sized 
companies have the most varied accounting quality within its own group and 
different accounting quality from large and small companies. This suggests that 
accounting regulations do not ensure the same accounting quality across different 
groups of companies, that large and small companies are quite similar. 
Market forces such as investors, equity-holders and debt-holders are in the 
position of expecting firms reporting good quality of accounting information. Large 
companies (public companies) are well disciplined from the market as users of 
accounting information have access to loads of information that is available in the 
market (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). As for private companies, they do not have 
demand from equity holders (because their equities are not publicly traded), but they 
may have demand of reporting good accounting quality from debt-holders. Will 
market discipline result any difference in accounting quality for private companies? 
Public companies are closely regulated and disciplined by the market. 
Furthermore, there are little studies have analysed the effects on accounting quality 
for SMEs. Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to analyse the effects of 
debt-holders’ discipline for accounting quality across as well as within medium-
sized and small companies only. 
 
5.1.4 Structure of Chapter 
Previous literature on debt and accounting quality and factors driven 
accounting quality are discussed in the next section 5.2. Hypothesis of this chapter is 
developed in section 5.3. Sample and data are provided section 5.4. First measure of 
accounting quality (earnings conservatism) and results are described in section 5.5. 
Second measure of accounting quality (earnings persistence) and results are 
discussed in the following section 5.6. Discussion of two tests is provided in section 
5.7. Conclusion of this chapter is in the last section 5.7.  
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5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Effects on Accounting Quality 
Givoly et al (2010 pg.195) investigate the accounting quality from two 
different perspectives. One is from market demand, that companies have discipline 
from the market to disclose their financial information, and hence investors 
(shareholder and debt-holders) demand high quality of accounting information from 
companies. The other one is from management incentives, that companies may have 
greater incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain targets or demand. 
Therefore, there are two effects driven the quality of accounting information, one is 
demand effect from market (such as investors, shareholders, and debt-holders) and 
the other one is incentives effect from managers of firms to manage earnings in order 
to meet this demand. They do not conclude that which effect is stronger to drive 
earnings quality high or low, unless weights are assigned to different dimensions of 
earnings quality and attributes.  
Therefore, based on Givoly et al (2010), the demand and incentives effects are 
expected to exist between debt-holders and firms. The discussion of demand and 
incentives are provided below in details. 
5.2.1.1 Demand Effects  
Skinner (1997) indicates that companies have stronger incentives to improve 
their accounting information and disclosure, and enhance their financial transparency 
so as to mitigate potential lawsuits and to reduce the cost of their equity capital. In 
addition, consistent with Skinner (1997), Givoly et al (2010) suggest that investors 
will demand high quality of accounting from firms because accounting information 
is the main type of information contractually available to public equity holders. Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) suggest that the reason why public companies have higher 
accounting quality than private companies is because public companies have more 
market demand to report higher accounting quality than private firms. 
 
Demand effects from debt 
Public companies face demand from their potential investors, equity-holders 
and debt-holders. The equities of private companies are not publicly traded, thus, the 
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demand may come from their debt-holders since the majority of funding resources 
for private companies are from debt-holders (including banks). Ball Robin and 
Sadka (2008) find that debt-holders demand higher accounting quality from 
companies, as financial statements are their primary information source about the 
firm. Frankel et al (2011) find that active banks’ monitoring can improve earnings 
quality. Chen et al (2011) find that bank-financing influence the role of accounting 
quality played in the investment efficiency. Basically, companies with bank 
financing have stronger relation between accounting quality and investment 
efficiency.  
  
5.2.1.2 Incentives Effects  
On the other hand, according to Givoly et al (2010) there is an opportunistic 
incentive for companies to manage earnings to counteract the effects of market 
demand for reporting good accounting quality. Management of public companies is 
facing continuous pressure from investors to meet certain performance thresholds 
(Givoly et al, 2010). For instance, management has incentives to manage earnings to 
meet analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999; Bartov et al. 2002) or to avoid 
reporting losses (e.g., Hayn 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) or earnings 
decreases (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Barth et al. 1999).  
 
Incentives effects from debt 
According to Frankel et al (2011), perhaps, bank access to information can 
deter managers from manipulating accounting information to avoid debt covenants. 
Watts and Zimmerman's (1986) positive accounting theory predicts that firms with 
larger debt loads tend to use income-increasing accounting methods to violate 
restrictive debt covenants (Martin, 2003).  
The market for financial reporting differs substantially between public and 
private companies. Private companies may face pressure from external lenders if 
they seek external financing. Therefore, managers may have incentives to manage 
earnings in order to meet debt-holders’ demand. Managers of private companies may 
have incentives to manage earnings because of the presence of earnings-based 
bonuses as well as to avoid violating earnings-based debt covenants (Givoly et al, 
2010). Kim, Lei and Pevzner (2010) suggest that managers have incentives to 
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employ various methods to avoid violating debt covenant. Sundgren (2007) finds 
that private firms have incentives to use income-increasing methods when they seek 
continuous support from external lenders. 
 
5.2.2 Existence of Debts and Accounting Quality 
Firms vary considerably in terms of fundamental characteristics such as 
ownership structure, external financing and leverage (Isidro and Raonic, 2012). 
Leverage is usually defined by firms’ debt-to-assets ratio. Firms with more debts will 
have higher leverage compared with companies with fewer debts.  
According to Givoly et al (2010), the existence of debts could create demand 
of reporting good quality of accounting information from debt-holders; in the mean 
time, the existence of debts could generate incentives for managers to manage 
earnings in order to meet this demand.  
5.2.2.1 Existence of debts improve accounting quality 
Grossman and Hart (1982) considered debt as an example of a pre-
commitment or bonding device. Debt bonds managers’ act in the interest of 
shareholders because of the desire to avoid bankruptcy, which in turn increases 
market value. They also offer three reasons why self-interested managers have 
incentives to issue debt to increase firm value. First, managers’ salaries are often 
dependent on firm value through incentive schemes. Second, the probability of a 
takeover is low for firms with high market value because acquiring firms have to pay 
more. A third reason is that it is easier to raise capital for managers when firm value 
is high, which increases the opportunities for perquisite consumption (Valipour and 
Moradbeygi, 2011).  
Similarly, Jensen (1986) views debt as a disciplinary instrument. Because 
contractual debt payments absorb free cash flows and reduce internal cash flows 
available for unprofitable investments, managers are unable to invest excess cash in 
negative net present value projects (positive effect of debt). 
Shleirer and Vishny (1997) conduct a survey on corporate governance, which 
deals with agency problems (i.e. the separation of ownership). They find that bank 
finance is a universal method of control that helps investors to get their money back. 
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Further, they suggest that the existence of debt could be an important governance 
mechanism (Shleifer & Visnhy, 1997).  
Frankel et al (2011) find that active banks’ monitoring can improve earnings 
quality. Chen et al (2011) find that bank-financing influence the role of accounting 
quality played in the investment efficiency. 
Ball, Robin and Sadka (2008) study the timely financial statements in both 
debt market and equity market, they find that debt-holders demand high scores of 
timely loss recognition than firms’ investors.  
5.2.2.2 Existence of debts creates incentives to manage earnings 
On the other hand, when the debt is high, due to different conflicts of agency 
between creditors and managers, managers try to interfere a role in the accounting 
reports to reduce the likelihood of violating debt obligations and creditors, resort to 
the contractual agreement which are mostly based on the financial accounting 
department, and this, leads to the expropriation of wealth (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). Furthermore, agreements of creditors like contractual obligations provide 
protection for lender loans and restrictions for the receiver (negative effect of debt) 
(Valipour and Moradbeygi, 2011). 
Sweeney (1994) find that managers of firms approaching default respond with 
income-increasing accounting. Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) argue that specifically, 
debt forces managers to generate cash flows to pay interest and the principal, 
mitigating agency conflicts created by free cash flows. It also increases demand for 
credible financial reporting as a way to monitor debt contracts. The counter-
argument is that excess debt can create incentives to manipulate accounting numbers 
in order to meet debt commitments. 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) examine the earnings management incentives for 
avoiding debt covenant violations. They report that unusually fewer observations of 
covenant slack just below zero and unusually many observations just above zero, 
providing strong evidence that managers use accounting distortion to avoid violating 
covenant thresholds.  
5.2.2.3 Leverage is associated with accounting quality 
Isidro and Raonic (2010) investigate how firms’ reporting incentives and 
institutional factors (taking leverage as one of factors) affect accounting quality in 
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firms from 26 countries. They exploit a unique multi-country setting where firms are 
required to comply with the same set of international reporting standards. They also 
develop an approach of cross-country comparisons allowing for differences between 
firms within a country and investigate the relative importance of country- versus 
firm-specific factors in explaining accounting quality. They find firm-specific 
incentives play a greater role in explaining accounting quality than countrywide 
factors. Furthermore, they find that financial reporting quality is positively 
associated with leverage and increases in the presence of strong monitoring 
mechanisms by external financing needs, leverage and etc.  
However, several studies find that companies with a high leverage tend to 
manage earnings. For instance, Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) review the research 
into the economic consequences of voluntary and mandatory choices of accounting 
techniques and standards. Their empirical tests reveal two systematic associations 
with accounting choice: size, a proxy for political visibility, and leverage, a proxy 
for contracting and monitoring costs of lending agreements. Specifically, firms with 
high leverage tend to adopt income increasing accounting methods. They didn't 
interpret results that leverage is related to contracting and monitoring costs due to 
general limitation of the tests.  
Simpson (1969) find that firms with more conservative accounting information 
have significantly smaller leverage (debt-to-equity ratios) and significantly larger 
sales (as a proxy for size) than similar liberal-method firms. 
In addition, Sundgren (2007) examines whether earnings management is a 
function of leverage with a sample of 99 public companies and 99 private Finnish 
companies. Various earnings management proxies (i.e. discretionary accruals, the 
ratio of small profits to small losses, the variation in earnings in relation to the 
variation in cash flows and the correlation between the change in earnings and the 
change in cash flows are applied in the studies and he finds that that highly leveraged 
companies are more likely to use income increasing accounting methods (manage 
earnings) than companies with a low leverage.  
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5.3 Hypothesis Development 
5.3.1 Demand and Incentives Approach 
Givoly et al (2010) indicate there are two effects affecting the quality of 
accounting information, one is demand effect from market (such as investors, 
shareholders, and debt-holders) and the other one is incentives effect from managers 
of firms to manage earnings in order to meet this demand. 
Financial statements of private companies are not widely distributed to the 
public and they have different ownership, governance, financing, management and 
compensation structures than public companies (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). The 
demand for higher accounting quality is not from their shareholders but from 
external lenders such as bank, long-term loan holders and creditors. Skinner (1997), 
companies improve the accounting information and disclosure and enhance their 
financial transparency so as to mitigate potential lawsuits and to reduce the cost of 
their equity capital. As discussed in literature review section, several studies (Ball et 
al, 2008; Chen et al, 2011; Frankel et al, 2011) find that debt-holders expect higher 
accounting quality from companies, and companies will increase the quality of 
accounting when they have external financing such as from bank.  
SMEs face demand from debt-holders (including banks) to report higher 
quality of accounting information if they seek for external financing. In the mean 
time, SMEs have incentives to manage earnings in order to meet this demand so as 
to obtain or renew the financing contracts with debt-holders (Sweeney, 1994; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Watts and Zimmerman's (1986) positive accounting 
theory predicts that firms with larger debt loads tend to use income-increasing 
accounting methods to violate restrictive debt covenants (Martin, 2003). Managers 
of private companies may have incentives to manage earnings because of the 
presence of earnings-based bonuses as well as to avoid violating earnings-based debt 
covenants (Givoly et al. 2010). Sundgren (2007) finds that private firms have 
incentives to use income-increasing methods when they seek continuous support 
from external lenders. 
In this chapter, based on the demand and incentive approach from Givoly et al 
(2010), we examine the accounting quality for SMEs from two effects, which are (1) 
demand from debt-holders to report better accounting quality (demand effects) and 
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(2) incentives from managers to manage earnings in order to meet the underlying 
demand (incentive effects). Givoly et al (2010) compare accounting quality between 
public and private companies from “investors-managers”10 perspective, while in this 
chapter we examine accounting quality from “lenders-managers” perspective for 
SMEs. The debt-holders of SMEs include banks, long-term loan holders, and 
creditors, who will require SMEs to disclose more financial information in order to 
lend money to SMEs.  
 
5.3.2 Association Between Leverage and Accounting Quality 
Companies with more loans and debts will have higher leverage. This suggests 
that companies with more external financing will have debt-holders acting as police 
to ensure the reliability and quality of accounting information that SMEs report.  
Literature on leverage and accounting quality has mixed findings. Some 
studies suggest that higher leverage firms have higher accounting quality. For 
instance, Chen et al (2011) investigate the role of financial reporting quality in 
private firms from emerging markets, a setting in which extant research suggested 
that accounting quality would be less conducive to the mitigation of investment 
inefficiencies. They find that the relation between accounting quality and investment 
efficiency is increasing in bank financing.  
Gormley et al (2009) examine the impact of changes in the banking sector on 
firms’ timely recognition of economic losses. In particular, they focus on the foreign 
banks entry in India during the 1990s. They find that foreign bank entry is associated 
with more timely loss recognition and this increase is positively related to a firm’s 
subsequent debt levels. They comment that increase in timely loss recognition is 
concentrated among firms more dependent on external financing: private firms, 
smaller firms, and non-group firms.  
Isidro and Raonic (2010) investigate how firm reporting incentives and 
institutional factors (taking leverage as one of factors) affect accounting quality in 
firms from 26 countries. They exploit a unique multi-country setting where firms are 
required to comply with the same set of international reporting standards. They also 
develop an approach of cross-country comparisons allowing for differences between 
                                                        
10 Agency issues which is due to separation of ownership in public companies. 
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firms within a country and investigate the relative importance of country- versus 
firm-specific factors in explaining accounting quality. They find firm-specific 
incentives play a greater role in explaining accounting quality than countrywide 
factors. Furthermore, they find that financial reporting quality is positively 
associated with leverage and increases in the presence of strong monitoring 
mechanisms by external financing needs, leverage and etc.  
However, some other studies suggest that firms with more debts (higher 
leverage) are more likely to manage earnings. For example, Simpson (1969) find that 
firms with more conservative accounting information have significantly smaller 
leverage (debt-to-equity ratios) and significantly larger sales (as a proxy for size) 
than similar liberal-method firms. Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) review the 
research into the economic consequences of voluntary and mandatory choices of 
accounting techniques and standards. They find that firms with high leverage tend to 
adopt income increasing accounting methods. Sundgren (2007) examines whether 
earnings management is a function of leverage with a sample of 99 public companies 
and 99 private Finnish companies. He finds that that highly leveraged companies are 
more likely to use income increasing accounting methods (manage earnings) than 
companies with a low leverage. 
 
5.3.3 Hypothesis of this chapter 
Based on the discussion above, companies with high leverage may possess 
more loans from debt-holders or external lenders who will be the one review 
companies’ financial information in detail so as to ensure the quality of companies’ 
financial information. Hence, companies with more debts from their debt-holders 
such as banks, long-term loan holders and etc. will have higher demand from debt-
holders to report good quality of financial information. 
However, managers of companies with higher leverage may have greater 
incentives to manage earnings (lower the accounting quality) in order to meet the 
underlying demand of debt-holders. When companies need financial support from 
lenders, they face pressure from the external lenders to report better accounting 
quality, which suggests that managers of companies will have incentives to manage 
earnings in order to get the loan or to renew the financial contracts. 
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Leverage is measured by companies’ liabilities (debts/assets), thus, companies 
with more debts have high leverage and companies with fewer debts have low 
leverage. We expect there are differences in accounting quality between companies 
(medium and small companies) with high leverage and companies with low 
leverage. Therefore, based the demand and incentives approach from Givoly et al 
(2010), we propose (which is illustrated in the diagram below): 
1. Firms with high leverage have higher demand from debt-holders to report 
higher accounting quality, comparing with firms with low leverage (Demand 
effects) 
2. Firms with high leverage have more incentives to manage earnings (i.e. lower 
the accounting quality) in order to meet the underlying demands, comparing 
with firms with low leverage (Incentives effects) 
 
 
 
Leverage 
Low High 
Demand 
Effect 
 
Incentives 
Effect 
 
 
We analyse effects of debt-holders on accounting quality for SMEs based on 
the demand and incentives approach between high and low leverage groups. The 
purpose of this is to demonstrate the questions, such as which effect (demand or 
incentives effect) dominates the accounting quality for medium and small 
companies? Will the effect of debt-holders lead to any difference in accounting 
quality between medium-sized and small companies? 
 
 
Low AQ                       High AQ 
       High AQ                Low AQ 
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5.4 Sample and Data 
In this chapter, we examine the effects of debt-holders’ discipline on 
accounting quality for private companies only. 
In order to be consistent with previous chapter, in this chapter, we will use the 
private firm-observations from same dataset in the previous chapters collected from 
FAME database, which include private non-small (medium) companies small 
companies. Under the definition of size of companies from sections 382 and 465 of 
the Companies Act 2006, we select private medium companies with turnover greater 
than £6.5 million and balance sheet worth greater £3.26 million for the years of 
2008-2010, and small companies with annual turnover of £6.5 million or less and 
have an annual balance sheet worth no more than £3.26 million for the years of 
2008-2010. We therefore obtain two groups of companies-observations based on the 
size criteria from Companies Act, medium companies (private medium-sized 
companies) and small companies. 
We exclude companies that are subsidiary as their reporting requirement is 
different. The criterion for subsidiary in FAME is that the minimum path of ultimate 
owner is 50.01%. We also screen out private firms whose legal form is not equal to 
the status of corporations such as legal forms like sole proprietorships or 
partnerships. We exclude banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions 
(SIC codes 6000-6799). We exclude companies that without known value of total 
assets in the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010 in order to mitigate the data errors. We 
also exclude those companies-observations where accounting items include profit, 
turnover, total assets and equity are exactly equal to zero or most likely indicating 
missing data for the years of 2008-2010. 
We winsorize each variable at 95% level (consistent with previous chapters) in 
order to control the effects of outliers. 
We then split each group of companies (medium and small companies) based 
on leverages. We use three definitions of leverage, which includes total liabilities 
over total assets, long-term loan over total assets, and creditors over total assets. 
Taking the median of leverage as benchmark, any firms with values of leverage 
above the median will be considered as high leverage; those firms fall below the 
median will be in the low leverage group. We then divide the each group of firms 
based on high and low leverage.  
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5.4.1 Divide samples based on Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
Total liabilities divided by total assets is a common measure of leverage in 
various studies. Total liability consists of total long-term loan and total current 
liabilities. This definition of leverage shows the percentage of total assets is financed 
through liabilities. If the percentage is higher, that suggests the companies have low 
borrowing capacity and are associated with greater risk. 
If the ratio is less than 0.5, most of the company's assets are financed through 
owners’ capital (equity). If the ratio is greater than 0.5, most of the company's assets 
are financed through debt. Companies with high debt/asset ratios are "highly 
leveraged". The major source of financial funding for SMEs is from banks, which 
means banks will be the one who review companies’ accounts in detail. Since the 
debt-to-ratio is used to measure leverage, we expect there are differences in 
accounting quality between companies with high leverage and companies with low 
leverage. Therefore, we divide samples of medium and small companies based on 
high and low leverage respectively.  
 
5.4.2 Divide samples based on Long-term Loan/Total Assets 
Ratio of Total liability to Total Assets will consist of the effects from the short-
term creditors, suppliers and long-term loan altogether. It represents the financial 
position of the company and the company’s ability to meet all its financial 
requirements.  
The advantage of using this definition is that allows us to examine the 
percentage of company’s assets is financed through long-term loan. Companies 
obtain a number of long-term loans from banks or external lenders to finance their 
business, which suggests that the discipline of accounting quality might come from 
those who issued long-term loan to companies. Lower percentage indicates 
companies are less dependent on debts for their business needs. Therefore, we would 
expect different accounting quality between high and low leverage groups. 
 
5.4.3 Divide samples based on Creditors/Total Assets 
Ratio of Creditors over Total Assets shows the percentage of total assets is 
financed through creditors. Some private companies may not have loans at all, so the 
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majority of their liabilities are from creditors. The discipline might come from 
creditors. Therefore, we use creditors over total assets as measure of leverage. 
This definition of leverage captures the effects of creditors on accounting 
quality for SMEs. We would expect there are differences in accounting quality 
between high creditors/assets ratio and low creditors/assets ratio for different groups 
of companies.  
Chapter 5: Effects of Debt-Holders on Accounting Quality – Earnings conservatism and Results (5.5) 
 168 
5.5 First Measure of Accounting Quality – Earnings Conservatism 
 
We examine the accounting quality by different accounting quality proxies 
with sufficient data to control for the level of leverage across medium and small 
companies. The first measure of accounting quality is earnings conservatism, which 
measure one aspect of accounting quality. The reason of using this measure is that 
debt-holders value conservatism from contracting companies.  
Watts (2003) indicates that conservatism “arises because it is part of the 
efficient technology employed in the organisation of the firm and its contracts with 
various parties”. He also suggests that conservatism is a mechanism used to address 
the management distortions arising from managers of a firm having an informational 
advantage relative to other parties contracting with the firm. Earnings conservatism 
is used to mitigate agency conflicts for debt-holders (Jayaraman and Shivakumar, 
2013). Zhang (2008) suggests that conservatism improves the effectiveness of debt 
covenants. Ball, Robin and Sadka (2008) study the timely financial statements in 
both debt market and equity market, they find that debt-holders demand high scores 
of timely loss recognition than firms’ investors. 
Therefore, in this chapter, we use conservatism as the first measures of 
accounting quality in order to analyse the effects of debt-holders’ discipline on 
companies’ financial reporting.  
5.5.1 Literature of Conservatism and Debt 
Earnings conservatism in some studies is being addressed as asymmetric 
timeliness and timely loss recognition. Assuming that the degree of asymmetric 
timeliness in a firm’s earnings is controllable by managers, at least in part, and that 
managers rationally respond to demand through their reporting choices, the 
correlation between demand and asymmetric timeliness suggests that asymmetric 
timeliness is decision useful (Dechow et al, 2010).  
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) suggest that financial reports can recognise 
economic income, which encompasses both current-period cash flow and revisions 
to the present value of the expected future cash flows of a firm, either in a deferred 
manner or in a timely manner. Under the deferred approach, the reporting system 
awaits the realisation of cash flows before recognising these as profits or losses in 
the income statement. In contrast, under the timely recognition approach, financial 
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reports incorporate economic gains or losses in the income statement as soon as they 
are incurred, irrespective of when cash is realised. Conservative reporting is the 
approach under which timely recognition approach is more prevalently employed for 
recording economic losses, while the deferred approach is more generally used for 
recording economic gains (Shivakumar, 2013). 
Earnings conservatism may represent high quality earnings. Basu (1997) 
suggests a conditional conservatism, which future bad news is anticipated, whereas 
future good news is not.  Therefore, under current accounting system, the foreseeable 
losses have to be recognised immediately in the accounts, which gives an 
asymmetric relation between earnings and stock returns.  
DeFond (2010) pointed out if debt-holders value earnings conservatism, and 
earnings management is used to avoid covenant violations (e.g., DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002), then debt holders are 
also potentially influenced by earnings management.  
Zhang (2008) documents that more conservative borrowers are more likely to 
violate debt covenants, implying that conservatism improves the effectiveness of 
debt covenants. Nikolaev (2010) hypothesises that, if conservatism is valued by 
lenders for use in debt covenants, then borrowers with more extensive use of 
covenants should exhibit timelier loss recognition in their financial statements. 
Supporting this hypothesis, he documents that reliance on covenants in a sample of 
public debt contracts is positively associated with the degree of timely loss 
recognition. 
Wittenberg and Moerman (2008) provides evidence for an indirect benefit 
from conservatism for debt contracting. She reports that conservative borrowers have 
lower bid–ask spreads in the secondary market for the firm’s syndicated loans, which 
is consistent with lower information asymmetry regarding a borrower. By lowering 
frictions in secondary loan markets, conservatism potentially benefits borrowers, 
both by improving credit availability and by improving the borrowers’ credit terms. 
Beatty et al. (2008) investigate whether lenders’ demand for conservatism is 
accommodated through contractual adjustments to accounting numbers employed in 
the contracts.12 They document that such modifications exist in a sample of 
syndicated loans, but that the modifications are not all-pervasive. They also find that 
the contractual modifications are greater when a firm’s financial reports are 
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conservative, suggesting that contractual modifications alone do not fulfil lenders’ 
demands for conservatism. 
However, the net effect of timely loss recognition on earnings quality is 
unknown because it results in lower persistence during bad news periods than during 
good news periods (Basu, 1997), since both persistence and conservatisms affect the 
decision usefulness of earnings. Therefore, whether timely loss recognition is 
improves earnings quality is still in debate, because timely loss recognition is 
associated with accounting conservatism, which is inconsistent with the persistence 
of earnings. Furthermore, timely loss recognition is measure of earnings quality 
relies strong assumption that accounting setters are producing a high quality earnings 
number and returns are providing an equal representation of timely loss recognition, 
which creating problems in cross-country studies where variation in market 
structures and information flow are significant (Dechow et al, 2010). 
 
5.5.2 Measure of Conservatism 
In measuring earnings conservatism, the model is based on Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) in order to test the contemporaneous relation between accruals 
and cash flows.  
Based on the assumption of Ball and Shivakumar (2005), that accruals 
compensate for cash flows in the calculation of income (timing issues), giving a 
negative relation between the two. The model is as follows: 
      0                            
where 
     = Accruals in year t, standardised by beginning total assets, defined as earnings 
after extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations in period t. 
     = Dummy variable, taking 1 when      is negative, 0 otherwise 
     = Cash flows from operations in year t, standardised by beginning total assets, 
defined as earnings after extraordinary items in period t + Depreciation – Changes in 
Working Capital 
 
According to Ball and Shivakumar (2005), this regression is used to test the 
contemporaneous relations between accruals and cash flows levels. The intuition 
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behind this is that the role of accruals is to mitigate the noise in cash flows; hence, 
they expect negative    and positive    and make no assumption of   .  
In the regression model,     measures the link between cash flows and 
accruals, since the role of accruals is to compensate the timing and matching 
problems of cash flows,  the relation between the accruals and cash flows is expected 
to be negative. (i.e.    is negative).  
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that timely loss recognition mitigates the 
agency problems associated with managers’ investment decisions. Conservative 
reporting is the approach under which timely recognition approach is more 
prevalently employed for recording economic losses (Shivakumar, 2013). Managers 
are expected to report losses under a timely loss recognition approach – that is, 
financial reports incorporate economic losses in the income statement as soon as 
they are incurred, irrespective of when cash is realised. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
make the point that when cash flows are negative, accruals do not compensate so 
much since the losses are impounded, instead, accruals are expected to recognise 
current and future losses in the accounts. This suggests that the relation between cash 
flows and accruals is less negative when cash flows are negative. Therefore,    is 
expected to be incremental positive.  
In the study of Ball and Shivakumar (2005), they compare accounting quality 
between public and private companies with the hypothesis include accruals are used 
to mitigate noises in cash flows which give a negative relationship between accruals 
and cash flows when cash flow is in gain; and private companies are less likely to 
recognize losses as transitory items, which means their asymmetric (negative) 
relationship between accruals and cash flows is lower. In another words, their 
assumption is that companies with lower accounting quality (conservatism) will have 
lower asymmetric relationship between accruals and cash flows, hence they predict 
   is negative and    is positive for public companies (higher accounting quality); 
and offer no prediction about    and predict    is negative for private companies 
(lower accounting quality). 
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5.5.3 Results of Conservatism  
Table 5.1 to Table 5.3 present our results from the following regression for 
medium and small companies, in which accruals are regressed on contemporaneous 
cash flows variables. Each group of companies’ samples is winsorized at 95% level 
in order to control the effects of outliers. This regression is used to test the relations 
between accruals and cash flows levels.  
      0                            
 
Descriptive Statistics 
[Table 5.1 Here] 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the measure of 
earnings conservatism. Values below 5
th
 level and above 95
th
 level are different from 
values at other percentiles for medium and small companies. Therefore, we 
winsorized each variable at 95% level in testing the earnings conservatism.  
Small companies have less variation in all variables than medium companies. 
The level of accruals in small companies is less than that in medium companies. 
However, cash flows in small companies have a positive mean whereas cash flows in 
medium companies have a negative mean. There are extreme values of cash flows 
and accruals in medium companies, which influence the overall results. Therefore, 
we need to winsorize each variable in order to take away the effects of outliers.  
 
Results for Medium Companies 
[Table 5.2 Here] 
Table 5.2 presents the results for medium companies with different quartiles of 
leverage groups based on 95% level of winsorized sample.    is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that this is consistent with accruals compensating 
timing and matching problems in cash flows from earnings (Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005; Dechow, 1994; and Dechow et al., 1998). In general, accruals in medium 
companies in all high leverage groups (Q3 and Q4) have stronger role of mitigating 
noises in cash flows compared to companies with low leverage (Q1 and Q2), 
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because the relation between accruals and cash flows is more negative, given    is 
more negative in high leverage groups than in low leverage groups.  
As for coefficient   , the results are rather mixed. Medium companies present 
positive    in very low leverage group (Q1) and very high leverage group (Q4), and 
negative    for Q2 and Q3. Furthermore, based on the assumption of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), medium companies in high leverage groups (Q3 and Q4) do not 
have more conservative reporting than medium companies in low leverage groups 
(Q1 and Q2), since the positive    in all Q4 is not significant. This is because 
accruals are used to recognise current and future losses when cash flow is negative, 
which lead an incremental positive correlation between accruals and cash flows (   
is expected to be positive). In Q2 and Q3, the negative relation is more pronounced 
when cash flow is negative, given    is negative. This indicates that accruals 
compensate even more and recognise less unrealised losses when cash flows are 
negative.  
Overall, these results suggest that in Q2 and Q3 leverage groups, medium 
companies accrue less unrealised losses and recognise losses in less timelier basis 
when cash flow is negative. Based on the assumption of Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), medium companies in very high leverage group (Q4) and very low leverage 
group (Q1) appear to have higher quality compared with medium companies in 
leverage Q2 and Q3 groups, because    is negative and is not as expected. This does 
not support our hypothesis that companies with higher leverage have higher quality 
of earnings, as external debt-holders demand high accounting quality from 
companies. In this test, debt-holders effects on accounting quality are rather weak.  
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TABLE 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Testing Earnings Conservatism 
 
 Medium Companies Small Companies 
Variables                                   
No. of observations 35,591 35,591 35,591 8,278 8,278 8,278 
Mean -0.06 -2.90 -3.75 -0.01 2.72 -0.11 
Std Deviation 23.56 673.80 672.60 6.59 108.10 2.51 
Min -1,452.00 -126,806.00 -126,806.00 -286.20 -198.50 -198.50 
1st Percentile -0.76 -0.65 -0.65 -1.14 -0.96 -0.96 
5th Percentile -0.26 -0.19 -0.19 -0.37 -0.32 -0.32 
25th Percentile -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 
Median -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 
75th Percentile 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.30 0.00 
95th Percentile 0.17 0.39 0.00 0.30 1.16 0.00 
99th Percentile 0.48 1.07 0.00 0.73 5.61 0.00 
Max 3,704.00 3,500.00 0.00 433.50 9,232.00 0.00 
 
*, **, *** represents significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
This table presents the summary statistics for variables used in regression of earnings conservatisms for medium companies and small companies. 
Variable Definitions: Dependent Variables:      = Accruals in year t, standardised by beginning total assets;      is defined as earnings after extraordinary 
items minus cash flows from operations in period t. 
Independent Variables:     = Dummy variable, taking 1 when      is negative, 0 otherwise.      = Cash flows from operations in year t, standardised by 
beginning total assets;       is defined as earnings after extraordinary items in period t + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital. 
 
Medium companies are those have turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 
employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 
million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
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TABLE 5.2: Results of Conservatisms for Medium Companies  
 
      0                            
 
  
Leverage Q1 Leverage Q2 Leverage Q3 Leverage Q4 
 
Predict Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept ( 0) ? 0.00284* (2.18) 0.00749*** (5.84) 0.00432*** (3.47) -0.0239*** (-14.18) 
     (  ) ? 0.0120*** (4.62) 0.0132*** (4.88) 0.0120*** (4.84) 0.0109*** (3.40) 
     (  ) - -0.320*** (-41.54) -0.486*** (-62.89) -0.583*** (-75.68) -0.530*** (-52.23) 
          (   ) + 0.140*** (6.00) -0.0652* (-2.57) -0.0563* (-2.51) 0.00848 (0.34) 
          R-square 
 
24.7% 49.6% 60.8% 46.1% 
No. of Observations 
 
9228 8923 8901 8539 
____________________ 
 
*, **, *** represents significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
This table presents the results from regression of conservatisms for medium companies with different measures of leverages.  
 
Leverage is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of year. Medium companies are divided into groups based on quartiles of leverage ratio. Furthermore, 
the regression is also run based on other types of leverage (long-term loan/total assets; creditors/total assets), results are consistent. 
 
The sample in this table is being wisorized at 95% level. 
 
Variable Definitions: Dependent Variables:      = Accruals in year t, standardised by beginning total assets;      is defined as earnings after extraordinary items minus 
cash flows from operations in period t. 
Independent Variables:     = Dummy variable, taking 1 when      is negative, 0 otherwise.      = Cash flows from operations in year t, standardised by beginning total 
assets;      is defined as earnings after extraordinary items in period t + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital. 
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Results for Small Companies 
[Table 5.3 Here] 
Table 5.3 presents the results for small companies with different quartiles of 
leverage groups based on 95% level of winsorized sample. The coefficient of     , 
  , is significantly negative across all leverage groups, implying that accruals play a 
strong role in compensating the timing and matching problems in cash flows. The 
coefficient of     ,   , is generally more negative in high leverage groups (Q3 and 
Q4) than in low leverage groups (Q1 and Q2), indicating that accruals in high 
leverage groups have stronger role of mitigating noises in cash flows than those in 
low leverage groups. Therefore, the negative relation between accruals and cash 
flows is more pronounced in high-leverage companies than that in low-leverage 
companies.  
However, the coefficient of the interactive variable          ,   , is 
significantly negative across all leverage groups. This implies that accruals in small 
companies over compensate when cash flow is negative. Especially in leverage Q3 
group (-0.163 and -0.437), nearly 60% of cash flows from this group are offset by 
accruals in cash-loss situation. This suggests that companies compensate even more 
cash flows in Q3 than that in other leverage quartile groups.  
Overall, results from small companies indicate that accruals seem to play its 
role to mitigate noises in cash flows when cash flow is positive, but when cash flow 
is negative, small companies may not report conservatively. Generally, high leverage 
groups have more negative relation between accruals and cash flows than low 
leverage groups have. Further, the percentage of over-compensation for cash flows 
through accruals is highest in leverage Q3 group than in other leverage groups. We 
can then interpret that small companies in high leverage groups are not more 
conservative than those in low leverage groups. Again, debt-holders effects on 
accounting quality are weak in small companies.  
From the analysis above, we can comment that the disciplines of debt-holders 
on accounting quality are weak in both medium and small companies. 
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TABLE 5.3: Results of Conservatisms for Small Companies  
 
      0                            
 
  
Leverage Q1 Leverage Q2 Leverage Q3 Leverage Q4 
 
Predict Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept ( 0) ? -0.00427 (-1.34) 0.00184 (0.45) -0.0229*** (-5.13) -0.0614*** (-9.49) 
     (  ) ? 0.0359*** (4.64) 0.0597*** (5.90) 0.0753*** (7.43) 0.0825*** (6.49) 
     (  ) - -0.0821*** (-10.65) -0.145*** (-14.47) -0.163*** (-15.54) -0.0807*** (-6.33) 
          (  ) + -0.214*** (-4.74) -0.378*** (-6.21) -0.437*** (-7.45) -0.166** (-3.20) 
          R-square 
 
15.7% 29.2% 36.6% 19.9% 
No. of Observations 
 
2152 2072 2069 1985 
____________________ 
 
*, **, *** represents significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
This table presents the results from regression of conservatisms for medium companies with different measures of leverages.  
  
Leverage is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of year. Small companies are divided into groups based on quartiles of leverage ratio. Furthermore, the 
regression is also run based on other types of leverage (long-term loan/total assets; creditors/total assets), results are consistent.   
 
The sample in this table is being wisorized at 95% level. 
 
Variable Definitions: Dependent Variables:      = Accruals in year t, standardised by beginning total assets;      is defined as earnings after extraordinary items minus 
cash flows from operations in period t. 
Independent Variables:     = Dummy variable, taking 1 when      is negative, 0 otherwise.      = Cash flows from operations in year t, standardised by beginning total 
assets;       is defined as earnings after extraordinary items in period t + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital. 
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Comparison between Medium and Small Companies  
Overall, according to the assumption from Ball and Shivakumar (2005),    is 
expected to have negative sign to indicate that the role of accruals is to compensate 
cash flows from earnings when there is a gain in cash flows.    is expected to have 
positive sign to indicate the less negative relations between accruals and cash flows, 
implying that accruals should be used to recognise current and unrealised losses 
when cash flows are negative. From the results,    and    in very high leverage 
group and very low leverage group for medium companies are generally consistent 
with the hypothesis of Ball and Shivakumar (2005), while leverage Q2 and Q3 
groups present a negative    (which is not as expected). Medium companies in Q2 
and Q3 leverage groups seem to compensate even more when cash flows are 
negative. Therefore, based on the assumption of Ball and Shivakumar (2005), we can 
comment that accounting quality in high leverage groups is not higher than those in 
low leverage groups in medium companies.  
On the other hand, from the results of small companies,    is negative across 
all leverage groups, which is consistent with the assumption that accruals is to 
mitigate the noises in cash flows so as to give a negative relation between accruals 
and cash flows. However,    is negative across all leverage groups suggesting that 
small companies (even more negative than medium companies) are likely to 
compensate more cash flows through accruals when there is a loss in cash flows.  
Medium companies with very high leverage and low leverage seem to have 
conservative effects on their earnings, whereas medium companies with middle 
range of leverage and all small companies do not have conservative effects on 
earnings based on the assumption of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Generally, the 
disciplining effects of debt-holders on accounting quality are weak, suggesting that 
debt-holders do not play the main role in disciplining accounting quality for medium 
and small companies.  
 
 
  
Chapter 5: Effects of Debt-Holders on Accounting Quality – Earnings conservatism and Results (5.5) 
 179 
Key Findings from Table 5.2 and 5.3: 
1. Medium-very-high-leverage and medium-very-low-leverage firms tend to 
report more conservatively than firms in other leverage groups, implying the 
demand effects of debt-holders on accounting quality are not strong in 
disciplining accounting quality. 
2. Based on Ball and Shivakumar (2005) assumption, small companies are not 
conservative, as they tend to compensate even more when cash flows are 
negative. The effects of debt-holders on small companies are not strong in 
small companies. 
3. Generally, demand effects from debt-holders are not strong in disciplining 
accounting quality for both medium and small companies. 
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5.5.4 Comment about the Results of Conservatism 
Does negative relation between accruals and cash flows when cash flows are 
negative in companies indicate that companies are not recognising losses at a timely 
basis? As shown in the results from small companies’ sample, that    is relatively 
small among all groups (all of them less than -0.163), implying that only a small 
percentage of cash flow is offset by accruals when cash flow is in gain, further, the 
percentage of cash flow being offset has increased significantly when cash flows are 
negative (     ). These results support the business characteristic of private 
companies, that is private companies are not given much credit.  
Based on Ball and Shivakumar (2005), we test the contemporaneous relation 
between accruals and cash flows (the conservatism test). The assumption of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) is that accruals and cash flows are expected to have negative 
correlation (   is expected to be negative in the model) as accruals are used to 
compensate the timing and matching problems of cash flows. When cash flows tend 
to be negative, accruals will be in the position of recognising current losses and 
informing future losses. This will drive the negative correlation between accruals 
and cash flows to be less negative (   is expected to be positive in the model).  
From the results of this test, only medium-very-high-leverage and medium-
very-low-leverage companies (positive   ) meet the expectation of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005). Accruals in other leverage groups of medium companies and 
small companies seem to compensate cash flows even more when cash flows are 
negative (negative    is presented). Especially, small companies in leverage Q3 
group have the most negative   . Does that suggest these groups of companies have 
lower accounting quality?  
Furthermore, Givoly et al (2010) find similar result between public and private 
companies, that public companies have incremental positive relation between 
accruals and cash flows, and private companies have even more negative relation 
between accruals and cash flows. However, they do not interpret results clearly. 
When cash flows are negative (CFO<0), the relation between cash flows 
(CFO) and accruals (ACC) will be influenced by two situations.  
1. When CFO<0, the company is in trouble and ACC does not compensate for 
this sort of cash flow; and indeed the company may make provisions in ACC 
for future losses (e.g. a write down of stock value). Accruals and cash flows 
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will have a less negative relation (positive   ). This is what Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) expected. (B&S effects) 
2. When CFO<0, the company is not doing well or company is too small, stock 
builds up (changes in stock rises). In the mean time, company may find it 
difficult to get working capital finance (debts are more difficult to collect and 
suppliers less willing to give credit for so long). So (changes in debtors – 
changes in creditor) may also rise. This means negative cash flows are 
associated with positive accruals, suggesting accruals and cash flows have 
more negative relation when CFO<0. (Working capital effects) 
Obviously, when CFO<0, both situations will take place. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) assume that the effect of situation (1) is larger than the effect of situation (2). 
However, if the provision has been made earlier, this may not be the case. 
Companies may have recognised the losses prior to CFO<0, that means the first 
situation may dominate the relation between cash flows and accruals, i.e. more 
negative relation between accruals and cash flows (as what we have found for 
medium-low-leverage, small-high-leverage, and small-low-leverage companies).  
 
 
The empirical proof of situation 2 will be provided in the Appendix. That 
suggests when effect of situation (2) dominates (working capital increases), the 
relation between accruals and cash flows will be more negative. When situation (1) 
dominates, accruals are used to recognise the current and future losses (decrease in 
working capital), the relation between accruals and cash flows will be less negative. 
Generally, the assumption of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) only takes account 
of one situation, i.e. accruals are used to recognise current and future losses when 
cash flows are negative. However, this is obscured by accruals rising naturally – the 
situation 2 (when CFO<0, stocks build up, and debts will be more difficult to collect 
and creditors are less willing to provide finance). 
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Therefore, the relationship between accruals and cash flows is illustrated in the 
graph below.  
 
 
 
Based on the above discussion, we can only comment that medium-very-high-
leverage and medium-very-low-leverage companies report conservatively (positive 
  ) according to the assumption of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Medium companies 
in leverage Q2 and Q3 groups, and small companies (negative   ) may not be of 
lower accounting quality because the increase in working capital may dominate the 
situation of recognising losses.  
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5.6 Second Measure of Accounting Quality – Earnings Persistence 
Previously, we measure accounting quality by earnings conservatism as debt-
holders expect firms to report conservatively. However, earnings conservatism only 
measures one aspect of debt-holders’ expectation and accounting quality.  
Debt-holders may also value earnings persistence as they expect firms’ 
earnings to be stable over time. This is because debt-holders are generally risk-
averse. Higher quality of accounting information is that current earnings are more 
informative about firms’ future financial performance. However, managerial 
incentives that are related to debt covenant may affect the earnings persistence in 
financial reporting (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
Therefore, the second measure of accounting quality is based on earnings 
persistence, in order to analyse the impacts of debt-holders’ on companies’ financial 
reporting quality. Earnings persistence measures another aspect of debt-holders’ 
demand and accounting quality. 
 
5.6.1 Literature of Earnings Persistence 
Basically, if earnings are persistent, the level of earnings will be continually 
recurring from accounting to accounting period. Earnings persistence means that the 
sustainability of current earnings. More earnings persistence is the ability to retain 
more profits; also the earnings quality of company is higher (Valipour and 
Moradbeygi, 2011). Generally, when we use reported earnings to help the users to 
take better decisions, then the quality of earnings is better. 
Earnings persistence fits well with the view of earnings forecast. It helps 
investors, since they are typically concerned with permanent performance. Earnings 
persistence captures the smoothness of earnings. Economic performance is quite 
persistent, so earnings should be too. If earnings are more persistent, it will be easier 
to forecast firms’ future earnings with less earnings volatility and less transitory 
components.  
This type of measure are usually adopted for the research of usefulness of 
earnings to equity investors for valuation, higher persistence of earnings will yield 
better inputs to equity valuation models and will be able to generate sustainable cash 
flows in the future, implying high quality of earnings (Dechow et al, 2010). 
Chapter 5: Effects of Debt-Holders on Accounting Quality – Earnings persistence and Results (5.6) 
 184 
Therefore, higher persistence of earnings will produce better inputs to equity 
valuation models and will be able to generate sustainable cash flows in the future 
(cash flows component greater than accruals component), implying high quality of 
earnings. 
Penman and Zhang (2002) define accounting quality as that current year’s 
reported earnings are a good indicator of future earnings. They consider high-quality 
earnings to be “sustainable earnings”. Studies of Richardson et al. (2005) and 
implicitly Sloan (1996) suggest a related dimension of earnings quality is the 
reliability of accruals as captured by earnings persistence. Richardson et al. (2005, 
438) find that “less reliable accruals result in lower earnings persistence.” Therefore, 
the basic idea of earnings persistence is that how informative of firms’ current 
earnings reflect their future performance. 
However, the lower persistence of the accrual component does not imply that 
accruals are not useful. The result simply tells us that when earnings are composed 
predominantly of accruals, they will be less persistent than when earnings are 
composed predominantly of cash flows. Interpreting this result as evidence that 
accruals do not improve earnings quality, however, does not allow accruals to be 
decision useful except through their impact on persistence. Accrual adjustments are 
useful, even though factors such as measurement error, managerial discretion, and 
growth affect their relation to persistence (Dechow et al, 2010).  
Sloan (1996) suggested that lower persistence is the result of accounting 
measurement problems in the system, either because of how it reflects fundamental 
performance or because of the discretion allowed in the accounting system. 
Furthermore, if analysis is based on short-term data, the earnings management could 
be engaged to achieve earnings persistence in the short run, which then lowers the 
power of underlying proxy to measure earnings quality. 
 
5.6.2 Measure of Earnings Persistence 
We test the earnings persistence based on how cash flows and accruals inform 
next years’ earnings. Following Sloan (1996) and Givoly et al (2010), we take cash 
flows and accruals as explanatory variables and next year’s earnings as dependent 
variable. 
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        0                    
where, 
      = Earnings after extraordinary items in period t+1 for firm i, standardised by 
lagged assets 
      = Cash flows from Operation in period t for firm i, standardized by lagged 
assets. It is defined as earnings after extraordinary items in period t + Depreciation – 
Changes in Working Capital 
      = Accruals in year t, standardised by beginning total assets, defined as 
earnings after extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations in period t for 
firm i, standardised by lagged assets. 
 
The intuition of this model is that    is expected to be larger than   , based on 
Sloan (1996) and Givoly (2010). They compare accruals component and cash flows 
component in earnings for earnings persistence test.    is expected to be larger than 
  , based on Sloan (1996), implying cash flows component should be more 
persistent than accruals component. Accruals are used to solve the timing and 
matching problems of cash flows, so would not expect accruals to have any 
permanence, whereas cash flows are related to economic activity. Therefore, cash 
flows are expected to be more persistent about             than accruals. If 
accruals are more informative, it is probably due to earnings management (an 
overestimate of sales in one period needs to be corrected in the next).  
Further, the bigger size of coefficients on accruals and cash flows, the greater 
persistence in earnings. 
Sloan (1996) also expects the accruals component and cash flows component 
do not have much difference. In order to compare these two components, following 
Givoly et al (2010), we use an F-test to test the equality of these coefficients (that is, 
testing whether   =  ).  
According to Givoly et al (2010), this model is subject to endogeneity, because 
cash flows and accruals are correlated, which may affect the overall results. In order 
to mitigate the effects of endogeneity, we use two-stage procedure following 
Heckman (1979): We firstly taking size (measured as total assets), growth in sales, 
leverage (Total Debt/Total Assets), profitability (Earnings/Total assets), and 
Chapter 5: Effects of Debt-Holders on Accounting Quality – Earnings persistence and Results (5.6) 
 186 
operating cycle as predictors of Ei,t+1 in a PROBIT model. Secondly, the estimates of 
PROBIT model are used to compute the inverse Mill ratio for each sample; this ratio 
(LAMBDA) is included in the regression as control variable to capture the effects of 
unobserved factors. Therefore, there are two sets of results, first set is the result 
without controlling endogeneity, and second set is the result after controlling the 
effect of endogeneity. 
In order to be consistent and comparable with the test of conservatism that 
captures the relationship between accruals and cash flows when cash flows are 
negative, we further divide the sample into positive cash flows group and negative 
cash flows group. Givoly et al (2010) also test earnings quality by the same measure 
(earnings persistence), but this paper does not provide clear interpretation between 
positive and negative cash flows. Hope, Thomas and Vyas (2013) test earnings 
persistence based on the conditional conservatism when changes in earnings are 
negative. When changes in earnings are negative, conservatism kicks in, resulting 
earnings to be less persistent than those changes in earnings are positive. This 
suggests that when cash flows are negative, conditional conservatism will result 
earnings to be less persistent than that of positive cash flows.  
For the definition of leverage, we only use total liabilities divided by total 
assets at end of year, because from previous finding, different measures of leverage 
do not give much different results. The differences in results are driven by outliers 
(different levels of winsorizing), hence in this section of test, we winsorize medium 
and small companies’ sample at 95% level (consistent with previous chapter) to 
control the influence of the outliers. This means that, for each group of companies 
(i.e. medium companies and small companies) will have four groups of results, 
positive cash flows with high leverage, positive cash flows with low leverage, 
negative cash flows with high leverage and negative cash flows with low leverage. 
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5.6.3 Result from Earnings Persistence 
Table 5.4 and Table 5.6 below present the results from following regression 
model which test the accrual persistence for medium and small companies.  
        0                    
In this section of test, consistent with previous tests, we winsorize medium and 
small companies’ sample at 95% level to control the influence of the outliers. Each 
group of companies (i.e. medium companies and small companies) has two sets of 
results, which are result without control of endogeneity and result with control of 
endogeneity. Each set of result includes four groups, positive cash flows with high 
leverage, high cash flows with low leverage, negative cash flows with high leverage 
and negative cash flows with low leverage. 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
[Table 5.4 Here] 
Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables in the measure of 
earnings persistence. There are differences in the variables of two samples of 
companies (medium and small companies). Typically, small companies are more 
profitable, have more cash flows and higher accruals. Notably, earnings and cash 
flows in small companies have higher variation than medium companies. However, 
the variation of accruals in small companies is much smaller than that in medium 
companies.  
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TABLE 5.4: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Testing Earnings Persistence 
 
 Medium Companies Small Companies 
Variables                               
No. of observations 35,587 35,587 35,587 8,272 8,272 8,272 
Mean 0.27 0.07 -0.14 2.54 1.34 -0.03 
Std Deviation 21.01 49.47 14.71 128.30 111.40 0.82 
Min -302.00 -5,785.00 -2,769.00 -1,458.00 -1,288.00 -21.56 
1st Percentile -0.50 -0.72 -0.71 -0.85 -1.81 -0.89 
5th Percentile -0.14 -0.20 -0.30 -0.21 -0.45 -0.41 
25th Percentile 0.00 0.00 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 
Median 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.10 -0.01 
75th Percentile 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.28 0.28 0.04 
95th Percentile 0.28 0.40 0.15 1.49 0.95 0.32 
99th Percentile 0.85 0.86 0.43 6.91 2.67 0.70 
Max 3,500.00 7,075.00 51.45 11,038.00 10,000.00 53.00 
 
*, **, *** represents significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
This table presents the summary statistics for variables used in regression of earnings persistence for medium companies and small companies. 
 
Variable Definitions: Dependent Variables:       = earnings after extraordinary items in period t+1 for firm i, standardised by lagged assets. 
Independent Variables:       = Cash flows from Operation in period t for firm i, standardized by lagged assets. It is defined as earnings after extraordinary 
items in period t + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital.       = Accruals in year t, standardised by beginning total assets, defined as earnings after 
extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations in period t for firm i, standardised by lagged assets. 
 
Medium companies are those have turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 
employees, following with UK GAAP. Small companies are those have turnover of not more than £6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 
million and not more than 50 employees, following with FRESSE. 
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Result for Medium Companies 
 
[Table 5.5 and 5.6 Here] 
Overall,     and    in two sets of results (Table 5.5 and 5.6) for medium 
companies are positive and statistically significant. Table 5.5 shows the results 
without control of endogeneity. Table 5.6 presents the results with consideration of 
endogeneity. The inverse mill ratio (LAMBDA) is significant positive (0.053) in 
medium companies high leverage group when cash flows are positive, suggesting the 
appropriateness of controlling for endogeneity in medium high leverage companies 
with positive cash flows. Positive LAMBDA indicates that the unobserved factors 
are positively associated with earnings, implying the unobserved economic factors 
boost medium companies’ earnings in high leverage group when cash flows are 
positive.  
As defined in earlier sections, under the assumption of Sloan (1996),    is 
expected to be larger than   , based on Sloan (1996), implying cash flows 
component should be more persistent than accruals component. Accruals are used to 
solve the timing and matching problems of cash flows, so would not expect accruals 
to have any permanence, whereas cash flows are related to economic activity.  
Further, the bigger size of coefficient on accruals and cash flows, the greater 
persistence in earnings. In order to compare the earnings quality between companies 
in high leverage group and companies in low leverage group, we compare coefficient 
   and    across groups as well as within groups. If companies’ earnings are more 
persistent,    should be larger than   , and the difference of    and    should be 
small. If companies’ earnings in high leverage group are more persistent than low 
leverage group, both    and    in high leverage should be larger than    and    in 
low leverage group.   
When comparing medium companies in high leverage group and low leverage 
group,    is smaller than    in both high and low leverage groups in Panel A 
(positive cash flows) from Table 5.5 and Table 5.6. Further, the differences of    and 
   between high and low leverage group are quite similar. Hence, earnings are 
generally persistent when cash flows are positive, and persistence in high leverage 
and low leverage is quite similar. This suggests, under the effects debt-holders on 
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accounting quality, there is not much difference in accounting quality between high 
and low leverage group for medium companies.   
However, when cash flows are negative (showing in Panel B) from Table 5.5 
and Table 5.6,    and    are both significant, and    is larger than   . Especially in 
low leverage groups when cash flows are negative, accruals component is more 
informative about future earnings in low leverage group than high leverage group for 
medium companies. Further,    and    in low leverage group is larger than in high 
leverage group, suggesting earnings in low leverage group are more persistent in 
high leverage group. 
Medium companies have smaller    for positive cash flows (showing in Panel 
A) and larger    presenting in negative cash flows (showing in Panel B) from both 
Table 5.5 and 5.6 when comparing    with   . This suggests that accruals 
component in negative cash flow are more informative about future earnings than 
that of cash flows component.  
Furthermore, the coefficients on    and    are smaller when cash flows are 
negative comparing than cash flows are positive. This suggests that earnings are less 
persistent when cash flows are negative. 
When cash flows are positive, there is not much difference in persistence. 
When cash flows are negative, earnings are more persistent and accruals are more 
informative about future earnings in low leverage group than that in high leverage 
group. From the results for medium companies, the demand effects of debt-holders 
on their quality of accounting information are not strong.  
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Result for Small Companies 
 
[Table 5.5 and 5.6 Here] 
Overall,     and    in two sets of results (Table 5.5 and 5.6) for small 
companies are statistically significant when cash flows are positive (Panel A). Panel 
B presents insignificant accruals component (-0.005, -0.0971) in high leverage group 
from Table 5.5 and Table 5.6. Table 5.5 shows the results without control of 
endogeneity. Table 5.6 presents the results with consideration of endogeneity. The 
inverse mill ratio (LAMBDA) is significantly negative (-0.1074, -0.054) in small 
companies when cash flows are negative, suggesting the appropriateness of 
controlling for endogeneity in small companies with negative cash flows. Negative 
LAMBDA indicates that the unobserved factors are negatively associated with 
earnings, implying the unobserved factors have negative effects on companies’ 
earnings in when cash flows are negative. This could capture the effect of 
depreciation. 
From the results for small companies in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6,    and    are 
statistically significant when cash flows are positive for small companies.    is 
negative and statistically significant in high leverage group when cash flows are 
negative.    is statistically significant in low leverage group but not significant in 
high leverage when cash flows are negative. In general,    is smaller than    when 
cash flows are positive, which is consistent with the assumption that cash flows 
component should be more persistent than accruals component. However,    is 
greater than    when cash flows are negative. This suggests that accruals are more 
informative about future earnings when cash flows are negative. 
   is smaller than    in both high and low leverage groups in Panel A from 
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, implying that cash flows component are more persistent 
than accruals component. Accruals in high leverage (0.876) and low leverage (0.851) 
groups from Panel A are not very different, suggesting that the effects of debt-
holders are not strong in this test for small companies. In Panel B,    is larger than 
   in both leverage groups, but    in high leverage is not significant. This implies 
that accruals are more informative about future earnings in low leverage group when 
cash flows are negative. However, accruals and cash flows component in low 
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leverage group (0.535, 0.104) are more persistent than in high leverage group (-
0.0971, -0.041) when cash flows are negative. 
Furthermore, the coefficients on    and    are smaller when cash flows are 
negative. This suggests that small companies are less persistent with negative cash 
flows than with positive cash flows.  
When cash flows are positive, persistence between high leverage and low 
leverage is not so different. When cash flows are negative, high leverage group has 
less persistence of earnings than low leverage group. This suggests that demand 
effects from debt-holders are not strong in this test for small companies.  
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TABLE 5.5: Result of Earnings Persistence Without Control of Endogeneity  
 
        0                    
 
Medium Companies Small Companies 
Panel A: 
 Positive Cash Flows Positive Cash Flows 
 
High Leverage group Low Leverage group High Leverage group Low Leverage group 
 
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Intercept ( 0) 0.007*** 5.76 0.016*** 13.32 0.019* 2.20 0.007 1.23 
      (  ) 0.542*** 55.77 0.528*** 65.46 1.231*** 53.09 1.128*** 63.83 
       (  ) 0.369*** 49.03 0.348*** 42.43 0.874*** 28.96 0.923*** 29.29 
R-square 20.50% 23.40% 51.30% 55.60% 
No. of Observations 13054 14077 2728 3313 
         Statistical Test:         
F-test: (     ) 557.24*** 594.98*** 145.55*** 44.71*** 
 
 
Panel B: 
 Negative Cash Flows Negative Cash Flows 
 
High Leverage group Low Leverage group High Leverage group Low Leverage group 
 
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Intercept ( 0) 0.005 1.77 0.008** 3.04 0.061 2.74 0.043*** 3.52 
      (  ) 0.160*** 14.17 0.184*** 13.78 -0.096*** -2.93 0.159** 2.66 
       (  ) 0.284*** 17.19 0.430*** 18.56 -0.005 -0.07 0.471*** 6.95 
(Continued on next page)
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TABLE 5.5 (Continued) 
 
R-square 8.90% 11.70% 24.2% 14.60% 
No. of Observations 4926 3501 1463 741 
 
Statistical Test:         
F-test: (     ) 39.41*** 98.40*** 12.26*** 94.83*** 
_________________ 
 
 
*, **, *** represents significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
This table presents the results from regression of earnings persistence for medium and small companies. The sample in this table is being 
wisorized at 95% level.  
Panel A of this table presents results from regression of earnings persistence based on high and low leverage of medium and small companies 
with positive cash flows.  
Panel B of this presents results from regression of earnings persistence based on high and low leverage of medium and small companies with 
negative cash flows.  
 
Variable Definitions: Dependent Variables:       = earnings after extraordinary items in period t+1 for firm i, standardised by lagged assets. 
Independent Variables:       = Cash flows from Operation in period t for firm i, standardised by lagged assets. It is defined as earnings after 
extraordinary items in period t + Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital.       = Accruals in year t, standardised by beginning total assets, 
defined as earnings after extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations in period t for firm i, standardised by lagged assets. 
 
F-test is used to test the equality of coefficients on        (  ) and        (  ), the hypothesis is that    and    are equal 
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TABLE 5.6: Result of Earnings Persistence With Control of Endogeneity 
 
        0                    
 
Medium Companies Small Companies 
Panel A: 
 Positive Cash Flows Positive Cash Flows 
 
High Leverage group Low Leverage group High Leverage group Low Leverage group 
 
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Intercept ( 0) 0.013*** -4.30 0.014 1.92 0.030** 3.05 0.030*** 3.98 
      (  ) 0.540*** 44.52 0.572*** 55.10 1.219*** 50.32 1.069*** 51.55 
       (  ) 0.367*** 40.05 0.378*** 36.80 0.876*** 28.59 0.851*** 24.14 
LAMBDA 0.053*** 6.81 0.001 -0.04 -0.035*** -4.25 -0.037*** -5.09 
     
R-square 20.50% 23.40% 51.30% 55.60% 
No. of Observations 13054 14077 2728 3313 
         Statistical Test:         
F-test: (     ) 404.79*** 451.82*** 135.18*** 42.50*** 
 
Panel B: 
 Negative Cash Flows Negative Cash Flows 
 
High Leverage group Low Leverage group High Leverage group Low Leverage group 
 
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Intercept ( 0) 0.024 0.90 0.011 0.65 0.458*** 6.75 0.0678** 2.71 
      (  ) 0.193*** 12.92 0.217*** 12.77 -0.041** -2.53 0.104* 2.28 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 5.6 (Continued) 
 
       (  ) 0.282*** 13.79 0.485*** 17.95 -0.0971 -0.62 0.535*** 6.65 
LAMBDA -0.051 -0.89 -0.006 -0.17 -1.074*** -4.02 -0.054* -2.23 
     
R-square 18.90% 11.70% 11.65% 5.58% 
No. of Observations 4926 3501 1463 741 
         Statistical Test:         
F-test: (     ) 12.37*** 87.85*** 4.82** 29.99*** 
 
*, **, *** represents significant at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
This table presents the results from regression of earnings persistence for medium and small companies. The sample in this table is being wisorized at 95% level.  
 
Panel A of this table presents results from regression of earnings persistence based on high and low leverage of medium and small companies with positive cash flows.  
Panel B of this presents results from regression of earnings persistence based on high and low leverage of medium and small companies with negative cash flows.  
 
Variable Definitions: Dependent Variables:       = earnings after extraordinary items in period t+1 for firm i, standardised by lagged assets. 
Independent Variables:       = Cash flows from Operation in period t for firm i, standardised by lagged assets. It is defined as earnings after extraordinary items in period t 
+ Depreciation – Changes in Working Capital.       = Accruals in year t, standardised by beginning total assets, defined as earnings after extraordinary items minus cash 
flows from operations in period t for firm i, standardised by lagged assets. 
 
F-test is used to test the equality of coefficients on        (  ) and        (  ), the hypothesis is that    and    are equal. 
 
In order to mitigate the effects of endogeneity, we use two-stage procedure following Heckman (1979): we firstly taking size (measured s total assets), growth in sales, 
leverage (Total Debt/Total Assets), profitability (Earnings/Total Assets), and operating cycle as preditors of E predictors of companies choice in a PROBIT model. Secondly, 
the estimates of PROBIT model are used to compute the inverse Mill ratio for each sample; this ratio (LAMBDA) is included in the regression as control variable to capture 
the effects of unobserved factors. 
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Comparison between Medium and Small Companies 
When cash flows are positive, small companies have larger cash flows and 
accruals components (1.219 and 0.876 for high leverage; 1.069 and 0.851 for low 
leverage) than medium companies (0.0540 and 0.367 for high leverage; 0.572 and 
0.378 for low leverage). This suggests that small companies have more persistent 
earnings than medium companies. Furthermore, the difference between    and    is 
significantly larger in medium companies than in small companies. These imply that 
earnings are more persistent in small companies than that in medium companies 
when cash flows are positive. However, there is not much difference between high 
leverage and low leverage, suggesting effects of debt-holders are not strong when 
cash flows are positive.  
When cash flows are negative, the results are quite mixed. In high leverage 
group, medium companies have more persistence in cash flows and accruals (0.193 
and 0.282) than small companies (-0.452 and -0.0971). In low leverage group, 
medium companies have better cash flows than small companies (0.217 vs. 0.104), 
whereas small companies have better accruals than medium companies (0.485 vs. 
0.535). Generally, when cash flows are negative, medium companies have better 
persistence than small companies. However, high-leverage companies are associated 
with less persistence in earnings than low-leverage companies. This implies that 
demand effects of debt-holders are not strong as high-leverage companies present 
lower earnings persistence.  
Furthermore, R-square in small companies is larger than that in medium 
companies, implying that higher percentage of future earnings (      ) is explained 
by current year’s cash flows and accruals (       and       ) in small companies 
than in medium companies.  
Therefore, in this test, result is mixed. When cash flows are positive, small 
companies have better persistence in cash flows and accruals, but no difference 
between high leverage and low leverage. When cash flows are negative, medium 
companies seem to have better persistence of earnings in high leverage. But high-
leverage companies have less persistence in earnings than low-leverage companies. 
The effects of debt-holders on accounting quality is not strong as high leverage 
groups do not have better accounting quality than low leverage groups. 
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Key Findings from Table 5.5 and Table 5.6: 
1. Generally, the effects and controls of debt-holders on accounting quality are 
not strong for both medium and small companies, as high-leverage 
companies do not have better accounting quality than low-leverage 
companies. 
2. Lower earnings persistence is associated more with negative cash flows 
rather than positive cash flows. 
3. When cash flows are positive, small companies are more persistent than 
medium companies. 
4. When cash flows are negative, medium companies seem to have better 
persistence of earnings than small companies. As medium-high-leverage 
companies have better persistence of earnings than small-high-leverage 
companies. In low leverage group, the earnings persistence in medium and 
small companies is not so different.  
 
 
Chapter 5: Effects of Debt-Holders on Accounting Quality – Link between two tests (5.7) 
 
 
 
199 
5.7 Discussion of Two Tests 
Link between two tests (conservatism and persistence) 
 According to Ball and Shivakumar (B&S throughout) (2005), when cash 
flows are negative, accruals will not compensate too much on the cash flows, 
instead, accruals are used to recognise current and future losses. This suggests less 
negative relation between accruals and cash flows (positive   ). Our results show 
that only medium-high-leverage companies have B&S effects (as predicted a less 
negative relation when CFO<0), but the others medium-low-leverage, small-high-
leverage, and especially small-low-leverage have even more negative correlation 
between accruals and cash flows when cash flows are negative. These three classes 
of companies seem to use accruals compensate even more when cash flows are 
negative, that is not recognising current and future problems.  
Do results of persistence test give any support to the assumption of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005)? Walker (2013) suggests that if managers have access to more 
timely information about future free cash flows than external investors, they may be 
able to communicate some of this information via their accruals choices. Based on 
the assumption of B&S, when cash flows tend to be negative, accruals are used to 
recognise current and future losses so as to give a less contemporaneous negative 
correlation between accruals and cash flows. When all the losses are recognized at 
current period (t), the      will be improved (i.e. purged of the negative cash flows), 
so if the assumption of B&S holds, this implies that      and      may have 
negative correlation. When accruals are used to recognize current and future losses, 
if the assumption of B&S holds, this implies that      should be more informative 
about     . 
Therefore, if the assumption of B&S is correct, we should expect medium-
high-leverage have more informative accruals about future earnings or more 
negative accruals in earnings than medium-low-leverage, small-high-leverage and 
small-low-leverage companies. However, from the results of persistence test, when 
cash flows are negative, medium-high-leverage firms are not more persistent that 
other groups of companies. Instead, medium-low-leverage and small-low-leverage 
have more informative accruals about future earnings than medium-high-leverage 
companies. There does not seem to be much support of interpretation of B&S.  
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Furthermore, if B&S is correct, accruals are used to recognise future losses 
when cash flows are negative, then accruals with negative cash flows should be as 
informative as accruals with positive cash flows. That means earnings in medium-
high-leverage companies with negative cash flows should be as persistent as 
medium-high-leverage companies with positive cash flows. However, results do not 
support this interpretation of B&S, as earnings in medium-high-leverage companies 
with negative cash flows are less persistent than in medium-high-leverage companies 
with positive cash flows.  
Therefore, the conflict between conservatism (B&S) and persistence might be 
due to a few reasons.  
 For example, the conservatism test from B&S is imprecise as there are other 
reasons that accruals may rise when cash flows are negative. As discussed 
earlier in the comments of B&S test, companies may have provided for future 
losses earlier, not waiting until cash flows to be negative but when cash flows 
are declining. The effects of working capital (situation 2 in the comments of 
B&S) may dominate the effects of accruals of recognising current and future 
losses (situation 1 in the comments of B&S), so as to give an even more 
negative contemporaneous correlation between accruals and cash flows when 
cash flows are negative. 
 On the other hand, the conflict could be due to the limitation of persistence 
test that only deals with next year’s earnings and not further into the future. 
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5.8 Conclusion  
Results from previous chapter suggest that accounting regulations do not 
ensure equalised accounting quality across different groups of companies. Therefore, 
this chapter we examine the effects of debt-holders on accounting quality for 
medium-sized and small companies. The purpose of this is to analyse whether debt-
holders discipline accounting quality despite that accounting standards encounter 
variations in accounting quality across different classes firms. 
We measure accounting quality by earnings conservatism based on Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) and earnings persistence based on Givoly et al (2010). Based on 
the assumption of Ball and Shivakumar (2005), we find that high-leverage 
companies report more conservatively than low-leverage companies. Specifically, 
only medium companies with high leverage conform the assumption of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), while other groups (medium-low-leverage, small-high-leverage 
and small-low-leverage groups) of companies do not satisfy the underlying 
assumption. The effect of debt-holders on accounting quality is strong as firms with 
more debt-holders (high leverage) have stronger discipline on accounting quality. 
Variation exists in accounting quality between medium and small companies.   
From the earnings persistence test, we find that small companies have better 
persistence in cash flows and accruals than medium companies, but no difference 
between high leverage and low leverage when cash flows are positive. When cash 
flows are negative, medium companies seem to have better persistence in cash flows 
and accruals, and high-leverage companies have less persistence in earnings than 
low-leverage companies. The demand and control effects of debt-holders on 
accounting quality is not strong, as high leverage groups do not have better 
accounting quality than low leverage groups. Furthermore, there is variation in 
accounting quality between medium and small companies.  
However, persistence test does not support conservatism test. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) expect accruals to recognise current and future losses to 
correspond the future bad news, otherwise, accruals are not performing the 
conservative roles (not anticipating future losses). In contrast, the results of earnings 
persistence test do not support the assumption of Ball and Shivakumar (2005).  
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If the assumption of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) holds, the persistence test 
should have shed some light on the results. Hence, the conflicting results may 
suggest that conservatism test from Ball and Shivakumar (2005) is imprecise. There 
are other reasons that accruals may rise when cash flows are negative. Companies 
may have provided for future losses earlier, not waiting until cash flows to be 
negative but when cash flows are declining. The effects of working capital may 
dominate the effects of accruals of recognising current and future losses. On the 
other hand, the conflict may be due to the limitation of persistence test that only 
deals with next year’s earnings and not further into the future. 
Generally, results from both tests suggest that effects of debt-holders 
disciplining accounting quality for medium and small companies are not strong. This 
suggests that medium and small companies need accounting standards to discipline 
the accounting quality. This is consistent with the findings of Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), who suggest that accounting standards are mainly for private companies as 
public companies are well disciplined by the market. 
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General Conclusion 
Currently, different sizes of firms in the UK are following different sets of 
accounting standards and different auditing standards. There are different regulations 
for three groups: public companies; medium sized private companies; and small 
private companies. Under the process of developing accounting regulations, 
regulators have not made clear what they expect in terms of accounting quality. Do 
they expect variation of accounting quality across different sizes of firms? Or do 
they expect equally accounting quality across different sizes of firms?  
Due to the lack of expectation from IASB and UK ASB on accounting quality 
across different tiers of companies and the IFRS for SMEs are not yet adopted in the 
UK, the main objective of this PhD thesis is to compare accounting quality across 
existing boundaries, that is we compare the accounting quality between companies 
which are subject to IFRS, UK GAAP, and FRSSE. The purpose of this is to inform 
discussion about the suitability of existing boundaries between groups (public listed, 
medium-sized and small companies). We propose no formal criteria on the desired 
differences between each group of companies.  
The comparisons of accounting quality across different tiers of companies are 
based on two disciplines – the discipline from legal forces (accounting standards) 
and discipline from market (debt-holders). The purpose of this is to examine whether 
there is variation in accounting quality under these two types of discipline for each 
group of companies. 
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we analyse whether the discipline of regulation 
results any variations in accounting quality across different classes of companies 
under differential reporting framework. We measure accounting quality by ratio of 
cash flows to earnings, earnings smoothing and distribution of small profit and small 
loss. We find that financial reporting behaviour of medium sized entities is 
significantly different from public and small companies. Public companies are 
closely regulated and small companies have little opportunities to manage earnings. 
Medium companies are small enough to have possible exemption from regulations 
but big enough to have opportunities to manage earnings. This suggests the 
regulation on medium companies may need to be strengthened. 
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In Chapter 5, we examine whether debt-holders discipline accounting quality 
despite accounting regulations encounter variation in accounting quality across 
different sizes of companies. We measure accounting quality by earnings 
conservatism and earnings persistence, which are widely used in accounting 
research.  
Based on the assumption of Ball and Shivakumar (2005), we find that debt-
holders discipline companies to report more conservatively for medium companies 
when the leverage is very high or very low. Based on the assumption of Givoly et al 
(2010), we find that discipline of debt-holders is not strong in earnings persistence 
test, that low-leverage companies report more persistent earnings than high-leverage 
companies. Small companies have better persistent earnings than medium companies 
when cash flows are positive. When cash flows are negative, medium companies 
have better persistence than small companies.   
Generally, high-leverage companies do not have better accounting quality than 
low-leverage companies. Further, medium companies have different financial 
reporting quality than small companies. Therefore, the demand and control effects of 
debt-holders on accounting quality are not strong in both medium and small 
companies. This suggests that medium and small companies accounting standards to 
discipline their accounting quality. This is consistent with the findings of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), who suggest that accounting standards are mainly for private 
companies as public companies are well disciplined by the market. 
Overall, accounting quality of public companies is disciplined by accounting 
regulations, equity market, and debt market. Accounting quality of private 
companies should be disciplined by accounting regulations and debt-holders. 
However, our results suggest that it is up to regulations to discipline accounting 
quality for medium and small companies because debt-holders do not have strong 
disciplining effects on their accounting quality. Furthermore, our results show that 
under the discipline of accounting regulations, medium companies have the most 
varied earnings and more incentives to manage earnings. Therefore, the regulations 
for private companies need to be further strengthened.   
In the mean time, we raise a few issues concerning the interpretation of the 
accounting quality measurements in regards of earnings conservatism and earnings 
persistence.  The conservatism test from Ball and Shivakumar (2005) is imprecise as 
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there are other reasons that accruals may rise when cash flows are negative. 
Companies may have provided for future losses earlier, not waiting until cash flows 
to be negative but when cash flows are declining. The effects of working capital may 
dominate the effects of accruals of recognising current and future losses. The 
empirical support for this discussion is provided in appendix. On the other hand, the 
conflict could be due to the limitation of persistence test that only deals with next 
year’s earnings and not further into the future. 
Limitation of the studies 
The sample collected from the database of FAME for small companies may 
not represent the whole population of small companies in the UK. Due to 
limited accounting information of small companies available in the public, we 
can only examine those small companies that file balance sheet and income 
statement. However, the main objective of this study is to analyse the effects of 
differential accounting standards on accounting quality for different groups of 
companies. The results of small companies could provide preliminary evidence 
for further research in effects of accounting standards on accounting quality. 
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Appendix 
This appendix provides the empirical proof of contemporaneous correlation between 
accruals and cash flows based on Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998). The purpose of 
this is to raise a few issues concerning the interpretation of the accounting quality 
measurements (earnings conservatism) and provides theoretical and empirical 
support for the discussion. 
 
Assumption from Dechow et al (1998)  
Dechow et al (1998) develop the model of earnings, cash flows and accruals, 
assuming a random walk sales process, variable and fixed costs, and that the only 
accruals are accounts receivable and payable, and inventory. They predict the 
negative correlation between changes in accruals and changes in cash flows.  
 
Model and Assumption of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) (B&S throughout) 
B&S (2005) proposed the model based on the prediction of Dechow et al 
(1998) accruals and cash flows have negative correlation. The role of accruals is to 
compensate the timing and matching problems of cash flows. Furthermore, when 
there is economic loss, accruals are expected to recognise the losses in a timely 
manner. The asymmetry arises because economic losses are more likely to be 
recognized on a timely basis, as unrealized (i.e., non-cash) accrued charges against 
income. Economic gains are more likely to be recognized when realized, and hence 
accounted for on a cash basis. This asymmetry implies that the positive correlation 
between cash flows and accruals arising from the timely recognition is greater in the 
case of losses (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). 
 
The model is as follows:  
      0                            
where 
     = Accruals in year t, standardised by beginning total assets, defined as earnings 
after extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations in period t. 
     = Dummy variable, taking 1 when      is negative, 0 otherwise 
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     = Cash flows from operations in year t, standardised by beginning total assets, 
defined as earnings after extraordinary items in period t + Depreciation – Changes in 
Working Capital 
 
They predict a negative coefficient for cash flows    as in Dechow et al. 
(1998). B&S (2005) make the point that when cash flows are negative, accruals do 
not compensate so much since the losses are impounded, instead, accruals are 
expected to recognise current and future losses in the accounts. This suggests that the 
relation between cash flows and accruals is less negative when cash flows are 
negative. Therefore,    is expected to be incremental positive.  
 
 
Empirical Proof of contemporaneous relation between accruals and cash flows  
 
Situations may arise when cash flows are negative 
Generally there is a negative relation between ACC and CFO as predicted in 
Dechow et al (1998). This is because ACC is compensating for CFO. For example, 
when stock is purchased and paid for, CFO goes down but stock goes up. 
 
When CFO is negative, there will be two situations going on: 
1. B&S’s idea is that when CFO<0 then the company is in trouble and ACC 
does not compensate for this sort of cash flow; and indeed the company may 
make provisions in ACC for future losses (e.g. a write down of stock value). 
This means that ACC and CFO have a less negative relation when CFO<0 
(i.e. for a unit decline in CFO, ACC does not compensate so much). 
2. When CFO<0 the company is not doing well and stock builds up, i.e. ΔStock 
rises. When CFO<0 the company may find it difficult to get working capital 
finance (debts are more difficult to collect and suppliers less willing to give 
credit for so long). So [ΔDebtors - ΔCreditors] may also rise. (Working 
Capital Effect) 
 
The provisions in ACC for future losses may have been made by the company 
prior to CFO<0. This may mean that items under situation (1) above may dominate. 
Obviously, when CFO<0, then both the B&S effect and the increase in working 
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capital effect may take effect. The B&S test assumes that their effect is larger than 
the working capital effect. But if the provision has been made earlier, then this may 
not be the case. 
 
The relation between accruals and cash flows 
      0         
The model of B&S is based on the assumption of slope (  ) in the above equation. 
   is generally expected to be negative, and less negative when cash flows are 
negative. Since the B&S effect is about the slope of the line between accruals and 
cash flows (see equation below), not the goodness of fit. We can see the situation 2 
above more formally. 
 
The slope is    =                         
   
Assuming a random walk sales process, variable and fixed costs, and that the only 
accruals are accounts receivable and payable, and inventory, hence, we have 
variables defined according to the definitions from Dechow et al (1998): 
 
Sales =               (equation 1, pg136) 
Expected long term operating cash cycle, expressed as a fraction of a year =   (top 
of pg138) 
Accruals =   ＝     (equation 14 and 15, pg141) 
Net profit margin =    
Earnings =    =      (middle pg136) 
CFO =         (equation 8, pg138) 
 
                   ＝ {[          ] [         ]} 
=  {[           ] [          ]}  
=  {[           ] [                      ]}  
 
Since    is a random error term, its expectation is 0, E(  ) = 0,  and   is a constant, 
then above equation can write as: 
   {[    ] [                 ]} 
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   {           
   
             } 
   {           
   
              }  (from equation 1, since E(  )=0) 
   {                 
   
 } 
   {           
   
 }  (from equation 1) 
   {   
          
 } 
   {   
         } 
    
            , (since E{  
 } =   
  = the variance of the random term   ). 
 
Therefore: 
                      
             
 
Since    =                         
 , so the same arguments apply: 
 
    
  =  {           }    (this is always positive} 
    {                      }
   
   {                 }
   (since E(  )=0) 
   {                       }
    (from equation1) 
   {                        }
  
   {                        }
  
   {                        }
  
   {                   }
    {      }
        
 
 
 
So the coefficient,     = {  
           }        
                   
 
In order for the coefficient to be negative,      , and as the length of the operating 
cycle gets longer   increases, i.e. the coefficient gets more negative (although the 
increase in the denominator works against this, but see examples below). This is 
much the same argument as in situation 2 above. 
 
Therefore, what we find that the relation between ACC and CFO gets more negative 
when CFO<0 is explained by the empirical proof for situation 2. 
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